Intergenerational dynamics of white residential mobility: School desegregation and avoidance

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Attention reader: This draft is under revision. After refining data and methods, some of the results have changed slightly. Please check with the author before citing or distributing. A new draft will be available in mid to late May, 2015.

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Abstract

Recent attention has focused on whether the racial preferences of parents play an important role in the persistence of residential segregation. This analysis compares families in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968 through 1990 at different stages of child-rearing as they were exposed to local, mandated school desegregation plans. The unpredictable timing of district desegregation forced many families to experience abrupt changes in racial schooling contexts from one year to the next. Logistic regression analyses demonstrate evidence of "parental white flight" in response to desegregation; however, outflow from these districts was high even before desegregation plans were implemented. A stronger policy effect is shown with conditional logistic regressions that analyze the chosen destinations of mobile households. White families with young children were much more likely to avoid moving to districts once mandated desegregation plans were implemented. This identifies the potent force that white parental priorities have had in shaping the segregated residential and educational landscape.

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Racial residential segregation is a prominent feature of U.S. metropolitan areas, and one that has remained persistently high for over a century. As of 2010, nearly 60% of black households would need to relocate in order to achieve integration (Logan and Stults 2011). Once shaped directly by federal policy and widespread discriminatory real estate practices, segregation persists at a high level today due, in part, to the tendency for white households to avoid integrated neighborhoods at disproportionately high rates (Massey and Denton 1993; Quillian 1999, 2002; Ellen 2000b).

Recent attention has focused on whether the decisions of parents play an important role in the persistence of racial and economic segregation (Reardon and Owens 2014; Goyette 2014). Parents may be compelled to pay more attention to local schools or the neighborhood environment in order to manage their children's contextual experiences and opportunities. If parents weigh race more heavily than families without children when considering housing trade-offs, then their decisions about where to live could reinforce or exacerbate prevailing levels of segregation.

To assess parental neighborhood decisions and whether they contribute to racial residential segregation, we must compare how mobility differs between families with and without children. This analysis draws upon micro-level data from 1968 through 1990 to compare families at different stages of child-rearing as they were exposed to local, mandated school desegregation plans. The timing and location of desegregation plans (as well as their

dismissal) has varied substantially across the United States since the initial *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954 (Logan, Oakley, and Stowell 2008). The scale of this variation provides unique leverage to understand how individual families have reacted and adapted to changes in school racial composition from one year to the next. Here, I compare white and black households at various stages of parenting to address the following:

1) Did white households with school-aged children move out of school districts at a higher rate than other households when mandated desegregation plans were implemented where they lived?
2) Does mandated school desegregation impact mobile households' choices of where to live? How does this vary by race and by stage of child-rearing?

These questions engage the claim that school desegregation triggered "white flight," a well-worn topic in the social science literature (Coleman, Kelley, and Moore 1975; Frey 1979; Welch and Light 1987; Logan et al 2008; Baum-Snow and Lutz 2011). Drawing almost exclusively upon aggregated population and school enrollment data, scholarship has converged on the finding that school desegregation led to white enrollment declines and increased between-district segregation, especially in non-southern metropolitan areas where there are high levels of district fragmentation (Clotfelter 2004; Bischoff 2008; Logan, Minca and Adar 2012; Reardon and Owens 2014).

This analysis brings a fresh lens to the school desegregation literature by drawing upon individual rather than aggregated data, and by investigating the distinct behavior of

parents with children who were the largest stakeholders of district policy changes. I show evidence of parental white flight, but residential out-mobility for parents with school-aged children was already occurring before desegregation plans were actively implemented. The phenomenon of white enrollment declines were actually driven less by direct policy non-compliance than by residential circulation and avoidance. That is, mobile white families with young children became much less likely to move into neighborhoods after their affiliated school districts were forced to desegregate. The findings demonstrate that school desegregation served as a "repellant" for white families, and had its strongest effect upon those with children under 5. This adds texture to our understanding of sociological processes undertow in the school desegregation era, but more importantly it isolates the unique contribution of white parental behavior in shaping the segregated school and housing landscape that persists today.

Background

The salience of white neighborhood racial preferences

Residential segregation—highest between white and black households than any other racial pairing—has been the subject of extensive social science research. While there is still evidence of discrimination in real estate and lending practices (Yinger 1998), the bulk of residential segregation since the 1960's is understood to be the outcome of both economic barriers to spatial assimilation and of the racialized sorting patterns of white households in

the housing market (Charles 2003; Krysan, Crowder, and Bader 2014). White households are especially sensitive to changing neighborhood conditions and more likely to move out as black neighbors move in (South and Crowder 1998; Quillian 1999; Crowder 2000). And although the intensity of white racial sorting has declined somewhat over the latest decade, it still occurs at a relatively high frequency (Iceland and Sharp 2013).

On surveys, whites report being less likely to move into neighborhoods with substantial proportions of black or other non-white populations (Farley et al. 1978; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2000, 2003; Krysan 2002). These white preferences persist even after accounting for additional neighborhood features that may be associated with racial composition, such as education, crime, or social class (Emerson, Chai, and Yancey 2001; Krysan, Couper, Farley, and Forman 2009). In contrast, non-white survey respondents report preferences for racially mixed neighborhoods (Charles 2003), but are also likely to avoid all-white neighborhoods for concern about hostility or discrimination (Charles 2006).

Certainly, many whites' "self-segregating" preferences are not guided by explicit racial animus. For some, the racial composition of a neighborhood merely acts as a decision-making heuristic for evaluating neighborhood quality (Clark 1991; Harris 1999) and for predicting future conditions and/or property values (Ellen 2000a). These predictions can be self-fulfilling: Avoidance patterns actually do lower demand in racially integrated neighborhoods, in turn deflating housing values, diminishing local tax revenue, and accelerating neighborhood change (Schelling 1971; Ellen 2000b). In this way, whites enjoy

an advantageous position in the housing market. All else equal, their movement into neighborhoods will contribute positively to local home values and, for homeowners, contribute to wealth appreciation (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Conley 1999). As Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith (1997) describe, the housing market serves as a "laissez-faire" system of institutional racism in which the individualized preferences of white households, irrespective of intention, reproduce segregation and racial stratification at a macro scale (see also: Bonilla-Silva 2010).

Parental residential priorities

This study considers the possibility that residential priorities are different for adults at different phases of the life course, and that local social and educational context is especially important when raising children (Speare 1974; Clark, Deurloo, and Dieleman 1994; Mulder and Hooimeijer 1999). Prior work demonstrates that many parents are particularly attentive to the local peer networks and public spaces that contextualize their children's development (Valentine 1997; Pain 2000; Kimelberg 2014). Thus high-quality schools, well-kept local parks, low-crime rates, and low housing density may take priority for households seeking to raise their children in what they perceive to be safe, stable, and opportunity-laden environments (Rossi 1955). Of course, households without children may also care about these neighborhood features, so a key question is whether the importance of specific housing goods vary for households with versus without children.

If parents indeed place extra priority on local contextual factors when making housing decisions, then they may be inclined to act more strongly on neighborhood *racial* preferences as well. Given findings from the segregation preference literature reviewed above, this would suggest that white parents will be the most likely to sort into mostly- or all-white neighborhoods. At the aggregate level, there is some evidence that supports this suspicion. In U.S. Census and American Community Survey counts since 2000, households with school-aged children are more residentially segregated by race in the than households without children (Iceland, Goyette, Nelson, and Chan 2010; Jargowsky 2014). At the micro-level, analyses of family mobility trajectories have tested whether households with children are more sensitive to racial neighborhood composition changes than households without children. The results are mixed. Harris (1997) and Goyette, Iceland, and Weininger (2014) each found that whites with children are slightly more likely to move out of tracts that experience an increase in black residents, but Crowder (2000) did not find evidence of an effect. Ellen (2000b) analyzed the likelihood of moving into (rather than out of) a racially diverse neighborhood, and found that the negative correlation for white movers was particularly strong for parents of school-aged children.

In addition to neighborhood racial composition, households may consider aspects of their housing decisions that operate at different geographic scales, such as public resources that are organized by broader political and municipal boundaries (Reardon et al 2008). For parents with children under 17 attending school (or who are soon to attend), the local

district and neighborhood schooling conditions could be particularly relevant. Of course, family school preferences cover a range of factors, including academic rigor, proximity, peer composition, safety, and special program offerings (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2005; Pattillo, Delale-O'Connor, and Butts 2014). But several studies have shown that race also plays a critical role in the evaluation of school quality, especially for white households (Schneider and Buckley 2002; Lankford and Wyckoff 2006). One study found that many white families completely exclude high-minority schools when considering enrollment options (Saporito and Lareau 1999). These findings map on to aggregate trends of school segregation, which has persisted at high rates between districts since the 1980s (Reardon, Yun, and Eitle 2000; Logan et al. 2012).

As organizing units, school districts arrange how households select into contexts through their residential choices (Tiebout 1956). Racial preferences are expressed in this way in several metropolitan areas of the North and West, where there are many fractured, racially homogenous districts (Clotfelter 2004; Bischoff 2008). In larger districts that have high levels of within-district racial diversity (often in central cities), white households are more likely to opt for alternative private schooling (Saporito and Sohoni 2007). Indeed, households concerned about school racial composition (or other priorities that are correlated with racial composition) may consider residential and schooling choices jointly: either they can live in a high-cost residential location where public schools are free and attractive, or they can live in an alternative residential location where they pay tuition for private school

(Shapiro 2005). This decision may be moderated by the availability of local attractive public school choices (such as high-performance magnet schools; Archbald 2004) and by whether districts have desegregation plans that attempt to even out the racial distribution across schools. Reardon et al (2012) showed that segregation between schools has increased in districts where former desegregation court orders have been lifted.

Residential sorting behavior

In this study, I evaluate whether white parents are more likely to prioritize racially homogenous schooling contexts when they make housing choices. Although the studies reviewed above demonstrate that whites prefer less racially-diverse neighborhoods than non-whites and that white parents avoid racially integrated schools, the scholarship to date has been unable to verify the extent that observed levels of residential segregation are *driven* by parental racial schooling preferences. Our understanding has been hindered by two methodological challenges (for a comprehensive review of this literature, see: Bruch and Mare [2012]).

The first challenge is that individuals may not be self-aware of their latent racial biases or they may choose to present themselves as "colorblind" so that they align to a socially desirable narrative (Pager and Quillian 2005; Bonilla-Silva 2010). As a result, direct survey and interview questions about racial preference can be unreliable. Social scientists have adopted creative indirect approaches, such as vignette studies (Farley et al. 1978),

factorial surveys (Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2009), video experiments (Krysan et al. 2009), and questions about local neighborhoods in respondents' metropolitan areas (Krysan and Bader 2009). These strategies allow us to detect the neighborhood racial preferences of respondents, but only in an abstract survey context.

The second methodological challenge is that *actual* residential decisions in a live housing market involve a complex bundle of goods, including housing unit features (quality and size) and geographic location (neighborhood; political jurisdiction; proximity to jobs, relatives, amenities, etc.). Moreover, residential choices are constrained by affordability and availability, requiring households to make tradeoffs between competing preferences (Clark, Deurloo, and Dieleman 1994; Mulder and Hooimeijer 1999). As a result, it is difficult to detect how much individual racial preferences weigh into family housing choices. One approach to this challenge has been to study how similar homes in different neighborhoods or jurisdictions are valued in the market (Bogart and Cromwell 1997; Harris 1999). These hedonic analyses capture geographic variation in housing demand, but they are unable to distinguish buyers who are attracted to appreciating home values from those whose decisions are guided more directly by local conditions and amenities (such as parents seeking high quality schools). An alternative approach—which I adopt in this study—is to evaluate the mobility histories of households over time.

Analysis of residential mobility involves two jointly related processes: 1) the decision to move, and 2) conditional on moving, the decision of where to live next.

The decision to move or stay can be understood as a response to disequilibrium between a household's active housing situation and the needs of that household (Coulter and van Ham 2013). A number of household-level changes may prompt disequilibrium, such as childbirth, job loss, marriage, retirement, and so forth. As a result, many individuals move frequently over the life course. In fact, about 35% of individuals change residence at least once every five years, most often switching neighborhoods within the same city or county (Ihrke and Faber 2012).

Changes in the broader residential context (neighborhoods, schools) may also lead to household disequilibrium and trigger residential mobility. Several observational studies of "white flight" discussed above show that white households are more likely to move out as their neighborhood increases in racial diversity (Harris 1997; South and Crowder 1998; Quillian 1999; Crowder 2000; Goyette et al. 2014). But it is less clear whether this pattern is intensified among parents. The analysis to follow will test *Hypothesis 1: White parents exposed to abrupt changes in local school racial composition will be the most likely to relocate (Parental white flight)*.

There are countervailing forces that may weaken the likelihood of parental white flight. First, Crowder and South (2008) showed that mobility decisions are made *relative* to extralocal conditions in nearby neighborhoods and that households may suppress their desire to move if nearby alternative options are unattractive. Thus if avoiding racially integrated schools would require families to move far away to a new, unfamiliar location, they may

decide to stay put and invest resources into private school or acquiesce to the change. Second, households with children tend to be more integrated into the local community, especially once their children are enrolled in school. This increases the social cost of moving, potentially offsetting the disequilibrium caused by changing contexts. These two offsetting effects may therefore weaken the white parental flight predicted by Hypothesis 1.

This study also analyzes where mobile households decide to live. Destination choices are informative because they allow us to observe trade-offs between competing preferences given the various financial, proximity, and supply-side constraints that households face (Bruch and Mare 2012; Quillian 2014). Prior work in the spatial attainment literature has tracked which variables influence the level of quality accessed in a mobile household's destination neighborhood (Alba, Logan, and Stults 2000). A few key studies have also focused on destination choices by race, demonstrating that white households particularly avoid moving into racially integrated neighborhoods (Ellen 2000b; Quillian 2002, 2014). Sampson and Sharkey (2008) showed that structural constraints to residential upgrades lead many poor, non-white households circulating within similar neighborhoods while white households circulate in segregated and more affluent neighborhoods.

Are destination choices distinct among parents? This study considers the likelihood that families with children pay special attention to local school conditions when deciding where to live, predicting *Hypothesis 2: Mobile white households with children are more likely to avoid neighborhoods with racially integrated schools than white households*

without children (Parental selective avoidance). Importantly, a comparison of destination choices for different family types is not hindered by the fact that households with children face higher moving costs. That is because all mobile families have already paid the social and economic cost of deciding to move, so their destination choices will more closely reflect their housing preferences under actual market constraints.

To summarize, this study evaluates the neighborhood exit (flight) and neighborhood choice decisions of households who vary in their child-rearing responsibilities. The key question underlying the analysis is whether white households with young or school-aged children are especially likely to make sorting decisions that avoid racially diverse schools. To do so, I analyze micro-level mobility histories between 1968 and 1990, mapping residential flight and avoidance patterns across school districts during the era of mandated school desegregation. From the late 1960s through the late 1980s, mandated desegregation was implemented district-by-district, year-by-year across the United States. In this era, many neighborhoods experienced a dramatic shift in the racial diversity of local schools. The following section briefly reviews the history and variability of mandated desegregation.

The era of school desegregation

The 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling that separate schools are "inherently unequal" initiated the school desegregation era, but meaningful action based on the decision

did not occur until Civil Rights legislation and subsequent court decisions in the late 1960's gave *Brown* enforceability and direction (Rosenberg 2008). Often required by court order, desegregation plans surged between 1966 and 1976, first across southern states and then later in large northern central-city districts. The timing of these court orders was relatively unpredictable and beyond local influence. But their scope became more salient after the 1971 *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg* Supreme Court ruling, which upheld the constitutionality of district busing programs. By the early 1970's, integration efforts swept from large southern districts to northern cities, where buses shuttled black and white students from racially-segregated neighborhoods to integrated schools.

An important turning point in the desegregation campaign came with the *Milliken v. Bradley* (1974) Supreme Court decision that integration attempts were not required across district boundaries. This effectively allowed suburban districts—often in northern cities where there is greater municipal fragmentation within metropolitan areas—to avoid busing plans in central city districts (Coleman et al. 1975; Reber 2005; Clotfelter 2004; see also: Tiebout 1956). Ultimately, then, the *Milliken v. Bradley* ruling "protected" those white families living in segregated districts from forced integration. Moreover, it made *relocation* a secure strategic option for those families seeking to avoid desegregation in their own district.

There is a growing consensus that although white movement from cities to segregated suburbs was already underway once desegregation plans were implemented (Frey 1979), there was an additional increase of white flight in response to the policy (Reber 2005; Baum-

Snow and Lutz 2011; Boustan 2012). But this must be understood in a broader context. A metropolitan-level study conducted by Logan et al (2008) found that the levels of desegregation achieved between 1970 and 1990 far outweighed between-district segregation, and that many critical factors—such as school district size, spillover between districts, and the prevalence of private schooling alternatives—mediated the intensity of white residential response.[1]

School desegregation policies persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but have since been repealed in many districts (Orfield and Eaton 1996; Reardon et al. 2012). Notably, empirical analyses of the effects of court-ordered desegregation have relied on aggregate population counts that describe net migration flows. Census and school enrollment data is not well suited for assessing nuanced variation in response—such as the question of flight versus avoidance, or the unique sorting decisions of parents. In the following analysis, I address this gap by linking household-level residential histories from 1968 to 1990 onto local school desegregation conditions that varied across time and geography. By analyzing mobility patterns as conditions changed, it is possible for the first time to test for the prevalence of white parental flight and selective avoidance.

Data

Household mobility data

[1] Indeed, the emphasis on white flight may have overlooked important positive impacts of desegregation. Johnson (2011) has shown long-term positive health and economic outcomes for black students who benefited from increased access to educational resources that flowed into desegregated districts.

The primary data in this analysis come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID interviewed a nationally representative sample of 4,800 black and white households in 1968 and has followed up each year from 1969 through 1997 (and every two years thereafter).[2] In each wave, the PSID collected updates on a wide range of individual and household characteristics, including income, age, race, marital status, education, and family composition. The survey also followed children and grandchildren of the original 1968 household sample as they split off to form new households.

In this analysis, I use the term "household" and "family" interchangeably to describe the individual or coupled units who make housing mobility choices. Households are observed over two consecutive years: an origin year (t-1) and a destination year (t). New households are formed when adults age 18+ first leave their parent's residence (or at age 25, whichever is sooner) and when cohabiting/married couples form between origin and destination years; if couples separate, two new households are formed. Parental status is identified as co-residence with biological children and categorized as follows: A) no children, B) eldest child under age 5, C) any children age 5 to17, and D) youngest child age 18 or older. These four child-rearing stages are collapsed into simpler categories as needed in the analysis. In cases where children do not live with either biological parent, they are matched to the household head. [3]

[2] The PSID oversampled a black, urban population; all analyses apply survey probability weights.

[3] This definition of household allows multiple decision-making units to be nested within a single residential location. An alternative approach follows household heads only, but this assumes that adults living in the same home (such as adult children moving in with parents) make uniform residential decisions. This can be

I use the restricted-access file from the PSID that includes the 2010 census tract geocodes of households at the time of each interview wave. Mobility decisions are directly observed by comparing residential locations (census tracts) in the origin year and destination year.[4] Households who do not move have the same tract code across consecutive years. Residential mobility can only be identified once per consecutive-year observation, even if households move multiple times. Moves within the same census tract are also not identifiable.

School district and neighborhood demographic data

This study focuses on household mobility patterns in the context of mandated school desegregation. District desegregation status is drawn from the American Communities Project (ACP), a public legal database of court cases and federal desegregation interventions by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that impacted over 1,000 school districts (Logan et al 2008). The ACP database includes district IDs and information about the timing and type of desegregation plan implemented in each district.

School districts are linked to 2010 census tract codes using GIS software and shapefiles provided by the National Historic Geographic Information System (NHGIS).

problematic because such shared housing choices are actually distinct residential decisions (Steele, Clarke, and Washbrook 2013). Sensitivity tests were conducted using the simpler household head definition; the results in all analyses lead to similar conclusions but are estimated with smaller sample sizes and larger standard errors.

[4] Geocodes are available for every consecutive PSID year from 1968 to 1997, and every two years from 1997 through 2011. However, there are missing geocodes in 1969. I fill in these records as follows: if tract codes are identical in 1968 and 1970, I use the same code for 1969. If they differ, I use the 1970 tract code. This decision assumes that there was only a single move over two years and that the move happened earlier.

Following a similar procedure as described by Baum-Snow and Lutz (2011), I use a U.S. Census Geographic Reference File that crosswalks 1970 census tract and county codes to the IDs of unified and elementary school districts with at least 300 students. The 1970 district boundaries are plausibly unbiased by district boundary changes that were used on occasion to preemptively avoid mandated desegregation (Baum-Snow and Lutz 2011). I use the historic crosswalk to generate contiguous district shape files, which I then spatially join to 2010 census tract centroids. The resulting 2010 tract to 1970 district crosswalk file enables PSID household residence to be linked with the district desegregation status over time identified in the ACP database.

Notably, Johnson (2011) conducted a similar geographic matching procedure between the PSID and the ACP in order to analyze adult attainment outcomes among children exposed to desegregation policy. To my knowledge, no analysis has studied mobility response to mandated desegregation using the PSID.

To capture additional contextual dimensions that impact residential choice, I also link neighborhood tracts to local demographic and economic characteristics using census data compiled in the Geolytics' 2010 Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB). The NCDB harmonizes census tract boundary changes made by the U.S. Census Bureau over time, allowing for longitudinal measurement of variables measured in the decennial 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Census. Tract boundaries were not defined by the Census Bureau in all counties prior to 1990. For continuity, I limit the geographic sample to Core Based Statistical

Areas that had been at least 80% tracted by 1970.[5] Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico are also dropped from the geographic sample. This excludes approximately 23% of the total U.S. tract coverage (as of 1990), most of which is rural. All non-decennial years are filled in with linear interpolation/extrapolation, allowing for a balanced 1968 to 2011 tract-by-year panel.

Methods

Analyzing parental white flight

Hypothesis 1 posits that white parents will be especially sensitive to changes in local school racial composition, leading to residential flight. To analyze parental flight in the context of mandated desegregation, I focus on the subset of white and black PSID households who were living in ever-desegregating districts in any years *prior* to implementation. This captures a portion of the population selecting into their neighborhood and school district before they experienced direct policy and/or legal action.

The timing of desegregation was unpredictable. Many districts experienced multiple court orders before meaningfully implementing plans to redistribute students across districts (Welch and Light 1987); others were held up in courts for idiosyncratic or bureaucratic reasons (Reber 2005; Johnson 2011). In addition, desegregation plans varied widely across contexts, involving actions as drastic as forced busing and as mild as open enrollment policies or the opening of magnet schools that draw from students across all neighborhoods in a

[5] CBSAs are census-defined metropolitan areas including a central city (or cities) and surrounding suburban municipalities that share common work-commute patterns.

district. Due to a limited pre-exposure sample size in the PSID, I reduce this variation into a single definition of "mandated desegregation," which is an analytically useful measure of policy treatment at the national scale. The implementation year of a mandated desegregation treatment is identified in the first year in which any court order or HEW action was implemented within the district. Because the year of implementation varied between districts, not all households were treated in the same year. Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of US metropolitan census tracts that were exposed to mandated desegregation from 1954 to 2009. Even though desegregation began in 1954 with the *Brown v. Board* decision, most neighborhoods were not actually exposed to plans until the period after 1968, which overlaps with PSID data collection. In the era of court order dismissals after 1990, the number of exposed tracts began to decline substantially. As a result, the remainder of the analysis focuses on mobility patterns between 1968 and 1990.

[Figure 1 about here]

Households did not influence the likelihood that they would experience mandated desegregation, but they could leave their district once implementation occurred. Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of white and black households living in school districts exposed to mandated desegregation from 1968 to 1990. Panel A depicts exposure in the South while Panel B depicts exposure in all other regions. Notably, a smaller proportion of white families with children under 15 lived in desegregating districts compared to white childless households and compared to all black households. While this pattern is consistent across U.S.

regions, overall white exposure is higher in the South while black exposure is slightly less frequent. The changing proportions depicted in Figure 2 are the product of a number of factors related to suburbanization (for both black and white households) and aging in place, but prior studies have shown that they also reflect mobility flows out of desegregating districts (Reber 2005; Baum-Snow and Lutz 2011). Less is known about how these patterns vary by parental status.

[Figure 2 about here]

One of the empirical challenges to studying residential flight is that over time, more and more families living in desegregating districts have moved away, even before plan implementation. These moves do not necessarily indicate policy avoidance. Rather, they demonstrate that mobility is an eventuality for most households. The key empirical task is to evaluate whether mandated desegregation accelerated household mobility timelines. To do so, I take advantage of the temporal and geographic variation of mandated desegregation by syncing all households to the relative year in which their own district experienced implementation. If the policy induced residential flight, then the year of implementation (or the years immediately following implementation) should yield a relative increase in the rate of household mobility.

The analysis is formalized in a logistic regression analysis for all households that lived in districts prior to implementation.

$$\log\left[\frac{pr(move)}{pr(stay)}\right] = \alpha + \boldsymbol{\delta D}_{ijt} + \gamma P_{it} + \beta \boldsymbol{H}_{it} + \gamma \boldsymbol{N}_{j} + \eta L_{it} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 expresses, for each household *i* in year *t* living in census tract *j*, the likelihood of moving versus staying. Desegregation exposure by relative year is represented by $\boldsymbol{D}_{ijt}$: a set of indicators for each year prior to implementation (-3, -2, -1) and well as each year at implementation and after (0, +1, +2). While mobility in the years prior to implementation may capture potential anticipation of an impending court order (a lead effect), it may also capture general patterns of mobility during this time period. Thus the analysis also tests an alternative timing bandwidth from -7 years to +3 years. All time-based analyses use the earliest included year as a reference category. The parameter estimate for δ therefore estimates a policy effect of desegregation relative to the observed counterfactual likelihood of mobility at a specified point in the pre-period. The interpretation of results is sensitive to which baseline year is used as the counterfactual for comparison; I discuss this in detail in the Results section.

To address the underlying survival function of mobility, all models include a linear measurement of the number of years that an adult has lived in the home of residence (L_{it})– naturally, this increases by one for each year in which the family has not moved.[6] Additional controls are also included in Equation 1, including a covariate for binary parental status (P_{it}), a vector of household-level covariates ($\boldsymbol{H}_{it}$) that capture householder attributes

[6] Squared and cubic terms did not improve model fit and were dropped.

(homeownership, family income, marital status) and changes between each consecutive year of observation (form new household, purchase home, child born). Finally, neighborhood-level attributes are expressed in the term $\boldsymbol{N}_{ij}$, which includes the percent black and percent homeowner in 1970 (tract-level), the number of tracts per school district in the local CBSA of origin, and indicator variables for the national region of origin. Covariates for the residential flight sample are described in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Equation 1 is modified in order to assess whether households with children were particularly sensitive to mandated desegregation. In Equation 2, an interaction term is included between the desegregation timing indicators ($\boldsymbol{D}_{ijt}$) and the binary indicator of parent (P_{it}). The interaction parameter $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ thus captures the difference in the log odds of moving in response to desegregation (at each relative time point) for parents versus non-parents.

$$\log\left[\frac{pr(move)}{pr(stay)}\right] = \alpha L_{it} + \boldsymbol{\delta D}_{ijt} + \gamma P_{it} + \boldsymbol{\xi D}_{ijt} P_{it} + \boldsymbol{\beta H}_{it} + \gamma \boldsymbol{N}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (2)$$

Equations 1 and 2 are modeled separately for white and for black households. Additional models, discussed further in the Results section, test variations in the definition of desegregation "treatment" and for variation in parental status by child age. Lastly, a multinomial logistic regression (with similar parameters as those used in Equation 2) is used to assess the probability of making three mutually exclusive types of moves relative to

staying: moving between tracts within the same district, moving between districts within the same CBSA, and moving between CBSAs. If the desegregation effect truly captures policy avoidance, the effect should be strongest for moves to alternative districts.

Analyzing selective avoidance

Hypothesis 2 anticipates that white mobile households with children—whether fleeing mandated desegregation or moving for other reasons—may be especially likely to avoid moving into neighborhoods once a desegregation plan is activated. Viewed in this way, mandated desegregation not only treats households living within the district, but it also potentially changes the attractiveness of some neighborhoods in a mobile household's choice set. If white households with children, circulating for any number of reasons, suddenly become less likely to move into a desegregating district, that district will slowly lose more and more white students. Thus selective avoidance may contribute to aggregate-level observations of declining white enrollment.

In this portion of the analysis, all mobile PSID white and black households are analyzed irrespective of where they lived previously. Household residential choices are modeled in a conditional logistic regression framework which estimates the joint influence of household-level and option-level characteristics that influence the likelihood of moving into one neighborhood versus another (McFadden 1978; Bruch and Mare 2012). There are two advantages to using a conditional logit. First, individual choice is contextualized in the

relative array of potential options. Movement in a metropolitan area with fractured school districts, for instance, may provide more options for desegregation avoidance than movement in a city with a single, large school district (Clotfelter 2004). The conditional logit adjusts for this sort of metropolitan-level variation by situating decisions within the personalized set of available options as those options change over time. The second advantage is that multiple neighborhood-level characteristics can be tested for their competing role in the trade-offs made by families. As all family decisions are pooled together relative to their individual choice sets, the conditional logit succinctly summarizes which neighborhood-level variables act as attractors or repellants relative to one another (for a thorough methodological discussion, see Bruch and Mare 2012).

Table 2 provides summary statistics of the destination neighborhoods chosen by mobile white and black households between 1968 and 1990. The conditional logit analysis evaluates the destination choices of white and black families that vary at different stages of child-rearing (no children, oldest child under 5 years old, and any children age 5-17). To do so, a neighborhood choice set is identified for each household based on the CBSA and year of their residential move.[7] Each householder is observed across all options in their pre-defined choice set; in other words, there is a unique householder-neighborhood row for every potential choice in their CBSA. The key outcome is a single binary indicator coded 0 for all unchosen neighborhoods and 1 for the single neighborhood selected. The conditional logit

[7] Neighborhood characteristics are measured at time t-1. Restricting the choice set to within the same CBSA assumes that households did not consider moving to other CBSAs when making decisions about which neighborhoods to live in.

regresses this binary outcome on neighborhood-level characteristics observed within each household choice set. Household-level characteristics are constant across all options in the choice set and therefore drop from the model; the joint household-by-neighborhood variable relationship is measured with interaction terms.

[Table 2 about here]

The neighborhood choice analysis includes four models that add various neighborhood-level attributes. The baseline model adjusts for the log of housing units in each neighborhood, and includes two key desegregation terms. An "ever desegregated" time-invariant indicator measures whether a neighborhood was ever exposed to mandated desegregation between 1954 and 1990. The second term is an interaction between "ever desegregated" and an indicator for whether, in the year of the move, the neighborhood was exposed to an active desegregation order. When modeled together, these variables simulate a neighborhood "difference in differences" estimation. The first term captures the attraction or avoidance of neighborhoods in the pre-activation period that would eventually face desegregation. A generalized theory of white suburbanization suggests that neighborhoods in these areas were less attractive to white families irrespective of mandated desegregation (Frey 1979). The interaction term captures the additional impact of desegregation policy activation on neighborhood attraction or avoidance. To be sure, there are several additional housing characteristics that may change over time and ultimately attract or repel households with children. If these characteristics are correlated with desegregation activation, then

estimates of desegregation avoidance may be biased. Thus several models are tested that include additional neighborhood features, including racial composition, homeownership level, housing density, average rooms per housing unit, average income, and unemployment levels (see Table 6). Choices related to household parental status are measured by interaction terms between the desegregation parameters (ever, ever*active) and indicators for parental status.

All estimates from the flight and avoidance analyses are reported as exponentiated logits. The parameters describe the multiplicative relationship between a given variable and the relative odds of the outcome, all else equal. This avoids potential interpretation errors that can occur when directly interpreting interaction terms as logits (Buis 2010). The significance tests report whether a coefficient's deviation from 1 is statistically significant; values less than 1 reflect a decrease in likelihood, while values above 1 indicate an increase.

Results

Did desegregation trigger parental white flight?

Desegregation may have triggered white flight, especially for households with school-aged children. This portion of the analysis uses logistic regression models to estimate the odds of moving versus staying for those households who lived in desegregation districts prior to the years of implementation. Did households leave as the policy came into effect?

The main results are presented in Table 3. The first model describes white household mobility behavior overall, with desegregation indicators for years before and after desegregation plans were activated. When compared to a three-year-prior baseline odds of moving, white households overall (Model 1) were more likely to relocate in the year immediately before ($p<.10$) and the year immediately after the court order ($p<.01$). Specifically, the odds of relocation for white households multiply by a factor of 2.143 after mandated desegregation was implemented. Notably, this estimated policy effect includes control for variance due to duration effects (years in home), which decreases the likelihood of moving ($p<.001$). As expected, homeowners were much less likely to move out than renters, while changes in household status led to more mobility. Among time-invariant contextual variables, the proportion of homeowners in 1970 reduced the likelihood of mobility ($p<.05$), as did living in metropolitan areas (CBSAs) with large districts. Moves for white households were less common in the Northeast than the South. Overall, Model 1 suggests that desegregation did have a general effect on white neighborhood flight.

[Table 3 about here]

I now turn to Model 2, which includes interactions between desegregation indicator variables and a binary indicator for parental status. This is a key focus of the analysis. If desegregation led white families with children to move out, then the interaction terms should be large and positive at the time of implementation (and afterwards in the case of lag effects). Although the interaction term in the year of implementation is positive (1.286),

indicating parental flight, it is not statistically distinguishable from a null effect. This suggests that the policy effect for white parents was only slightly stronger than for white non-parents more generally. However, the indicator variable for the parent covariate, which captures parental mobility in in the reference time point (3 years prior), demonstrates that white households with children were moving out before implementation ($p<.05$). This may be evidence of predictive mobility among white parents (and still a policy effect), or it could pick up on a broader trend of suburbanization to which desegregation triggered little extra parental flight. Interestingly, the likelihood of neighborhood out-mobility was strong for households without children (measured by the non-interacted desegregation parameters). It is possible that households without children chose to move for fear of declining home values or local disruptions to the social order. These speculations cannot be tested in this analysis, but are suggestive of a potential spillover effect of education policy on neighborhood stability.

Models 3 and 4 summarize residential mobility for black PSID households. Interestingly, there is no evidence of a policy effect on black residential mobility overall. When interacted by parental status, however, there is evidence of a variation by parental status in the year of implementation and the year after ($p<.10$). This finding appears to indicate "black parental flight," but as I later show, these moves circulated to other neighborhoods within the same district. It is possible that black households moved during

policy implementation in order to move closer to attractive schools from which they were formerly excluded. Again, these speculations are beyond the scope of this project.

The results from Table 3 provide evidence of overall white household mobility in response to desegregation, and a possibly distinct white parental response. Although this finding is consistent with prior aggregate-level studies, the parameter estimates do not indicate the strong parental policy effect that some analysts suggested (Coleman et al. 1975). Moreover, the detection of a policy effect depends heavily on the type of comparison made. For instance, Appendix A provides a table of alternative regressions that expand the bandwidth of years observed to a range of -7 years prior and +3 years after desegregation implementation. If households were acutely sensitive to desegregation plans once they were implemented, we might expect results from these models to show higher odds of relocation (comparing to the earlier baseline). Yet the parameters yield no policy effects overall or for households with children. This issue may arise from including a selectively different population of early movers into the sample. However, the sensitivity analysis suggests that the findings from Table 3 should be considered with caution, and invites additional scrutiny.

Table 4 presents an alternative test of residential mobility that considers variation between parenting households with children of schooling age (5-17) and those whose oldest child is under five years old. Notably, the PSID desegregation-exposure sample is relatively small, and mobility events are infrequent (14.8% for white households, 16.6% for black households—see Table 1), so it is not possible to view differentiated parental status at each

time point relative to desegregation implementation. As an alternative, the models in Table 4 include a single indicator variable for whether desegregation was active. This pools together indicators at times -3, -2, and -1 (baseline) for comparison with indicators at times 0, +1, and +2). However, the lost precision in treatment measurement allows for a more granular analysis of parenting before and after implementation.

[Table 4 about here]

The results in Table 4 show that white households with young children were more likely to move out of desegregation-prone neighborhoods in general than households without children ($p<.05$). This mobility behavior, however, was not particularly strong after implementation. The interaction terms in Model 2, while strong and in the expected direction, are not statistically significant. This again provides weak evidence of a difference between parental and non-parental white flight. Could it be that desegregation triggered specific types of residential flight?

If desegregation triggered mobility, it should lead to relocations outside of the same district. Indeed, mobility within the same district is not a likely policy response and is subject to added statistical noise of households moving for a variety of reasons. To evaluate this possibility, I conduct a multinomial logistic regression analysis that distinguishes mobility into three categories: mobility between tracts within the same district, mobility between districts within the same CBSA, and mobility between CBSAs. The cross-classification of mobility type by parental status by active desegregation exposure leads to very small cell

sizes (see Appendix B). Table 5 presents results from the multinomial logistic regression for white households only. The desegregation parameters and interactions by parent type are the same as those in Table 4. However, the multinomial produces three sets of coefficients for each type of mobility compared to not moving.

[Table 5 about here]

The key parameters of interest in Table 5 are the interactions between desegregation and parental status. The parental white flight hypothesis predicts mobility to other districts (the middle column of results) in response to school district desegregation. The interaction term for school-aged children is strong and statistically significant ($p<.10$), providing more persuasive evidence in support of the white parental flight hypothesis. Specifically, the odds of relocating districts versus staying after desegregation implementation was 2.756 times greater for parents of school-aged children than for childless households. Due to small cell sizes, analysis of movement between CBSAs (an infrequent occurrence) leads to unreliable results. In Appendix C, the model from Table 5 without interaction terms is included.

To summarize, the residential mobility analysis provides evidence of a policy effect on parental white flight. This confirms Hypothesis 1—white households with children were particularly responsive to changes in the racial context of their local schools. These patterns are observable even with small sample sizes. Yet they do not provide overwhelming evidence of an immediate and distinctly parental policy backlash. Additionally, the regressions in Table 3 showed that black families with children were also responsively mobile once the

policy was activated. However, almost all of this movement among black households was to homes in other neighborhoods within the same school district. A multinomial analysis of flight was not possible because so few black families exposed to the policy moved out of their school district (Appendix B).

A lingering question is whether residential relocation is the most likely form of policy response. Households with children bear significant costs when relocating; moving to a new district, for instance, involves changing the peer networks, teacher relationships, and curriculum pace. This may have been unattractive to many families, such that acquiescing to the policy became the most desirable option even for race-sensitive parents. Moreover, many households who were responsive to the changing policy enrolled their children in private school (Clotfelter 2004). For these reasons, the evidence of white parental residential flight is somewhat muted. This presents an interesting puzzle: why did aggregate white enrollment decline so markedly in the years following desegregation implementation if white parental flight was limited? The following section addresses this question by evaluating destination choices of mobile households.

Did white parents avoid desegregating districts?

The second portion of the study evaluates whether white households with children were more likely to avoid desegregating districts than households without children. However, because many districts facing mandated desegregation were located in urban

centers with relatively diverse populations (compared to nearby suburbs), it is possible that choices to reside elsewhere do not reflect policy avoidance. Conditional logistic regressions were run to evaluate which neighborhood-level characteristics attract or repel mobile households.

Table 6 presents results from conditional logistic regressions for white mobile households (see Table 2 for sample information). All models include a parameter for the log of the number of housing units in each tract within a mobile household's choice set, which accounts for the higher probability of moving into neighborhoods that have higher relative capacity. The models also include components that provide a neighborhood-level desegregation "difference-in-differences" comparison. The "ever desegregated" term is an indicator variable that does not vary over time. The second term is an interaction between "ever desegregated" and a time-varying indicator of active policy conditions. Together, these terms capture a general avoidance of the types of neighborhoods exposed to desegregation before implementation and any change in avoidance patterns that occurred after implementation.

[Table 6 about here]

Model 1 of Table 6 indicates that white households in the pre-implementation period overall had much weaker odds of moving to ever-desegregating districts ($p<.01$). Households may have avoided these neighborhoods if they anticipated eventual desegregation, though they may also have avoided other neighborhood attributes correlated with desegregation.

Models 2 and 3 add additional neighborhood controls. As anticipated by prior analyses of white residential choice (Ellen 2000b; Quillian 2014), white households were much more likely to choose neighborhoods with a higher percentage of white residents. Additionally, spacious housing, high-density neighborhood attributes, and high homeownership rates attracted white households.[8]

Notably, the time-varying neighborhood-level variables in Models 2, 3, and 4 are endogenous because they could capture changes that are the outcome of the desegregation policy implementation. White flight patterns shown above, for instance, could lead to changes in neighborhood racial composition which mobile households may avoid irrespective of the desegregation policy itself. A "total effect" of desegregation policy would therefore be captured without these neighborhood control variables. However, neighborhood choices are dynamic and time-sensitive, so the key question is not really one of total effect but, rather, whether neighborhoods that otherwise compare similarly will attract or repel households based on their desegregation status.

Model 4 evaluates this desegregation policy effect specifically for households with young children and school-aged children compared to households without children. Here the results are striking. Households with young children were 39.5% less likely to move into "ever-desegregated" districts in the pre-implementation period compared to childless households ($p<.10$). The effect of policy activation *substantially strengthened* this avoidance

[8] These covariates are strongly correlated but do not produce multicollinearity issues in the estimation models. Correlation matrices available upon request. Cubic terms were tested for percent white and percent homeowners, but did not improve model fit so they were dropped.

tendency among white households with children, who were 46.5% less likely to move into ever-desegregating neighborhoods once the plans were activated ($p<.05$). This clarifies why aggregate white enrollment in desegregating districts declined: Families with young children became even more likely to avoid actively desegregating districts when they made choices about where to live. Thus although avoidance of these districts was high in the pre-period, it was much more forceful once desegregation orders were implemented. Notably, these strong results include controls for neighborhood racial composition, suggesting that all else equal, desegregation status was a salient sorting aspect for child-rearing couples facing school enrollment choices in the coming years. By contrast, the results for households with school-aged children in Model 4 are not statistically distinguishable from 1 (null effect).

In Table 7, the conditional logistic regression analysis is repeated for black mobile households. A contrasting story emerges. The ever-desegregated coefficients in Models 1 through 3 indicate that, prior to implementation, black households were *much more likely* to move into neighborhoods that would eventually face desegregation implementation. This pattern declined by 71.7% in the implementation era, but was still more likely than selection into never-desegregated neighborhoods by a factor of 1.117 (from Model 3, 1.558*.717). The interaction terms in Model 4 demonstrate that black households with young children were more likely to move into desegregating districts once implementation began compared to black households without children—the opposite response compared to white households with young children. However, black households with school-aged children were less likely

than black childless households to choose to move into desegregating districts. Here the results are not entirely clear. One possibility is that black households with children in desegregating schools experienced negative backlash from resistant white citizens, which led them to choose districts with less turmoil. Alternatively, there may be a potential life course effect whereby black households with young children are at a lower earnings level but as they age and their children attend school, they have more resources to invest in attractive districts outside of central city districts. This speculative account of black neighborhood attainment within the context of desegregation invites future scholarship beyond the scope of this analysis. Variation along additional dimensions, such as region and household resources, may illuminate the underlying phenomenon.

[Table 7 about here]

Discussion

This study analyzed the mobility patterns of white and black households in the era of mandated school desegregation, when racial school contexts were altered dramatically in districts throughout the United States. While we know that white enrollment rates declined after desegregation plans were implemented, to date there have been no micro-level analyses that explore the nuanced selection patterns of households, particularly those raising children.

The first portion of the analysis tested the hypothesis of white parental flight, showing that white families with children were more likely to relocate in response to

desegregation (Table 3). However, families with children were also leaving prior to plan implementation, due either to anticipation of impending changes or in a general pattern of suburbanization. A multinomial regression analysis (Table 5) confirmed that the policy effect on white residential flight was most strongly expressed in the decision of families with children to relocate districts. In contrast, black household moves between districts were extremely rare; desegregation plans induced more mobility within districts immediately following implementation.

Households living within districts on the eve of mandated desegregation changes make up only a fraction of households across the United States (Figure 1). A much wider set of households must also make choices about where to live, irrespective of their reasons for moving. In the second portion of the analysis, I employed conditional logistic regression analysis to evaluate the neighborhood-level characteristics that were more or less attractive to households raising children. The results show a clear story of substantial white *parental* response to mandated desegregation. Specifically, white households with young children—who avoided ever-desegregating districts even before implementation—were much more likely to avoid those districts once policies became active. Mandated desegregation acted as an extra layer of neighborhood repellant for households with young children.

Taken together, the results confirm that white parents with children were especially likely to make sorting decisions away from mandated desegregation plans. This supports the conclusion that white parental behavior plays a distinct role in the shaping of residential and

school segregation in the United States—and that these patterns emerge more through avoidance behavior among mobile households than from flight among those households directly exposed to school assignment policy changes. To be sure, mandated desegregation did not simply reshuffle the racial context of schools. In districts that implemented forced busing programs, there were also practical concerns vocalized by many parents who wished to have their children attend local schools. While this study demonstrates policy non-compliance, it cannot adjudicate between race-specific mobility decisions and those that are related to more general dissatisfaction in local schooling conditions.

There are a number of additional limitations in the analysis, especially related to sample size. The small sample size of PSID sample families limits the statistical power required to answer deeper questions about residential selection. As a result, the analysis simplified a wide range of desegregation plans into a single binary definition of "mandated desegregation." In addition, households could not be cross-classified in ways that prior theory anticipates: parental status by region and by type of move, for instance.

In addition, the measurement of school desegregation status is subject to measurement error. Some districts had multiple implementation events over time, but here I simplified the timing to simply indicate the first court order or HEW action implemented within the district. This may lead to inaccuracies in the relative timing of household moves. In addition, the geographic matching used to link households to school districts leads to some additional measurement error. Finally, there are accounts of potential spill-over effects in

which some districts voluntarily desegregated in order to avoid top-down direct actions, and that this was more common once a district within a given CBSA was treated (Logan et al. 2008). This could downwardly bias the effect estimates in the choice analysis if some neighborhoods were effectively measured as "never desegregated" when their actual conditions did involve district-level diversity programs. This could also upwardly bias the result in the multinomial analysis of moves to non-desegregating districts.

Finally, one last limitation is that parenting is not an exogenous variable among households. The decision of whether and when to have children may be informed by local conditions, such that some households may have chosen to delay child-rearing until they could move to an attractive school district. This would downwardly bias the estimates if households in the PSID are identified as "childless" when they are actually making parenting-oriented decisions. Evaluating these potential neighborhood and parental selection decisions jointly could be fruitful terrain for qualitative scholarship that can assess such deliberative processes among childless adults.

In spite of the limitations of the study, the findings add important insight to the literature on desegregation. Specifically, the results demonstrate that white flight and white avoidance increased when desegregation plans were implemented, especially among parents.

The results also indicate a broader sociological and political tension between the ideal of equal educational opportunity and a family system in which parents secure competitive advantages for their own children (Blau and Duncan 1967:205; Labaree 1997). This tension

underlies much of the stratification scholarship on the transmission of opportunity across generations, which has demonstrated a strong correlation between family background and various health, achievement, and adulthood attainment outcomes (Blau and Duncan 1967; Solon 1992; Conley 1999; Sharkey 2008; Reardon 2011; Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez 2014).

While there are many mechanisms through which families transmit advantage or disadvantage to children during child-rearing years (Lareau 2011), residential selection is a particularly salient (and observable) decision when parents can leverage their resources to influence the opportunities and social contexts to which their children will be exposed (Durlauf 1996; Shapiro 2005; Johnson 2006). By demonstrating that white parents were especially likely to sort away from racially diverse schooling contexts in the era of mandated desegregation, this analysis shows that an important driving force of neighborhood sorting is the race-related schooling priorities of white parents. Moreover, the study shows that persistent racial segregation is in part fueled by the leveraging of white privilege across successive generations.

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

Figure 1. Neighborhood exposure to mandated desegregation in the United State, by region

Source: Author's compilation from American Communities Project and After Brown legal databases.
Note: U.S. 2010 tracts matched to 1970 school district jurisdictions (see text). Tract coverage limited to metropolitan areas that were at least 80% tracted by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1970, excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico (750 Core Based Statistical Areas; 56,634 tracts).



Figure 2A. White and black household exposure to desegregation in the U.S. South



Figure 2B. White and black household exposure to desegregation in the U.S. Northeast, Midwest, and West

Source: Author's compilation from the Neighborhood Change Database (1970, 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census counts) and the American Communities Project.
Note: Metropolitan subsample of U.S. tracts, as described in Figure 1. Percentages in non-census years calculated with linear interpolation (and extrapolation for 1968-69); trends lines are smoothed lowess cuves.

Table 1. Summary statistics of Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) households living in ever-desegregated districts within three years prior to implementation, by race (consecutive-year observations).

			White (n=1,802)		Black (n=2,497)	
Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Mobility						
Stay in neighborhood	0	1	.852	.355	.834	.372
Move, by geography						
Within same district	0	1	.059	.236	.136	.343
Between districts, within CBSA	0	1	.054	.226	.016	.127
Between CBSAs	0	1	.034	.182	.014	.116
Parental status (t)						
No children	0	1	.582	.493	.443	.497
Young children (under 5)	0	1	.105	.307	.091	.287
School aged children (5-17)	0	1	.312	.464	.467	.499
Other household variables (t-1)						
Years in home	0	25	3.09	2.84	2.77	2.37
Homeowner	0	1	.526	.499	.299	.458
Family income adjusted to 2010 ($1000)	1.34	12.13	10.82	0.81	10.27	0.86
Married	0	1	.634	.482	.320	.467
Changes in household (t-1 to t)						
New household formed	0	1	.097	.295	.090	.286
Purchase home	0	1	.024	.153	.024	.152
Child born	0	1	.019	.138	.028	.164
Contextual variables						
Tract percent black, 1970	0	100	8.3	18.5	70.0	31.1
Tract percent homeowners, 1970	0	100	53.4	27.0	39.9	23.5
Tracts per school district in CBSA	3.24	304.75	25.53	53.18	19.81	34.62
Region						
Northeast	0	1	.307		.137	
Midwest	0	1	.338		.556	
West	0	1	.264		.236	
South	0	1	.092		.070	

Source: Author's calculation, Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).

Notes: Consecutive-year-observational year units between time t-1 and time t (all regression analyses that follow adjust for unit dependence by clustering standard errors). The sample includes consecutive-year observations for families living in ever-treated districts up to 3 years prior to implementation, and observed up to 2 years after implementation. PSID households living in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, outside of a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), or in a CBSA that was <80% tracted in 1970 have been excluded. County census data used to fill in remaining unknown tract-level proprtion black and proporiton homeowner in 1970.

Table 2. Summary statistics of destination neighborhoods chosen by white and black mobile households, 1968 to 1990

			White (n=7,912)		Black (n=6,623)	
	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Mobile households, by parental status						
No children	0	1	.580	.494	.462	.499
Young children (under 5)	0	1	.197	.398	.165	.372
School aged children (5-17)	0	1	.223	.416	.373	.484
Year	1968	1990	1980	6	1981	6
Neighborhood						
Ever exposed to mandated deseg.	0	1	.277	.448	.601	.490
Housing units	2.000	8971.400	1446.039	700.618	1606.099	685.459
Percent white	0	100	89.044	15.022	35.174	32.242
Percent owned	0	100	63.176	22.703	46.909	23.541
Avg. rooms per housing unit	.000	9.093	5.334	.945	4.933	.804
Density (units per sq. mile)	.203	117489.800	2608.323	6305.987	4629.656	5478.799
Avg. income ($1000), 2010 adjusted	11.746	401.263	71.971	27.174	50.779	19.286
Unemployment rate	.000	.545	.055	.032	.104	.063
Region						
Northeast	0	1	.202		.098	
Midwest	0	1	.252		.273	
South	0	1	.239		.488	
West	0	1	.306		.141	

Notes: The mobility sample is identified as PSID households changing neighborhoods between two consecutive (origin-destination) years. This table describes characteristics of their destination neighborhoods. The sample is limited to those moving to geographic areas that were at least 80% tracted by 1970 (see Figure 1 notes). Under this geographic sample restriction, white households are observed moving to 193 different Core Based Statiscal Areas (CBSAs), while black households are observed moving to 122 CBSAs.

Table 3. Results from logistic regression (odds ratios) models predicting mobility by timing of desegregation

	White households				Black households			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Desegregation (ref = 3 years prior)								
2 years prior	1.334	(.335)	1.821+	(.593)	1.036	(.396)	.838	(.526)
1 year prior	1.517+	(.357)	2.049*	(.614)	1.395	(.522)	.846	(.490)
Desegregation implem.	.822	(.249)	.734	(.314)	.682	(.237)	.377+	(.200)
1 year after	2.143**	(.617)	2.559*	(.957)	.912	(.376)	.487	(.317)
2 years after	1.084	(.358)	1.193	(.511)	1.014	(.456)	.850	(.524)
Parent (binary)	1.385	(.275)	2.141*	(.806)	1.392	(.288)	.683	(.302)
Interaction desegregation x parent								
2 years prior x parent			.442+	(.218)			1.609	(1.232)
1 year prior x parent			.442+	(.215)			2.844	(1.947)
Desegregation implem. x parent			1.286	(.766)			3.322+	(2.056)
1 year after x parent			.638	(.350)			3.785+	(2.815)
2 years after x parent			.828	(.545)			1.418	(1.081)
Household variables (t-1)								
Years in home	.831***	(.037)	.832***	(.037)	.910+	(.049)	.896*	(.046)
Homeowner	.393***	(.086)	.388***	(.086)	.348***	(.095)	.342***	(.094)
Family income (log)	.810+	(.102)	.805+	(.102)	.732*	(.099)	.728*	(.100)
Married	.850	(.182)	.859	(.185)	.776	(.199)	.819	(.213)
Changes in household (t-1 to t)								
New household formed	2.085**	(.496)	2.050**	(.494)	1.079	(.319)	1.053	(.306)
Purchase home	5.253***	(2.255)	5.296***	(2.234)	3.856**	(1.878)	3.770**	(1.814)
Child born	1.474	(.757)	1.585	(.862)	1.108	(.599)	1.110	(.607)
Contextual variables								
Tract percent black, 1970	1.007	(.006)	1.007	(.006)	.991**	(.003)	.991**	(.003)
Tract percent homeowners, 1970	.991*	(.004)	.991*	(.003)	.995	(.005)	.994	(.005)
Tracts per school district in CBSA	.994+	(.003)	.994+	(.003)	.997	(.008)	.998	(.007)
Region (ref = South)								
Northeast	.217***	(.095)	.209***	(.092)	1.046	(.660)	1.068	(.656)
Midwest	.612	(.263)	.601	(.260)	2.254	(1.418)	2.244	(1.368)
West	.555	(.229)	.549	(.229)	2.635+	(1.489)	2.701+	(1.507)
Constant	8.217	(11.068)	7.447	(10.337)	6.706	(10.485)	9.896	(15.478)
N (households)	1802		1802		2497		2497	
BIC	29014.024		28897.816		12148.458		12089.768	
Log-likelihood	-14432.046		-14355.200		-5996.001		-5947.098	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. See Table 1 for sample information. PSID probability sample weights applied. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4. Results from logistic regression (odds ratios) models predicting mobility by active desegregation status and parental status

	White households				Black households			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Desegregation active	.995	(.174)	.845	(.190)	.726	(.155)	.619	(.191)
Parental status (ref = no children)								
Young children (under 5)	1.949*	(.595)	1.721	(.594)	1.543	(.589)	1.248	(.499)
School aged children (5-17)	1.249	(.253)	1.039	(.268)	1.344	(.294)	1.221	(.301)
Interaction								
Deseg active x young children			1.485	(.727)			1.852	(1.331)
Deseg active x school-aged children			1.610	(.627)			1.327	(.508)
Household variables (t-1)								
Years in home	.851***	(.036)	.853***	(.036)	.921	(.047)	.915+	(.047)
Homeowner	.398***	(.087)	.391***	(.086)	.349***	(.096)	.345***	(.094)
Family income (log)	.816	(.102)	.814+	(.102)	.729*	(.100)	.719*	(.100)
Married	.805	(.175)	.802	(.175)	.756	(.197)	.780	(.203)
Changes in household (t-1 to t)								
New household formed	2.138**	(.507)	2.081**	(.495)	1.101	(.329)	1.107	(.322)
Purchase home	5.277***	(2.296)	5.286***	(2.283)	3.923**	(1.921)	4.031**	(1.863)
Child born	1.157	(.655)	1.189	(.672)	1.097	(.619)	1.109	(.602)
Contextual variables								
Tract percent black, 1970	1.007	(.005)	1.007	(.005)	.991**	(.003)	.991**	(.003)
Tract percent homeowners, 1970	.991*	(.004)	.991*	(.003)	.995	(.006)	.995	(.006)
Tracts per school district in CBSA	.994+	(.003)	.994+	(.003)	.998	(.007)	.998	(.007)
Region (ref = South)								
Northeast	.211***	(.092)	.206***	(.091)	1.056	(.648)	1.040	(.634)
Midwest	.587	(.251)	.575	(.249)	2.304	(1.421)	2.271	(1.391)
West	.547	(.226)	.539	(.225)	2.653+	(1.463)	2.634+	(1.450)
Constant	9.737+	(12.929)	10.800+	(14.422)	7.865	(12.385)	9.730	(15.353)
N (households)	1802		1802		2497		2497	
BIC	29292.213		29261.063		12163.908		12164.786	
Log-likelihood	-14582.385		-14559.313		-6015.460		-6008.076	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. See Table 1 for sample information. PSID probability sample weights applied. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 5. Results from multinomial logistic regression (odds ratios) for type of mobility (compared to not moving) among white households

	Move between tracts within same district		Move between districts within same CBSA		Move between CBSAs	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Desegregation active	.615	(.255)	.827	(.270)	1.377	(.575)
Parental status (ref = no children)						
Young children (under 5)	2.336*	(1.004)	1.861	(.949)	.965	(.660)
School aged children (5-17)	1.179	(.455)	.820	(.329)	1.096	(.501)
Interaction						
Deseg active x young children	1.666	(1.227)	1.396	(1.091)	1.854	(1.660)
Deseg active x school-aged children	1.842	(1.150)	2.756+	(1.603)	.696	(.517)
Household variables (t-1)						
Years in home	.779***	(.059)	.905+	(.048)	.876*	(.058)
Homeowner	.359**	(.121)	.326***	(.099)	.613	(.265)
Family income (log)	1.046	(.229)	.816	(.133)	.560**	(.101)
Married	.596	(.207)	.632	(.196)	1.915	(.815)
Changes in household (t-1 to t)						
New household formed	1.255	(.459)	2.109*	(.785)	4.069***	(1.477)
Purchase home	4.614**	(2.368)	7.603***	(4.021)	2.223	(2.662)
Child born	.792	(.602)	1.714	(1.242)	1.129	(1.363)
Contextual variables						
Tract percent black, 1970	1.011	(.007)	1.003	(.007)	1.007	(.008)
Tract percent homeowners, 1970	.986**	(.005)	.994	(.005)	.995	(.008)
Tracts per school district in CBSA	1.002	(.003)	.993	(.004)	.973**	(.010)
Region (ref = South)						
Northeast	.540	(.386)	.366	(.257)	.055***	(.036)
Midwest	1.295	(.921)	1.632	(1.131)	.098***	(.060)
West	1.232	(.862)	1.242	(.855)	.149***	(.080)
Constant	.199	(.476)	1.554	(2.736)	270.769**	(510.357)

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. See Table 1 for sample information (N=1,802). A similar multinomial logistic regression for black families is not included due to small cell sizes (see Appendix A). PSID probability sample weights applied. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 6. Results from conditional logistic regressions (odds ratios) predicting neighborhood selection, white mobile households

	1	2	3	4
Neighborhood exposure to desegregation (ref = none)				
Ever desegregated	.743**	.890	.803*	1.025
	(.067)	(.080)	(.073)	(.117)
Ever desegregated x active implementation	.988	1.027	1.008	.950
	(.094)	(.097)	(.096)	(.112)
Household parental status (ref = no children) x exposure				
Young children (under 5)				
Ever desegregated				.615*
				(.136)
Ever desegregated x active implementation				.535**
				(.119)
School aged children (5-17)				
Ever desegregated				1.018
				(.243)
Ever desegregated x active implementation				1.173
				(.280)
Neighborhood characteristics (at time of move)				
Housing units in tract (log)	2.010***	2.049***	1.871***	1.871***
	(.051)	(.052)	(.050)	(.050)
Proportion white		1.058***	1.053***	1.053***
		(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Proportion white squared		1.000***	1.000***	1.000***
		(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Proportion owned			1.001	1.001
			(.003)	(.003)
Proportion owned squared			1.000**	1.000**
			(.000)	(.000)
Rooms per housing unit			1.057***	1.058***
			(.006)	(.006)
Log of housing density (units per sq mile)			1.053***	1.054***
			(.012)	(.012)
Log of average income			1.020	1.019
			(.063)	(.063)
Log of unemployment rate			.899**	.898**
			(.034)	(.034)
N (household-neighborhood observations)	1735516	1735516	1735516	1735516
N (households)	7912	7912	7912	7912
BIC	98496.498	97745.892	97676.779	97675.762
Log-likelihood	-49226.699	-48837.029	-48759.372	-48730.130

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. Each mobile household's choice set is defined as neighborhoods (census tracts) within their destination Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), irrespective of their origin CBSA. Rather than include all tracts in each CBSA-year choice set, a 20% random sample of tracts was used to lessen computation demand; all models include an offset adjustment to account for this (Bruch and Mare 2012). See Table 2 for mobility sample and destination neighborhood information. PSID probability sample weights applied. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 7. Results from conditional logistic regressions (odds ratios) predicting neighborhood selection, black mobile households

	1	2	3	4
Neighborhood exposure to desegregation (ref = none)				
Ever desegregated	4.239***	1.642***	1.558***	1.191
	(.365)	(.184)	(.175)	(.188)
Ever desegregated x active implementation	.728***	.729**	.717**	.943
	(.065)	(.083)	(.082)	(.157)
Household parental status (ref = no children) x exposure				
Young children (under 5)				
Ever desegregated				1.403
				(.378)
Ever desegregated x active implementation				1.647*
				(.388)
School aged children (5-17)				
Ever desegregated				.623+
				(.177)
Ever desegregated x active implementation				.636+
				(.157)
Neighborhood characteristics (at time of move)				
Housing units in tract (log)	2.782***	2.079***	1.854***	1.854***
	(.088)	(.069)	(.068)	(.068)
Proportion white		1.010***	1.014***	1.014***
		(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Proportion white squared		1.000***	1.000***	1.000***
		(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Proportion owned			1.010***	1.010***
			(.003)	(.003)
Proportion owned squared			1.000***	1.000***
			(.000)	(.000)
Rooms per housing unit			1.057***	1.057***
			(.017)	(.017)
Log of housing density (units per sq mile)			1.108***	1.108***
			(.019)	(.019)
Log of average income			1.037	1.038
			(.087)	(.087)
Log of unemployment rate			1.252***	1.251***
			(.064)	(.064)
N (household-neighborhood observations)	1551359	1551359	1551359	1551359
N (households)	6623	6623	6623	6623
BIC	84444.830	76102.607	76016.751	76064.808
Log-likelihood	-42201.033	-38015.667	-37929.975	-37925.494

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. See Table 6 for additional details. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Appendix A. Results from logistic regression (odds ratios) models predicting mobility by timing of desegregation, expanded sample and timeline

	White households				Black households			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Desegregation (ref = 7 years prior)								
6 years prior	.786	(.304)	1.038	(.506)	.556	(.281)	.414	(.292)
5 years prior	1.075	(.465)	1.401	(.746)	.430	(.256)	.369	(.336)
4 years prior	.908	(.368)	.866	(.465)	.904	(.454)	.609	(.392)
3 years prior	.785	(.316)	.885	(.459)	.528	(.272)	.224*	(.164)
2 years prior	.879	(.337)	.845	(.414)	.940	(.538)	1.365	(1.079)
1 year prior	1.186	(.437)	1.533	(.741)	1.008	(.578)	1.152	(.950)
Desegregation implem.	1.338	(.497)	1.733	(.811)	1.384	(.733)	1.130	(.818)
1 year after	.647	(.262)	.559	(.303)	.731	(.388)	.542	(.422)
2 years after	1.687	(.652)	1.931	(.954)	1.048	(.588)	.731	(.628)
3 years after	.864	(.363)	.926	(.499)	1.288	(.755)	1.402	(1.136)
Parent (binary)	1.158	(.165)	1.829	(1.256)	1.699**	(.281)	1.242	(1.102)
Interaction desegregation x parent								
6 years prior x parent			.443	(.344)			1.854	(1.807)
5 years prior x parent			.452	(.397)			1.427	(1.643)
4 years prior x parent			.978	(.824)			2.170	(2.048)
3 years prior x parent			.670	(.535)			3.821	(3.552)
2 years prior x parent			.991	(.781)			.487	(.496)
1 year prior x parent			.457	(.336)			.818	(.872)
Desegregation implem. x parent			.444	(.339)			1.559	(1.537)
1 year after x parent			1.272	(1.054)			1.826	(1.866)
2 years after x parent			.645	(.509)			2.123	(2.333)
3 years after x parent			.800	(.687)			.767	(.853)
Household variables (t-1)								
Years in home	.824***	(.027)	.825***	(.027)	.810***	(.035)	.806***	(.034)
Homeowner	.345***	(.062)	.341***	(.061)	.349***	(.081)	.346***	(.079)
Family income (log)	.879	(.081)	.872	(.080)	.845	(.092)	.843	(.093)
Married	1.015	(.164)	1.026	(.168)	.764	(.154)	.770	(.156)
Changes in household (t-1 to t)								
New household formed	1.451*	(.240)	1.443*	(.242)	1.146	(.248)	1.096	(.231)
Purchase home	2.974***	(.865)	3.001***	(.859)	4.618***	(1.950)	4.628***	(1.925)
Child born	1.640	(.588)	1.689	(.626)	1.038	(.435)	1.072	(.449)
Contextual variables								
Tract percent black, 1970	1.003	(.004)	1.003	(.004)	.996+	(.002)	.995*	(.002)
Tract percent homeowners, 1970	.991**	(.003)	.992**	(.003)	.995	(.004)	.995	(.004)
Tracts per school district in CBSA	.998	(.002)	.998	(.002)	.996	(.007)	.996	(.007)
Region (ref = South)								
Northeast	.289**	(.118)	.280**	(.114)	1.017	(.575)	1.012	(.581)
Midwest	.688	(.276)	.673	(.271)	1.753	(.998)	1.747	(1.005)
West	.618	(.239)	.612	(.237)	1.952	(.985)	1.915	(.979)
Constant	3.641	(3.805)	3.473	(3.739)	1.650	(2.041)	2.041	(2.575)
N (households)	3028		3028		4593		4593	
BIC	48081.440		47940.176		20901.000		20767.187	
Log-likelihood	-23940.524		-23829.814		-10345.096		-10236.028	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses clustered by household. The analytic sample includes consecutive-year observations for families living in ever-treated districts up to 7 years prior to implementation, and observed up to 3 years after implementation (expaned from the sample in Table 1). PSID probability sample weights applied. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001