

Girls' Education, Aspirations, and Social Networks: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in Rural Rajasthan

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Abstract

In recent years, policymakers have begun to recognize the importance of “soft skills” to a variety of outcomes, especially in the context of girls’ empowerment. By means of a randomized trial involving 30 schools in rural Rajasthan, we measure the causal effects of a life-skills program in the form of a girls’ parliament on soft skills for approximately 1200 young girls in rural Rajasthan. Girls were either elected by their peers to participate, were randomized into the program, or served as controls. We use extensive network data to show selection into the program as well as partial segregation of friend groups between elected and non-elected girls. We find differential effects of the program on measures of aspirations and gender attitudes, depending on the selection mechanisms into the program.

1. Introduction

Amid growing recognition that girl-specific interventions can be effective and increased acknowledgement of the importance of emotional and social learning, a number of education programs have been developed with the aim of impacting girls' aspirations and so-called "soft skills." These skills include educational and employment aspirations, self-esteem, empowerment, and attitudes toward the appropriate role of women in society. In the past, studying soft skills such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, aspirations, and confidence to voice opinions have often been the subject of qualitative work. More recently, a number of quantitative studies have examined measurement using surveys as well as identifying important correlations – and in some cases causal links – between these attributes and behaviors; these papers are discussed in more detail below. In economics, there are some clear gaps in the literature on aspirations and self-esteem. First, how important are aspirations and self-esteem for economic outcomes such as schooling, investment, and labor force participation? Second, if these attributes are important causal determinants of economic outcomes, what are the most effective ways to impact aspirations and self-esteem?

This paper makes headway towards addressing both of these questions using a randomized control trial to measure the determinants and effects of soft skills formation. We evaluate a program for adolescent school girls in rural India. This program, called Bal Sabha or Girls' Parliament, has been run by a local NGO, Educate Girls in hundreds of schools in the poorest districts of Rajasthan. The program consists of democratic elections of 13 girls from grades six, seven, and eight to meet after school several times per month to participate in life skills games. They practice setting goals for their school or community and are told to pass on the life skills games to other students. For example, one game consists of working through various socially-fraught scenarios such as how to stand firm when a girl's father determines that she is to marry as an adolescent before the legal marriage age of 18.

In October 2013, the Bal Sabha program was randomly allocated across 30 schools in Sirohi District of Rajasthan – ten schools received the standard program, ten received a modified program in which girls were randomly selected rather than elected, and ten were controls that did not receive the program. A baseline and endline survey were conducted to measure changes in aspirations, self-esteem, and gender attitudes, as well as a baseline and endline network survey to measure social links within each school.

In this paper, we examine the effect of the program on measures of aspirations, expectations, attitudes, and self-efficacy. Our main effects – among both participants and non-participants are found in the standard program where girls are elected. We find that for the democratically-elected program, the program causes girls who participated (elected by their peers) to increase their expectations about age at marriage, while being more pessimistic about their career prospects. In our other treatment arm – where participants were randomly selected – the effects are more muted, and in some cases are negative. Similar to Miguel and Kremer who measure spillover effects of de-worming in schools (2004), we estimate effects

on non-participants in addition to participants. Surprisingly, in the democratically-elected program, non-elected girls (who did not participate) had significantly lower educational expectations and aspirations, possibly suggesting a discouragement effect from not being elected. We do not find this effect on non-participant girls when participants are randomly chosen.

In addition to providing rigorous quantitative evidence of soft skills formation, this paper makes a significant contribution to a nascent literature that accounts for network dynamics in measuring peer effects. Over the past two decades, a growing literature in economics and related fields has investigated the importance of one's peers to a large variety of economic and social outcomes (See, e.g., Miguel and Kremer 2004; Oster and Thornton 2012). However, these studies typically neglect to account for changing network structure; rather, they almost universally assume that network structure is static. This shortcoming could be especially important if an intervention affects the structure of a peer network, such as when an intervention is administered at a group-level. By gathering and analyzing extensive network data at multiple points in time, this paper examines changes in peer networks of the girls in our study schools over time, and as a result of the program. In a novel finding, we show that being randomly selected into participation serves to partition friendship groups between those who are selected and those who are not. This finding has important implications for the estimation of peer effects more generally and the design of appropriate rules for assigning individuals to treatment in a wide range of development programs. More generally, our results provide important insights into the processes whereby girls' aspirations and expectations form and change over time and how such changes are affected by and affect social networks.

2. Background

2.1 Girls' aspirations and self-esteem

Limited evidence from cross-sectional studies suggests that self-efficacy, self-esteem, and aspirations are likely to be correlated with each other and with other background characteristics. Because self-efficacy, self-esteem, and aspirations are likely to be correlated with background characteristics such as parental education and wealth, cross-sectional studies may lead to biased estimates of the causes and effects of these soft skills. A small number of randomized studies have examined causal relationships with soft-skills. For example, belief in one's own ability and self-efficacy has been found to be associated with aspirations and educational goals (Bandura, 2001). Female role models have also been found to have large effects on girls' aspirations and empowerment (Nguyen, 2008; Beaman et al., 2012).

Further, while there is a growing economics literature measuring subjective well-being, aspirations and self-efficacy in developing countries (Dercon and Singh, 2013; Bernard et al., 2011; Kosec et al., 2012), only one, to our knowledge, has focused on women's aspirations (Beaman et al., 2012). Research rigorously evaluating the mechanisms that improve these skills and identifying the causal determinants of these skills

is very limited. To our knowledge, none has investigated ways that changes in peer groups interact with changes in social norms, gender representations and girls' aspirations.

2.2 Networks and peer effects

A vast literature in economics and related fields investigates the relationship between networks—particularly friendship groups—and a variety of outcomes and behaviors. Networks have been shown to affect technology adoption in many settings (Oster and Thornton, 2012; Conley and Udry, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006), and information diffusion through a network depends critically upon network structure (Banerjee et al., 2012). Who one knows is also crucially important for job referrals (See, e.g., Beaman and Magruder, 2012).

A severe limitation of this literature is that it almost uniformly assumes that networks are static, or at least exogenous. This assumption may be innocuous in settings where networks are indeed random (De Giorgi, Pellizzarri, and Redaelli, 2010; Sacerdote, 2001), or when interventions are unlikely to affect network structure (Ngatia, 2011). However, a large literature in sociology and related fields demonstrates that links are far from random. Importantly, social networks tend to demonstrate *homophily*, whereby individuals are more likely to be friends with individuals similar to them by race, age, gender, etc. (See, e.g., Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009).

Due to the availability of AddHealth network data in the United States, non-random network structure has been most convincingly demonstrated among American junior high and high school students. If such a pattern extends to other contexts, such as Indian adolescents in our study, then failure to account for network changes may lead to biased estimates of peer effects. Further, failure to investigate interventions' effects on networks may lead researchers to neglect an important channel whereby outcomes are determined.

Despite these issues, there has been very little research accounting for changing network structure. In a recent paper, Comola and Prima (2014) investigate the effect of randomized access to savings accounts, accounting for changes in network structure due to their intervention. As in our setting, they collect data on network structure pre- and post-intervention, so as to assess the effect of their intervention on the network itself. To our knowledge, this is the only study that leverages randomized treatment to measure impacts on the network itself.

3. Setting and Research Design

3.1 Description of the Bal Sabha

The particular intervention we study is a unique program designed by Educate Girls, a nongovernmental organization based in Mumbai. Through their program, a Girls' Parliament (Bal Sabha) is formed in each school, wherein 13 girls in grades six to eight are democratically elected by their peers – both boys and girls. These parliaments meet on Saturdays with the aim to stimulate girls' participation in matters related to their growth and development, in addition to building confidence, leadership and

self-esteem. Girls in the parliament undergo a life skills training based on the WHO recommendations: problem solving; critical thinking; decision making; communication; self-awareness; creative thinking; interpersonal relationships; coping with stress; coping with emotions; and empathy. The program content is delivered through a series of “games,” whereby participant girls work through scenarios dealing with complex issues such as early marriage and standing up to parental authorities. The facilitators of the parliaments are community volunteers (Team Balika) who are highly motivated to contribute to girls' development.

3.2 Sample and randomization

This paper evaluates the Bal Sabha program during the 2013-14 academic year in Sirohi district of Rajasthan. Thirty schools from two blocks in Rajasthan were selected for the study. All girls who were enrolled in grades six, seven, and eight are in our sample and were administered a baseline survey with questions about their background, aspirations, expectations, and attitudes toward gender roles. Of all of the enrolled students, 73.3 percent completed the survey. At this time we collected extensive data on friendship connections through a detailed network survey. Each female student would stand up, and every non-standing student would answer questions about their link with the standing girl. 69.9 percent of enrolled students completed the baseline network survey.

Further, at these baseline school visits, an election was held to choose 13 girls to participate in the Bal Sabha. These elections were held in *all* schools to facilitate comparison between girls selected for participation in treatment and control schools, since our prior was that elected girls are systematically different from girls not elected to the program. Treatment groups had not yet been assigned at the time of the baseline data collection and elections.

After the conclusion of baseline data collection, the 30 schools were randomly allocated to three treatment arms. Ten schools assigned to T1 received the standard version of the program with participants chosen by election. Ten T2 schools received the Bal Sabha program, but participants were selected to participate by random lottery with the expectation that this would lead to a different profile of participant girls and possibly different network dynamics. The final ten schools served as controls and did not receive the Bal Sabha program in any form.

The program was implemented over a period of approximately six months, after which the study team returned to each school to conduct endline data collection. Endline data collection consisted of an endline questionnaire and an endline network survey. Of those who completed the baseline questionnaire, 80.8% completed the endline questionnaire and 81.9 completed the endline network survey. Attrition was not associated with treatment status, as shown in Table 1, Panels A, B and C.

3.3 Baseline data

Baseline Characteristics

Baseline summary statistics are presented in Table 2, Panel A and B. In addition to showing the sample averages, we test for balance across the treatment groups to provide evidence of successful randomization. The fourth column of Table 2 presents results of a three-way test of mean equality between the three groups, with standard errors clustered at the school level. Students assigned to T1, T2, and C schools are balanced among most baseline characteristics and outcomes. With the relatively small sample of schools, balance becomes an issue with some baseline characteristics: we see some imbalance among replies to a question about leadership, with T2 girls more likely to reply that they prefer to follow rather than lead. Similarly, the final row suggests that girls in T2 schools are more likely to agree that women should not disagree with husbands in public. These minor imbalances motivate inclusion of baseline controls in our endline regressions that follow.

Selection into Election

Table 3A, Panels A and B, presents baseline characteristics comparing girls who were elected and girls who were not. This provides evidence of selection into participation in the Bal Sabha program in the NGO's preferred delivery model. Those elected were significantly older and in a higher grade than those who were not elected. However, those elected were no more likely to be wealthier, as proxied by TV ownership and electricity, or to have educated parents. Elected girls also were more likely to expect to complete grade 12, but they were less optimistic about girls' opportunities in India.

Table 3B demonstrates that selection of girls into participation in T2 schools is quite different. Since girls are randomly chosen, we do not expect participants and non-participants to be systematically different. While some baseline characteristics do show significant differences, the balance across selected and non-selected girls is quite different from the clear patterns we saw with elected students. Those randomly chosen are on average the same age and in the same grade as those not chosen. Those randomly selected are less likely to have fathers who attended school, and more likely to agree that women should not disagree with their husband in public. Seeing no clear pattern, we think that any of these differences in baseline characteristics can be attributed to sampling randomness.

Baseline social networks

Our extensive network data allows us to investigate sorting and possible mechanisms of change due to participation in the Bal Sabha program. To measure networks, each girl was asked to identify whether each other girl in the school was a friend. We employ the following two symmetric definitions of friendship from the data:

- A. Girls i and j are "*OR*" friends if either i identifies j as a friend or j identifies i as a friend.
- B. Girls i and j are "*AND*" friends if i identifies j as a friend and j identifies i as a friend.

Consistent with a large literature on friendship networks, we find substantial evidence of homophily. That is, two girls are more likely to be friends with each other if they share characteristics in common, such as being in the same grade or the same age. To assess this, we ran the following regressions at

baseline, where L_{ij0} indicates existence of a network link between individuals i and j at baseline (time 0) and X_{i0} and X_{j0} are characteristics of each individual at baseline. In this context, $\alpha_1 < 0$ indicates homophily in friendship networks.

$$(1) L_{ij0} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 |X_i - X_j| + \epsilon_{ij0}$$

Table 4 presents results. Panel A suggests that individuals in the same grade are 10.1 percentage points more likely to be OR friends than those one grade apart and 15.2 percentage points more likely to be AND friends. We see similarly significant results for age and whether students were enrolled in prior years.

Interestingly, there is less evidence of homophily for home and family characteristics, as shown in Panel B. The signs of the coefficients are negative, as expected, but only the coefficient on mother being literate is statistically significant. This suggests that students do not appear to be sorting into friend groups based upon wealth and family characteristics.

Panels C and D show strong evidence of homophily in school and career aspirations. This suggests that estimates of peer effects on these aspirations outcomes that fail to account for network dynamics will be biased in favor of finding strong peer effects, a fact pointed out by Manski (1993) and many others.

Sorting between Elected and Non-Elected

Table 5 presents evidence of the selection processes that led to the formation of Bal Sabhas. Since elections were held in all 30 schools – unconditional on treatment status, we can investigate the election results for all students. In Columns 1 and 3, we estimate the following regressions via a linear probability model:

$$(2) L_{ij0} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_2 \text{Elected}(AND) + \epsilon_{ij0}$$

Note that the level of analysis here is that of the pairwise link: L_{ij0} is an indicator for being linked at baseline under the appropriate link definition. The variable *Elected (OR)* indicates that at least one of the members of the dyad was elected to participate, while *Elected (AND)* indicates that both members were elected. Columns 1 and 3 suggest that elected girls are more likely to be friends with each other than non-elected girls.

To investigate potential imbalance between the different treatment groups, we further estimate the following interacted model:

$$(3) L_{ij0} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_2 \text{Elected}(AND) + \gamma_3 T1_i + \gamma_4 T2_i + \gamma_5 T1_i * \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_6 T1_i * \text{Elected}(AND) + \gamma_7 T2_i * \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_8 T2_i \text{Elected}(AND) + \epsilon_{ij0}$$

Interestingly, we see large and significant estimates of the coefficients on the treatment indicators, which suggest that T1 and T2 non-elected girls are more likely to be friends than control non-elected girls. This may suggest a lack of balance at baseline. In columns 2 and 4, the coefficients on $T1 * \text{Elected}(OR)$ and

$T2 * Elected (OR)$ are negative and large (10 percentage points in many cases), suggesting that pairs of students in which one is elected and the other not elected are less likely to be friends at baseline. That is, non-elected girls are substantially less likely to be friends at baseline with elected girls, as compared with other non-elected girls. However, this relationship at baseline does not appear to hold for control schools.

While the coefficients are less consistently in the same direction, positive coefficients on *Elected (AND)*, $T1 * Elected (AND)$, and $T2 * Elected (AND)$ suggest that elected students are more likely to be friends with other elected students. This offers support for the proposition that, even before the program begins, friendship links are far from random. Rather, at baseline there is strong evidence to support the notion that elected and non-elected girls have sorted into partially-overlapping groups.

We further investigated network measures at the student level. For a given network statistic S for individual i at time 0, we estimate the following model:

$$(4) S_{i0} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Elected_i + u_{i0}$$

In this context, $Elected_i$ is an indicator for whether individual i was elected to the Bal Sabha. The coefficient δ_1 thus indicates any differences between elected and non-elected girls.

As shown in Panel A of Table 6A, we find that elected girls have *fewer* friends than those not elected under the OR definition. However, elected girls have more “strong” friends – those with reciprocal links (AND friends). Further, Panel A demonstrates sorting of groups of friends into elected and non-elected groups. That is, elected and non-elected girls have different peer groups, as shown by the mean proportion of friends who were also elected to the Bal Sabha. Combined with our link-level analysis above, those who are elected are both (1) more likely to be friends with any given other elected girl, and (2) have a higher proportion of their friends also elected. These findings have important implications for our findings as relate to non-elected girls, discussed below. If elected girls are substantially less likely to interact with non-elected girls, then this may suggest limited scope for program spillovers, especially as relates to information diffusion and learning.

Selection into Participation in T2 Schools

Looking at selection into participation in T2 schools, we see very little differences on network measures across participation, as expected due to the random selection. There are only insignificant differences among number of friends and proportion of friends selected to participate. Participants’ mean friend characteristics are very similar to non-participants’, as are baseline attitudes and expectations. These results are presented in Table 6B.

4. Results: Program Impacts

4.1 Participation in the Bal Sabha

The baseline individual- and link-level analyses presented above provide strong evidence that elected and non-elected girls are different among multiple dimensions. Because we conducted elections in all three treatment groups prior to randomization, we are able to compare those who were elected and participated

in the program in T1 schools to those who were elected but did not receive the program in C schools. Accordingly, we estimate the following equation for outcomes y at time 1 (endline) for student i :

$$(5) y_{i1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_i + u_{i1}$$

Here we restrict estimation to elected girls in T1 and C schools, omitting T2 girls. In estimating the impact on T1 girls, we. Results are presented in Table 7. Panel A suggests that the program did not have significant effects on aspirations or expectations for education for those who were elected to participate. In contrast, Panel B suggests that the program was effective in moving expectations about age at marriage upward, while making career expectations more pessimistic. Finally, we do not see significant effects on attitudes about gender roles but note that the point estimates suggest positive changes in attitudes about marriage, women’s work, and the propriety of disagreeing with men in public.

By an analogous strategy, we estimate program impacts in T2 schools by estimating the following equation:

$$(6) y_{i1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T2_i + u_{i1}$$

Since the 13 participant girls in each school were chosen at random, we compare these girls to all girls in control schools in Table 8. We find less evidence for impacts among those who were randomly selected to participate in T2 schools. While cautioning that our sample sizes are not large and we are testing multiple hypotheses, the only significant result we see is that participants are more likely to favor marriage over father’s objection.

4.2 Spillovers to non-participants

The prior section compared elected girls in T1 to elected girls in control schools. Analogously, we can compare non-elected girls in T1 to non-elected girls in control schools to investigate the program impact on non-participants. Spillovers in T1 schools are estimated via Equation 5, except now restricting the sample to non-elected girls in T1 and C. Curiously, T1 non-participants’ educational aspirations and expectations appear to be negatively affected by the program. Panel A of Table 9 suggests that these individuals are 17.4 to 17.7 percentage points *less* likely to say they would like to complete at least grade 12, and 13.5 to 14.7 percentage points *less* likely to want to complete a B.A. We see smaller, negative, and mostly insignificant results for educational expectations.

In contrast, we find positive impacts on marriage expectations among non-participant T1 girls. For marriage after age 18, we see an effect of approximately 10 percentage points, roughly half the effect on participant girls. We see significant negative effects on our self-efficacy measures (“I am able to do things as well as most people”), suggesting that these girls may have been discouraged by not being chosen for the Girls’ Parliament. Finally, similar to participants, we see no significant effects on attitudes about gender roles.

Since T2 participants—and thus also non-participants—were chosen randomly from the entire population of students, we compare T2 non-participants to all C students. Accordingly, spillovers in T2

schools are estimated via Equation 6, but restricting the sample to non-participants in T2 and all C students. While again cautioning as to the sample sizes, note the lack of significance of almost all treatment estimates in Table 10. Comparing these to the effects on participants in Table 8, note that they are generally smaller and of the same sign, as expected for peer effects. Similar to T1 non-participants, we see a negative and marginally significant negative effect on self-efficacy. This supports the supposition that girls are actually affected by *the selection mechanism*, a claim that will be investigated in future work.

5. Mechanisms of Change and Diffusion of Soft Skills

5.1 Evidence of Differential Network Formation at the Link Level

In order to better understand the spread of soft skills throughout this vulnerable population, we collected extensive social network data at both baseline and endline, allowing us to investigate changes in networks themselves due to participation in the program. We first look at network effects at the level of the pairwise link. To investigate the effects in T1 schools, we estimate Equation 7.

$$(7) L_{ij1} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_2 \text{Elected}(AND) + \gamma_3 T1_i + \gamma_4 T1_i * \text{Elected}(OR) + \gamma_5 T1_i * \text{Elected}(AND) + \epsilon_{ij1}$$

Here, L_{ij1} represents the existence of a link between individuals i and j at endline. The sample for this analysis is all students in T1 and C schools. Note here that γ_1 identifies the difference in probability of having a link at endline if one student is elected, as compared to neither. In contrast, γ_2 indicates the difference in probability of a link existing at endline if both students were elected, as compared to only one. Coefficients of interest are γ_3 , the effect on pairs that were not elected along with the interaction terms γ_4 and γ_5 .

Panel A of Table 11 presents our main results on network formation in T1 schools. All results are consistent with the program leading to differential segregation of girls into “in” and “out” groups. Notice the consistently significant coefficients on $T1 * \text{Elected}(OR)$ for OR friendships in Panel A. From Columns 2 and 3, this suggests that, conditional on baseline friendship, T1 assignment causes a dyad that has one member elected and the other not to be 8.2 percentage points less likely to be friends at endline, as compared to similarly-situated control dyads. We see insignificant coefficients on $T1 * \text{Elected}(AND)$, suggesting that elected girls are no more or less likely to be friends with other elected girls in T1 schools at endline. All results are robust to inclusion of baseline friendship and other network measures.

The network effects for T2 students are even clearer. We estimate Equation 8, restricted to students in C and T2 schools.

$$(8) L_{ij1} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 T2_i + \gamma_2 T2_i * \text{Participant}(OR) + \gamma_3 T2_i * \text{Participant}(AND) + \epsilon_{ij1}$$

Here, $\text{Participant}(OR)$ is an indicator for one member of the dyad being randomly chosen for participant, while $\text{Participant}(AND)$ indicates that both were chosen. While not all significant, the coefficients on the interaction of T2 and $\text{Participant}(OR)$ are all negative, while the coefficients on the

interaction of $T2$ and *Participant (AND)* are all positive. So, having one member of a potential friendship pair selected as a participant in T2 schools implies lower probability of being friends post-intervention, while having both members selected as participants implies higher probability of being friends as compared with having one member participate. This presents strong support for the claim that treatment serves to partition the population into two groups. Post-intervention, participants and non-participants are more likely to be friends with their own types but less likely to claim friendships with the opposite type.

5.2 No Evidence of Differential Network Effects at the Student Level

In contrast to the link-level analysis, if we zoom up a level to that of the individual, we see little evidence of differential network formation. Similar to baseline, for a given network statistic S for individual i at time 1, we estimate Equation 9.

$$(9) S_{i1} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 T1_i + u_{i1}$$

We restrict estimation of Equation 9 to girls in T1 and C schools. Similar to the analysis above, we estimate this separately for elected and non-elected girls. Results are presented in Table 12. Interestingly, we see no significant impact on number of friends or proportion of friends who were also elected to the program. These null results are robust to including baseline measures to lower variance.

We conducted analogous estimation in T2 schools, leading to Equation 10.

$$(10) S_{i1} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 T2_i + u_{i1}$$

We estimate Equation 10 separately for participants and non-participants, comparing each group to all students in control schools. Results are presented in Table 13. Participant girls in T1 schools have no more friends on average than all girls in control schools. Further, we see similar null results for non-participants, as shown in Panel B of Table 13.

These findings of no significant effects on network measures at the student level are in contrast to the finding of strong effects on networks at the pairwise-link level. We speculate that this is due to the relatively small sample sizes at the individual level, together with limited variation in peer group mean outcomes. The aggregation inherent in analysis of individual-level measures may also be a culprit: it is possible that the peer effects literature's focus on peer group aggregates serves to obscure important peer group dynamics that occur at the level of the pairwise link.

6. Conclusion

This paper examines the causal effect of participation and non-participation in a girls' parliament program on self-efficacy, aspirations and expectations as well as network formation. The program was conducted in rural Rajasthan (India) for a duration of approximately six months. We randomly split schools into three groups: one where participants were democratically elected by their peers, one where participants were randomly selected and one group with no parliament. Exogenous variation in both treatment assignment and the selection process allows us to better understand the channels of change that work both through and on social networks.

We find that participants are more strongly affected by the program when they are democratically elected rather than randomly selected. Democratically-elected participants expect to marry at a significantly older age than their counterparts (elected too but in control schools and thus not participating in the program), while their career expectations are more pessimistic, possibly reflecting more realistic assessments of their career prospects. Program impacts on randomly selected participants are not significant.

In addition, we find evidence of spillovers with both types of selection into participation. In schools where girls were elected into the parliament, non-participants' expectations of age at marriage are also significantly higher than those of their counterparts in control schools. Similarly, in these schools, the negative impact of the program on career expectations spills over to non-participants.

Interestingly, the peer effects analysis also suggests that girls are affected by the selection mechanism. Non-participants in both types of treatment schools – with democratically-elected or randomly-selected participants – have significantly lower self-efficacy than girls in control schools after the program. Similarly, while the educational expectations of democratically-elected participants were not significantly affected by the program, their non-participant peers expect to attend school for a significantly shorter period than similarly-situated students in control schools. This “discouragement effect” for non-participants contrasts with the positive impact of the program on both participants and non-participants' marriage expectations and calls for caution in expanding this type of education program based on the exclusion of a significant portion of the school population.

Finally, we analyze the network formation process in order to better understand this selection mechanism. The program leads to partitioning friendships and increases network segregation between participants and non-participants. This not only suggests that the program's effects work *through* social networks, but also hints at the possibility that *changes* in social networks may be an important channel through which the program affects girls' aspirations and expectations. Future work will scale up this project and seek to speak more to this issue.

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Table 1 -- Attrition**Panel A: Of those present on baseline enrollment list**

Dependent var:	Present for Baseline	Present for Baseline	Present for Endline	Present for Endline
	Questionnaire	Network Survey	Questionnaire	Network Survey
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T1	0.053 (0.058)	0.030 (0.047)	0.067* (0.033)	0.049 (0.038)
T2	-0.024 (0.062)	0.011 (0.056)	-0.008 (0.040)	-0.014 (0.043)
Constant	0.722*** (0.047)	0.685*** (0.042)	0.726*** (0.023)	0.735*** (0.025)
Observations	2,662	2,662	2,662	2,662
R-squared	0.005	0.001	0.006	0.004
Mean of dep var in control	0.722	0.685	0.726	0.735
Mean of dep var in entire sample	0.733	0.699	0.745	0.747

Panel B: Of those present for baseline questionnaire

Dependent var:	Present for Baseline	Present for Endline	Present for Endline
	Network Survey	Questionnaire	Network Survey
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	0.041 (0.067)	0.049* (0.026)	0.031 (0.025)
T2	0.068 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.034)	0.009 (0.027)
Constant	0.757*** (0.057)	0.806*** (0.017)	0.816*** (0.015)
Observations	1,950	1,950	1,950
R-squared	0.005	0.005	0.001
Mean of dep var in control	0.757	0.806	0.816
Mean of dep var in entire sample	0.784	0.808	0.819

Panel C: Of those present for baseline network survey

Dependent var:	Present for Baseline	Present for Endline	Present for Endline
	Questionnaire Survey	Questionnaire	Network Survey
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	0.066 (0.048)	0.047 (0.035)	0.013 (0.030)
T2	0.030 (0.059)	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.038)
Constant	0.798*** (0.041)	0.803*** (0.022)	0.825*** (0.021)
Observations	1,860	1,860	1,860
R-squared	0.005	0.004	0.000
Mean of dep var in control	0.798	0.803	0.825
Mean of dep var in entire sample	0.814	0.797	0.808

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample is all students (girls and boys).

Table 2 -- Baseline Balance (all Students)

Panel A: Balance among Individual Characteristics	T1	T2	Control	P-value of F-test of	
				Equality	N
Standard	7.044 (0.054)	6.882 (0.088)	6.933 (0.017)	0.116	1189
Age	12.288 (0.130)	12.305 (0.096)	12.561 (0.122)	0.188	1189
Enrolled Previous Year	0.881 (0.041)	0.792 (0.054)	0.862 (0.024)	0.388	891
School Enrollment Size	97.816 (11.136)	82.176 (8.510)	114.519 (18.438)	0.210	1189
Has Electricity at Home	0.925 (0.023)	0.932 (0.028)	0.976 (0.012)	0.079	891
Owns TV	0.823 (0.053)	0.866 (0.043)	0.907 (0.025)	0.304	839
Father Attended School	0.851 (0.043)	0.787 (0.042)	0.848 (0.044)	0.478	806
Father Literate	0.853 (0.043)	0.804 (0.029)	0.818 (0.047)	0.636	880
Mother Attended School	0.618 (0.055)	0.484 (0.065)	0.556 (0.060)	0.282	823
Mother Literate	0.468 (0.060)	0.434 (0.059)	0.453 (0.061)	0.917	842
Panel B: Balance among Baseline Outcomes	T1	T2	Control	P-value of F-test of	
				Equality	N
Would like to complete at least Grade 12	0.517 (0.077)	0.564 (0.052)	0.529 (0.061)	0.840	909
Would like to complete at least B.A.	0.236 (0.075)	0.198 (0.063)	0.244 (0.039)	0.810	909
Expect to complete at least Grade 12	0.462 (0.078)	0.561 (0.065)	0.449 (0.075)	0.437	854
Expect to complete at least B.A.	0.185 (0.068)	0.225 (0.052)	0.232 (0.064)	0.849	854
Expect to get married at Age 18 or older	0.189 (0.039)	0.224 (0.050)	0.185 (0.053)	0.817	919
Expect to get married at Age 22 or older	0.106 (0.047)	0.065 (0.025)	0.111 (0.035)	0.480	919
Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary when grow up	0.409 (0.082)	0.457 (0.075)	0.480 (0.056)	0.766	999
It is likely that I will have this career	0.693 (0.061)	0.615 (0.082)	0.632 (0.055)	0.661	899
There is an adult that I feel comfortable talking with about problems/concerns	0.604 (0.076)	0.773 (0.032)	0.745 (0.048)	0.126	904
Prefer to follow rather than lead	0.381 (0.102)	0.577 (0.044)	0.364 (0.052)	0.007	929
I am able to do things as well as most people	0.699 (0.052)	0.704 (0.054)	0.798 (0.039)	0.201	934
In India, boys have more opportunities than girls	0.553 (0.057)	0.574 (0.056)	0.509 (0.048)	0.637	931
If man and woman want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection	0.179 (0.074)	0.306 (0.089)	0.300 (0.043)	0.328	910
Only men should work outside the home	0.349 (0.060)	0.443 (0.088)	0.303 (0.050)	0.372	933
A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	0.261 (0.027)	0.418 (0.068)	0.351 (0.049)	0.050	894

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3A -- Who was Elected (Baseline Characteristics)**Panel A: Individual Characteristics**

	Elected Girls	Non Elected Girls	Difference Elected - Not	P-value for F-test of Equality	N
Standard	7.084 (0.059)	6.872 (0.037)	0.212 (0.062)	0.002	1124
Age	12.539 (0.105)	12.286 (0.074)	0.253 (0.109)	0.028	1124
Enrolled Previous Year	0.858 (0.028)	0.841 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	0.488	845
Has Electricity at Home	0.943 (0.015)	0.953 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.657	846
Owns TV	0.860 (0.029)	0.877 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.030)	0.563	804
Father Attended School	0.825 (0.033)	0.835 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.029)	0.743	777
Father Literate	0.859 (0.036)	0.809 (0.026)	0.051 (0.035)	0.158	841
Mother Attended School	0.529 (0.051)	0.571 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.049)	0.395	786
Mother Literate	0.453 (0.043)	0.455 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.041)	0.962	803

Panel B: Baseline Outcomes

	Elected Girls	Non Elected Girls	Difference Elected - Not	P-value for F-test of Equality	N
Would like to complete at least Grade 12	0.561 (0.045)	0.531 (0.042)	0.030 (0.038)	0.440	1112
Expect to complete at least Grade 12	0.288 (0.046)	0.202 (0.032)	0.085 (0.031)	0.009	1112
Expect to get married at Age 18 or older	0.210 (0.037)	0.199 (0.026)	0.011 (0.030)	0.721	1114
Would like to work for wage/salary when grow up	0.443 (0.053)	0.477 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.033)	0.304	1122
I am able to do things as well as most people.	0.746 (0.034)	0.719 (0.038)	0.027 (0.041)	0.527	1114
I would rather follow than lead.	0.477 (0.052)	0.419 (0.046)	0.059 (0.035)	0.106	1114
A woman should not disagree with her husband in public.	0.359 (0.050)	0.316 (0.022)	0.043 (0.040)	0.296	1102
Boys in India have more opportunities than girls.	0.603 (0.040)	0.510 (0.027)	0.093 (0.030)	0.004	1115

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3B -- Who was Randomly Chosen in T2 (Baseline Characteristics)

Panel A: Individual Characteristics

	Participants	Non-Participants	Difference	P-value for F-test of Equality	N
Standard	6.891 (0.165)	6.864 (0.078)	0.027 (0.158)	0.867	352
Age	12.255 (0.177)	12.260 (0.087)	-0.006 (0.149)	0.970	352
Enrolled Previous Year	0.836 (0.067)	0.764 (0.061)	0.072 (0.069)	0.322	255
Has Electricity at Home	0.906 (0.036)	0.945 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.025)	0.155	268
Owns TV	0.870 (0.048)	0.860 (0.048)	0.010 (0.043)	0.814	241
Father Attended School	0.653 (0.055)	0.850 (0.038)	-0.197 (0.045)	0.002	242
Father Literate	0.793 (0.042)	0.815 (0.038)	-0.022 (0.065)	0.742	260
Mother Attended School	0.507 (0.076)	0.473 (0.075)	0.033 (0.069)	0.641	244
Mother Literate	0.468 (0.089)	0.416 (0.069)	0.052 (0.078)	0.521	240

Panel B: Baseline Outcomes

	Participants	Non-Participants	Difference	P-value for F-test of Equality	N
Would like to complete at least Grade 12	0.538 (0.057)	0.572 (0.071)	-0.034 (0.066)	0.620	350
Expect to complete at least Grade 12	0.221 (0.070)	0.195 (0.066)	0.026 (0.055)	0.649	350
Expect to get married at Age 18 or older	0.291 (0.089)	0.222 (0.047)	0.069 (0.070)	0.350	350
Would like to work for wage/salary when grow up	0.506 (0.091)	0.433 (0.066)	0.073 (0.064)	0.278	352
I am able to do things as well as most people.	0.650 (0.081)	0.711 (0.053)	-0.061 (0.073)	0.424	350
I would rather follow than lead.	0.653 (0.055)	0.541 (0.047)	0.113 (0.023)	0.001	350
A woman should not disagree with her husband in public.	0.476 (0.075)	0.362 (0.056)	0.114 (0.057)	0.076	350
Boys in India have more opportunities than girls.	0.618 (0.068)	0.551 (0.048)	0.067 (0.057)	0.277	350

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 --What Predicts Links

Panel A: Individual Characteristics

Indep. Variable	Standard		Age		Enrolled Previous Year	
	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
Network Definition	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Abs Value of Distance	-0.101*** (0.011)	-0.152*** (0.019)	-0.029*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.010)	-0.074*** (0.024)	-0.130*** (0.036)
Constant	0.869*** (0.038)	0.515*** (0.058)	0.824*** (0.045)	0.452*** (0.057)	0.806*** (0.050)	0.446*** (0.066)
Observations	12,488	12,477	11,376	11,366	7,410	7,403
R-squared	0.034	0.054	0.006	0.009	0.006	0.013

Panel B: Home and Family Characteristics

Indep. Variable	Family Has Electricity at				Father Attended School		Father Literate		Mother Attended School		Mother Literate	
	Home		Family owns TV		OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
Network Definition	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Abs Value of Distance	0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.078)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.047 (0.059)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.006 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.023)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.035** (0.013)	-0.052** (0.020)
Constant	0.798*** (0.049)	0.415*** (0.063)	0.796*** (0.048)	0.410*** (0.067)	0.795*** (0.045)	0.407*** (0.061)	0.782*** (0.054)	0.400*** (0.065)	0.798*** (0.045)	0.422*** (0.060)	0.812*** (0.044)	0.441*** (0.062)
Observations	7,847	7,840	7,225	7,218	6,918	6,910	7,727	7,717	6,926	6,919	6,914	6,908
R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003

Panel C: Baseline Aspirations and Expectations about School

Indep. Variable	Would like to complete		Would like to complete		Expect to complete		Expect to complete	
	Grade 12		B.A.		Grade 12		B.A.	
Network Definition	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Abs Value of Distance	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.046** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.022)	-0.058 (0.036)	-0.045*** (0.011)	-0.064*** (0.018)	-0.063* (0.037)	-0.060 (0.055)
Constant	0.803*** (0.044)	0.416*** (0.054)	0.809*** (0.042)	0.415*** (0.055)	0.806*** (0.044)	0.423*** (0.054)	0.806*** (0.036)	0.415*** (0.044)
Observations	11,781	11,771	11,781	11,771	11,708	11,697	11,708	11,697
R-squared	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.002

Panel D: Baseline Aspirations and Expectations about Marriage and Career

Indep. Variable Network Definition	Expect to get married at Age 18 or older		Expect to get married at Age 22 or older		Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary		It is likely that I will have this career	
	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Abs Value of Distance	-0.077** (0.030)	-0.097** (0.039)	-0.118*** (0.042)	-0.147** (0.055)	-0.055*** (0.015)	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.076*** (0.022)
Constant	0.806*** (0.039)	0.422*** (0.047)	0.805*** (0.041)	0.421*** (0.052)	0.814*** (0.039)	0.435*** (0.055)	0.801*** (0.046)	0.425*** (0.058)
Observations	12,007	11,996	12,007	11,996	11,742	11,731	11,886	11,875
R-squared	0.006	0.006	0.010	0.011	0.004	0.006	0.002	0.004

Panel E: Baseline Self Confidence

Indep. Variable Network Definition	There is an adult I am comfortable talking w/ re: problems/ conerns		Prefer to follow rather than lead		I am able to do things as well as most people	
	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Abs Value of Distance	-0.033* (0.019)	-0.046 (0.027)	-0.039* (0.021)	-0.037 (0.030)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.030)
Constant	0.798*** (0.043)	0.412*** (0.058)	0.799*** (0.052)	0.408*** (0.061)	0.784*** (0.052)	0.401*** (0.060)
Observations	11,804	11,793	11,967	11,956	11,978	11,967
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000

Panel F: Baseline Attitudes about Gender Roles

Indep. Variable Network Definition	In India, boys have more opportunities than girls		want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection		Only men should work outside the home		A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	
	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND	OR	AND
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Abs Value of Distance	-0.032 (0.019)	-0.054** (0.022)	-0.018 (0.032)	0.007 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.036 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.051** (0.019)
Constant	0.799*** (0.041)	0.419*** (0.056)	0.789*** (0.041)	0.393*** (0.049)	0.792*** (0.044)	0.409*** (0.056)	0.793*** (0.039)	0.414*** (0.056)
Observations	12,050	12,039	11,954	11,943	11,972	11,961	11,922	11,912
R-squared	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Dependent variable is existence of friendship at Baseline.

Table 5 - Elected and Participants

Panel A: Elected				
Network Definition	OR		AND	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elected (OR)	0.076 (0.048)	0.116*** (0.040)	0.095* (0.050)	0.116*** (0.036)
Elected (AND)	0.076*** (0.022)	0.093* (0.048)	0.157*** (0.041)	0.099 (0.063)
T1		0.169** (0.069)		0.139* (0.081)
T2		0.189** (0.071)		0.236*** (0.067)
T1 * Elected (OR)		-0.115** (0.048)		-0.058 (0.067)
T1 * Elected (AND)		-0.032 (0.059)		0.106 (0.101)
T2 * Elected (OR)		-0.099** (0.046)		-0.107* (0.057)
T2 * Elected (AND)		-0.027 (0.052)		0.052 (0.079)
Constant	0.745*** (0.060)	0.659*** (0.066)	0.333*** (0.060)	0.244*** (0.060)
Observations	14,029	14,029	14,029	14,029
R-squared	0.014	0.045	0.023	0.054
Mean of Dep var in Control	0.701	0.701	0.286	0.286
P-value of Test of T1 * Elected (OR) + T1 * Elected (AND)		0.721		0.050
P-value of Test of T2 + T2 * Elected (OR) + T2 * Elected (AND)		0.206		0.105

Panel B: Participants		
Network Definition	OR	AND
	T1	0.124* (0.068)
T2	0.158** (0.068)	0.184** (0.073)
T1 * Participant (OR)	0.001 (0.027)	0.065 (0.057)
T1 * Participant (AND)	0.103*** (0.032)	0.222*** (0.068)
T2 * Participant (OR)	-0.001 (0.018)	0.041 (0.036)
T2 * Participant (AND)	0.045** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.037)
Constant	0.701*** (0.065)	0.286*** (0.061)
Observations	14,029	14,029
R-squared	0.034	0.046
Mean of Dep var in Control	0.701	0.286
P-value of Test of T1 * Elected (OR) + T1 * Elected (AND)	0.003	0.000
P-value of Test of T2 + T2 * Elected (OR) + T2 * Elected (AND)	0.012	0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Dependent variable is existence of friendship at Baseline.

Table 6A -- Who was Elected (Peer Group Characteristics)

	Elected Girls	Non Elected Girls	Diff Elected - Not	P-value	N
<u>Panel A: Peer Group Characteristics</u>					
Number of female friends (OR)	16.214 (1.538)	18.416 (1.894)	-2.201 (1.377)	0.121	1124
Number of female friends (AND)	9.186 (1.046)	8.706 (0.915)	0.479 (0.765)	0.535	1124
Proportion of friends also elected (OR)	0.423 (0.042)	0.272 (0.036)	0.151 (0.039)	0.001	894
Proportion of friends also elected (AND)	0.459 (0.039)	0.262 (0.031)	0.196 (0.038)	0.000	855
<u>Panel B: Peer Group Mean Individual Characteristics</u>					
Standard	7.078 (0.049)	6.929 (0.046)	0.149 (0.053)	0.009	894
Age	12.413 (0.086)	12.333 (0.080)	0.080 (0.076)	0.298	893
Enrolled Previous Year	0.870 (0.025)	0.837 (0.023)	0.034 (0.017)	0.057	891
Has Electricity at Home	0.946 (0.014)	0.945 (0.017)	0.001 (0.010)	0.934	893
Owns TV	0.862 (0.027)	0.891 (0.024)	-0.028 (0.017)	0.116	892
Father Attended School	0.830 (0.025)	0.859 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.015)	0.061	891
Father Literate	0.823 (0.026)	0.861 (0.019)	-0.037 (0.019)	0.057	892
Mother Attended School	0.567 (0.045)	0.574 (0.041)	-0.007 (0.031)	0.817	890
Mother Literate	0.481 (0.037)	0.478 (0.040)	0.003 (0.025)	0.904	890
<u>Panel C: Peer Group Mean Baseline Outcomes</u>					
Would like to complete at least Grade 12	0.545 (0.036)	0.566 (0.042)	-0.021 (0.031)	0.509	893
Expect to complete at least Grade 12	0.506 (0.048)	0.533 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.037)	0.483	893
Would like to work for wage/salary when grow up	0.481 (0.054)	0.431 (0.045)	0.050 (0.028)	0.091	893
I am able to do things as well as most people.	0.722 (0.033)	0.718 (0.042)	0.004 (0.028)	0.893	893
I would rather follow than lead.	0.465 (0.049)	0.436 (0.052)	0.030 (0.032)	0.368	893
A woman should not disagree with her husband in public.	0.353 (0.048)	0.299 (0.025)	0.054 (0.034)	0.125	888
Boys in India have more opportunities than girls.	0.578 (0.040)	0.517 (0.033)	0.061 (0.026)	0.026	893

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample restricted to girls who have a nonzero number of friends at baseline.

Table 6B -- Who is Selected in T2 (Peer Group Characteristics)

<u>Panel A: Peer Group Characteristics</u>	Participants	Non-Participants	Difference	P-value	N
Number of female friends (OR)	16.500 (2.603)	18.128 (2.944)	-1.628 (1.587)	0.332	352
Number of female friends (AND)	10.500 (2.007)	10.244 (2.297)	0.256 (1.349)	0.854	352
Proportion of friends also selected (OR)	0.396 (0.070)	0.281 (0.047)	0.116 (0.066)	0.113	294
Proportion of friends also selected (AND)	0.414 (0.075)	0.317 (0.058)	0.097 (0.066)	0.175	285
<u>Panel B: Peer Group Mean Individual Characteristics</u>	Participants	Non-Participants	Difference	P-value	N
Standard	6.890 (0.099)	6.940 (0.066)	-0.050 (0.054)	0.383	294
Age	12.167 (0.130)	12.315 (0.101)	-0.148 (0.109)	0.208	294
Enrolled Previous Year	0.781 (0.070)	0.810 (0.039)	-0.030 (0.045)	0.525	292
Has Electricity at Home	0.912 (0.032)	0.925 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.014)	0.395	294
Owns TV	0.844 (0.056)	0.865 (0.050)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.468	294
Father Attended School	0.798 (0.045)	0.808 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.036)	0.780	293
Father Literate	0.806 (0.029)	0.825 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	0.527	294
Mother Attended School	0.480 (0.086)	0.481 (0.081)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.973	293
Mother Literate	0.451 (0.086)	0.422 (0.074)	0.029 (0.043)	0.526	293
<u>Panel C: Peer Group Mean Baseline Outcomes</u>	Participants	Non-Participants	Difference	P-value	N
Would like to complete at least Grade 12	0.550 (0.068)	0.587 (0.060)	-0.037 (0.050)	0.483	294
Expect to complete at least Grade 12	0.567 (0.088)	0.579 (0.070)	-0.012 (0.055)	0.832	294
Would like to work for wage/salary when grow up	0.520 (0.102)	0.388 (0.080)	0.132 (0.063)	0.065	294
I am able to do things as well as most people.	0.700 (0.060)	0.695 (0.070)	0.005 (0.037)	0.887	294
I would rather follow than lead.	0.622 (0.062)	0.595 (0.055)	0.027 (0.023)	0.267	294
A woman should not disagree with her husband in public.	0.465 (0.086)	0.362 (0.061)	0.104 (0.068)	0.162	294
Boys in India have more opportunities than girls.	0.608 (0.057)	0.544 (0.065)	0.064 (0.043)	0.171	294

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample restricted to girls who have a nonzero number of friends at baseline.

Table 7 -- T1 vs C elected

Panel A: Aspirations and Expectations about Education

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Would like to complete at least Grade 12		Would like to complete at least B.A.		Expect to complete at least Grade 12		Expect to complete at least B.A.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	T1	-0.036 (0.116)	-0.071 (0.095)	-0.078 (0.123)	-0.066 (0.100)	0.012 (0.122)	0.009 (0.116)	-0.066 (0.113)
Baseline Response		0.399*** (0.082)		0.372*** (0.099)		0.279*** (0.079)		0.302*** (0.094)
Constant	0.717*** (0.088)	0.754* (0.402)	0.396*** (0.098)	0.047 (0.438)	0.533*** (0.086)	0.468 (0.539)	0.271*** (0.092)	-0.071 (0.321)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	219	219	219	219	219	219	219	219
R-squared	0.002	0.186	0.007	0.166	0.000	0.120	0.006	0.167
Mean of dep var in control	0.717	0.717	0.396	0.396	0.533	0.533	0.271	0.271

Panel B: Aspirations and Expectations about Marriage and Career

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Expect to get married at Age 18 or older		Expect to get married at Age 22 or older		Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary when grow up		It is likely that I will have this career	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	T1	0.200** (0.073)	0.212*** (0.073)	0.014 (0.086)	0.021 (0.075)	-0.007 (0.074)	-0.050 (0.061)	-0.118* (0.067)
Baseline Response		0.152 (0.116)		0.277** (0.125)		0.184*** (0.051)		0.005 (0.083)
Constant	0.260*** (0.055)	0.035 (0.472)	0.202*** (0.056)	0.357 (0.471)	0.832*** (0.053)	0.975*** (0.229)	0.851*** (0.046)	0.217 (0.403)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	215	215	215	215	221	221	206	206
R-squared	0.043	0.066	0.000	0.067	0.000	0.419	0.021	0.060
Mean of dep var in control	0.260	0.260	0.202	0.202	0.832	0.832	0.851	0.851

Panel C: Self-Confidence

Dependent var: Endline Response to	There is an adult that I feel comfortable talking					
	with about problems/concerns		Prefer to follow rather than lead		I am able to do things as well as most people	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T1	-0.031 (0.081)	-0.047 (0.092)	0.030 (0.109)	0.020 (0.105)	-0.021 (0.080)	-0.028 (0.087)
Baseline Response		0.023 (0.092)		-0.113 (0.083)		0.118* (0.063)
Constant	0.683*** (0.064)	0.561 (0.447)	0.514*** (0.073)	0.614 (0.452)	0.762*** (0.056)	0.984** (0.466)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	219	219	217	217	217	217
R-squared	0.001	0.020	0.001	0.018	0.001	0.025
Mean of dep var in control	0.683	0.683	0.514	0.514	0.762	0.762

Panel D: Attitudes about Gender Roles

Dependent var: Endline Response to	If man and woman want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection				Only men should work outside the home		A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	
	In India, boys have more opportunities than girls							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	0.138 (0.098)	0.131 (0.088)	0.094 (0.070)	0.061 (0.051)	-0.106 (0.105)	-0.109 (0.094)	-0.088 (0.102)	-0.083 (0.109)
Baseline Response		0.048 (0.047)		0.177** (0.064)		0.107 (0.088)		0.059 (0.090)
Constant	0.119*** (0.024)	0.297 (0.389)	0.160*** (0.035)	0.029 (0.277)	0.279*** (0.079)	0.974*** (0.302)	0.262*** (0.079)	0.403 (0.318)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	210	210	220	216	220	220	222	218
R-squared	0.031	0.074	0.013	0.093	0.016	0.062	0.011	0.045
Mean of dep var in control	0.119	0.119	0.160	0.160	0.279	0.279	0.262	0.262

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Baseline controls include age, standard, and school enrollment.

Table 8 -- T2 participants vs all C

Panel A: Aspirations and Expectations about Education

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Would like to complete at least Grade 12		Would like to complete at least B.A.		Expect to complete at least Grade 12		Expect to complete at least B.A.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T2	-0.116 (0.074)	-0.117 (0.073)	-0.013 (0.090)	0.047 (0.085)	-0.042 (0.087)	-0.038 (0.090)	-0.005 (0.087)	0.048 (0.074)
Baseline Response		0.204*** (0.070)		0.310*** (0.072)		0.250*** (0.054)		0.302*** (0.069)
Constant	0.732*** (0.044)	0.644 (0.411)	0.368*** (0.048)	-0.128 (0.321)	0.552*** (0.055)	0.650 (0.391)	0.265*** (0.053)	-0.288 (0.272)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	484	484	484	484	473	473	473	473
R-squared	0.011	0.061	0.000	0.090	0.001	0.080	0.000	0.121
Mean of dep var in control	0.732	0.732	0.368	0.368	0.552	0.552	0.265	0.265

Panel B: Aspirations and Expectations about Marriage and Career

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Expect to get married at Age 18 or older		Expect to get married at Age 22 or older		Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary when grow up		It is likely that I will have this career	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T2	-0.052 (0.087)	-0.039 (0.079)	-0.097 (0.080)	-0.059 (0.077)	0.004 (0.049)	-0.018 (0.037)	0.033 (0.033)	0.022 (0.037)
Baseline Response		0.182** (0.069)		0.250** (0.114)		0.175*** (0.036)		0.002 (0.061)
Constant	0.282*** (0.040)	-0.274 (0.335)	0.207*** (0.040)	-0.180 (0.305)	0.814*** (0.027)	0.611*** (0.146)	0.833*** (0.012)	0.770*** (0.214)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	472	472	472	472	485	485	463	463
R-squared	0.002	0.059	0.010	0.079	0.000	0.579	0.001	0.004
Mean of dep var in control	0.282	0.282	0.207	0.207	0.814	0.814	0.833	0.833

Panel C: Self-Confidence

Dependent var: Endline Response to	There is an adult that I feel comfortable talking					
	with about problems/concerns		Prefer to follow rather than lead		I am able to do things as well as most people	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T2	0.073 (0.108)	0.009 (0.107)	-0.065 (0.091)	-0.028 (0.102)	-0.043 (0.053)	0.010 (0.059)
Baseline Response		0.131 (0.090)		0.016 (0.057)		0.052 (0.045)
Constant	0.629*** (0.069)	0.137 (0.459)	0.546*** (0.065)	0.319 (0.315)	0.779*** (0.029)	0.723** (0.275)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	481	481	483	483	477	477
R-squared	0.004	0.055	0.003	0.015	0.002	0.023
Mean of dep var in control	0.629	0.629	0.546	0.546	0.779	0.779

Panel D: Attitudes about Gender Roles

Dependent var: Endline Response to	If man and woman want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection								A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	
	In India, boys have more opportunities than girls		able to despite father's objection		Only men should work outside the home		disagree with her husband in public			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
T2	-0.013 (0.055)	-0.042 (0.051)	0.169* (0.083)	0.170* (0.085)	-0.024 (0.076)	-0.073 (0.072)	0.008 (0.056)	-0.003 (0.066)		
Baseline Response		-0.001 (0.029)		0.080 (0.068)		0.062 (0.066)		0.086 (0.062)		
Constant	0.151*** (0.021)	0.243 (0.239)	0.157*** (0.025)	-0.434* (0.211)	0.199*** (0.044)	0.260 (0.190)	0.196*** (0.031)	0.169 (0.270)		
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES		
Observations	474	474	485	485	480	480	481	481		
R-squared	0.000	0.015	0.031	0.064	0.001	0.018	0.000	0.013		
Mean of dep var in control	0.151	0.151	0.157	0.157	0.199	0.199	0.196	0.196		

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Baseline controls include age, standard, and school enrollment.

Table 9 -- T1 vs C non-elected

Panel A: Aspirations and Expectations about Education

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Would like to complete at least Grade 12		Would like to complete at least B.A.		Expect to complete at least Grade 12		Expect to complete at least B.A.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	-0.177** (0.076)	-0.174* (0.086)	-0.147** (0.061)	-0.135*** (0.043)	-0.084 (0.070)	-0.094 (0.060)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.052* (0.029)
Baseline Response		0.206*** (0.067)		0.295*** (0.064)		0.235*** (0.060)		0.351*** (0.073)
Constant	0.737*** (0.038)	0.998** (0.388)	0.358*** (0.042)	0.353 (0.291)	0.560*** (0.055)	0.693** (0.314)	0.263*** (0.046)	-0.013 (0.323)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	483	483	483	483	474	474	474	474
R-squared	0.034	0.090	0.026	0.105	0.007	0.064	0.010	0.123
Mean of dep var in control	0.737	0.737	0.358	0.358	0.560	0.560	0.263	0.263

Panel B: Aspirations and Expectations about Marriage and Career

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Expect to get married at Age 18 or older		Expect to get married at Age 22 or older		Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary when grow up		It is likely that I will have this career	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	0.091* (0.052)	0.111** (0.049)	0.022 (0.071)	0.035 (0.067)	-0.067 (0.059)	-0.060 (0.054)	-0.108** (0.047)	-0.116** (0.042)
Baseline Response		0.153** (0.061)		0.239* (0.128)		0.218*** (0.056)		0.041 (0.071)
Constant	0.291*** (0.034)	-0.062 (0.298)	0.209*** (0.038)	0.099 (0.239)	0.807*** (0.032)	0.689*** (0.155)	0.826*** (0.013)	0.883*** (0.245)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	467	467	467	467	481	481	460	460
R-squared	0.009	0.042	0.001	0.051	0.006	0.565	0.017	0.033
Mean of dep var in control	0.291	0.291	0.209	0.209	0.807	0.807	0.826	0.826

Panel C: Self-Confidence

Dependent var: Endline Response to	There is an adult that I feel comfortable talking					
	with about problems/concerns		Prefer to follow rather than lead		I am able to do things as well as most people	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T1	0.003 (0.077)	-0.009 (0.072)	-0.160* (0.086)	-0.143 (0.096)	-0.180*** (0.047)	-0.153*** (0.043)
Baseline Response		0.135** (0.053)		0.009 (0.069)		0.031 (0.046)
Constant	0.608*** (0.073)	0.311 (0.502)	0.558*** (0.069)	0.575** (0.263)	0.785*** (0.021)	0.340 (0.298)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	481	481	480	480	475	475
R-squared	0.000	0.028	0.025	0.037	0.039	0.056
Mean of dep var in control	0.608	0.608	0.558	0.558	0.785	0.785

Panel D: Attitudes about Gender Roles

Dependent var: Endline Response to	If man and woman want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection				Only men should work outside the home		A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	
	In India, boys have more opportunities than girls							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	0.025 (0.059)	0.018 (0.062)	0.066 (0.054)	0.056 (0.055)	-0.016 (0.059)	-0.034 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.045)
Baseline Response		-0.049 (0.035)		0.043 (0.058)		-0.058* (0.029)		0.127* (0.064)
Constant	0.162*** (0.025)	0.287 (0.291)	0.156*** (0.027)	-0.249 (0.239)	0.168*** (0.035)	0.468** (0.218)	0.170*** (0.025)	-0.301* (0.160)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	474	474	482	480	483	483	478	471
R-squared	0.001	0.013	0.007	0.033	0.000	0.027	0.001	0.033
Mean of dep var in control	0.162	0.162	0.156	0.156	0.168	0.168	0.170	0.170

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Baseline controls include age, standard, and school enrollment.

Table 10 - T2 non-participants vs all C

Panel A: Aspirations and Expectations about Education

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Would like to complete at least Grade 12		Would like to complete at least B.A.		Expect to complete at least Grade 12		Expect to complete at least B.A.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	T2	-0.038 (0.074)	-0.057 (0.064)	-0.076 (0.066)	-0.027 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.070)	-0.042 (0.069)	0.026 (0.068)
Baseline Response		0.210*** (0.056)		0.326*** (0.065)		0.279*** (0.046)		0.334*** (0.075)
Constant	0.732*** (0.044)	0.779** (0.348)	0.368*** (0.048)	0.161 (0.296)	0.552*** (0.055)	0.502 (0.348)	0.265*** (0.053)	-0.107 (0.312)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	602	602	602	602	589	589	589	589
R-squared	0.002	0.058	0.006	0.099	0.002	0.089	0.001	0.122
Mean of dep var in control	0.732	0.732	0.368	0.368	0.552	0.552	0.265	0.265

Panel B: Aspirations and Expectations about Marriage and Career

Dependent var: Endline Response to	Expect to get married at Age 18 or older		Expect to get married at Age 22 or older		Would like to / expect to work for wage/salary when grow up		It is likely that I will have this career	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	T2	0.062 (0.086)	0.082 (0.079)	-0.033 (0.050)	0.009 (0.049)	-0.063 (0.062)	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.069 (0.053)
Baseline Response		0.197*** (0.066)		0.289*** (0.094)		0.214*** (0.038)		0.001 (0.068)
Constant	0.282*** (0.040)	-0.148 (0.332)	0.207*** (0.040)	-0.095 (0.317)	0.814*** (0.027)	0.483** (0.191)	0.833*** (0.012)	0.687*** (0.212)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	590	590	590	590	602	602	578	578
R-squared	0.004	0.048	0.002	0.059	0.005	0.549	0.007	0.014
Mean of dep var in control	0.282	0.282	0.207	0.207	0.814	0.814	0.833	0.833

Panel C: Self-Confidence

Dependent var: Endline Response to	There is an adult that I feel comfortable talking					
	with about problems/concerns		Prefer to follow rather than lead		I am able to do things as well as most people	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T2	0.095 (0.100)	0.052 (0.110)	-0.037 (0.083)	0.007 (0.096)	-0.100* (0.054)	-0.065 (0.061)
Baseline Response		0.111 (0.073)		-0.027 (0.053)		-0.027 (0.053)
Constant	0.629*** (0.069)	0.345 (0.458)	0.546*** (0.065)	0.351 (0.320)	0.779*** (0.029)	0.826*** (0.261)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	598	598	601	601	593	593
R-squared	0.009	0.034	0.001	0.010	0.012	0.024
Mean of dep var in control	0.629	0.629	0.546	0.546	0.779	0.779

Panel D: Attitudes about Gender Roles

Dependent var: Endline Response to	In India, boys have more opportunities than girls		If man and woman want to marry, they should be able to despite father's objection		Only men should work outside the home		A woman should not disagree with her husband in public	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	T2	0.011 (0.056)	-0.021 (0.052)	0.059 (0.048)	0.071 (0.059)	0.004 (0.051)	-0.024 (0.057)	0.045 (0.071)
Baseline Response		-0.006 (0.030)		0.047 (0.042)		0.030 (0.048)		0.141** (0.056)
Constant	0.151*** (0.021)	0.149 (0.206)	0.157*** (0.025)	-0.277 (0.229)	0.199*** (0.044)	0.317* (0.183)	0.196*** (0.031)	0.004 (0.211)
Baseline Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	589	589	603	603	594	594	598	598
R-squared	0.000	0.017	0.005	0.018	0.000	0.008	0.003	0.027
Mean of dep var in control	0.151	0.151	0.157	0.157	0.199	0.199	0.196	0.196

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Baseline controls include age, standard, and school enrollment.

Table 11 - Network Formation

Panel A: T1 vs C						
Network Definition	OR			AND		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T1	0.132 (0.088)	0.076 (0.063)	0.071 (0.056)	0.069 (0.051)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.000 (0.023)
T1 * Elected (OR)	-0.114** (0.046)	-0.082* (0.043)	-0.082* (0.041)	-0.086** (0.038)	-0.052 (0.032)	-0.050 (0.031)
T1 * Elected (AND)	-0.057 (0.071)	-0.062 (0.060)	-0.053 (0.052)	-0.062 (0.086)	-0.068 (0.064)	-0.068 (0.066)
Elected (OR)	0.197*** (0.026)	0.162*** (0.016)	0.147*** (0.016)	0.191*** (0.033)	0.152*** (0.022)	0.137*** (0.020)
Elected (AND)	0.164*** (0.047)	0.132*** (0.034)	0.098*** (0.029)	0.224*** (0.049)	0.187*** (0.039)	0.157*** (0.034)
Friends at Baseline (OR)		0.180*** (0.020)	0.141*** (0.025)		0.170*** (0.016)	0.132*** (0.020)
Friends at Baseline (AND)		0.175*** (0.033)	0.133*** (0.033)		0.220*** (0.037)	0.162*** (0.040)
Constant	0.554*** (0.055)	0.387*** (0.046)	0.314*** (0.045)	0.244*** (0.042)	0.073*** (0.024)	0.041** (0.018)
Baseline Network Controls Included	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Observations	6,655	6,655	6,655	6,505	6,505	6,505
R-squared	0.056	0.134	0.156	0.056	0.151	0.177
Mean of Dep var in Control	0.631	0.631	0.631	0.322	0.322	0.322
P-value of Test of T1 * Elected (OR) + T1 * Elected (AND)	0.112	0.096	0.077	0.167	0.148	0.161
Panel B: T2 vs C						
Network Definition	OR			AND		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T2	0.210** (0.078)	0.146** (0.057)	0.159** (0.059)	0.194** (0.084)	0.113 (0.067)	0.120* (0.067)
T2 * Participant (OR)	-0.048* (0.023)	-0.049* (0.024)	-0.058** (0.020)	-0.041 (0.045)	-0.046 (0.042)	-0.060 (0.039)
T2 * Participant (AND)	0.066** (0.027)	0.036 (0.023)	0.027 (0.024)	0.136** (0.055)	0.096* (0.047)	0.073* (0.038)
Friends at Baseline (OR)		0.201*** (0.020)	0.170*** (0.019)		0.187*** (0.020)	0.161*** (0.016)
Friends at Baseline (AND)		0.162*** (0.042)	0.132*** (0.039)		0.258*** (0.037)	0.200*** (0.040)
Constant	0.631*** (0.069)	0.438*** (0.066)	0.368*** (0.071)	0.322*** (0.061)	0.112*** (0.038)	0.073* (0.037)
Baseline Network Controls Included	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Observations	6,869	6,869	6,869	6,728	6,728	6,728
R-squared	0.044	0.129	0.151	0.038	0.156	0.186
Mean of Dep var in Control	0.631	0.631	0.631	0.322	0.322	0.322
P-value of Test of T2 * Participant (OR) + T2 * Participant (AND)	0.694	0.735	0.413	0.207	0.443	0.802

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Dependent variable is existence of friendship at Endline.

Sample in Panel A is restricted to T1 and C pairs.

Sample in Panel B is restricted to T2 and C pairs.

Table 12 -- Individual-Level Network Outcomes T1 vs C

Panel A: Elected Students								
Dependent var: Endline Response to	Endline Number of female friends (OR)		Endline Number of female friends (AND)		Proportion of Friends Elected (OR)		Proportion of Friends Elected (AND)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	-2.934 (6.422)	-1.886 (5.171)	-2.223 (3.331)	-2.527 (3.124)	0.004 (0.088)	-0.031 (0.045)	0.053 (0.081)	0.006 (0.061)
Baseline Response		0.583*** (0.112)		0.348*** (0.121)		0.582*** (0.144)		0.451*** (0.088)
Constant	23.513*** (5.316)	14.097*** (4.381)	13.009*** (2.739)	10.292*** (2.616)	0.404*** (0.068)	0.167** (0.060)	0.427*** (0.066)	0.235*** (0.050)
Observations	238	238	238	238	212	167	211	160
R-squared	0.008	0.201	0.014	0.091	0.000	0.566	0.014	0.287
Mean of dep var in control	13.513	13.513	13.009	13.009	0.404	0.404	0.427	0.427
Panel B: Non-Elected Students								
Dependent var: Endline Response to	Endline Number of female friends (OR)		Endline Number of female friends (AND)		Proportion of Friends Elected (OR)		Proportion of Friends Elected (AND)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1	-6.144 (6.564)	-5.053 (5.574)	-2.165 (1.974)	-2.269 (2.043)	0.067 (0.079)	-0.002 (0.032)	0.073 (0.086)	0.019 (0.047)
Baseline Response		0.312*** (0.080)		0.301*** (0.105)		0.608*** (0.081)		0.538*** (0.084)
Constant	29.802*** (5.793)	23.419*** (5.103)	12.234*** (1.604)	9.828*** (1.370)	0.249*** (0.059)	0.118*** (0.033)	0.270*** (0.053)	0.155*** (0.032)
Observations	534	534	534	534	464	337	452	314
R-squared	0.025	0.094	0.013	0.080	0.039	0.629	0.026	0.330
Mean of dep var in control	29.802	29.802	12.234	12.234	0.249	0.249	0.073	0.073

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample restricted to girls who have a nonzero number of friends at endline.

Table 13 -- Individual-Level Network Outcomes T2 vs C

Panel A: Participants				
Dependent var: Endline Response to	Endline Number of female friends (OR)		Endline Number of female friends (AND)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T2	-5.777 (6.508)	-1.237 (5.875)	-0.068 (2.276)	0.550 (2.664)
Baseline Response		0.382*** (0.084)		0.410*** (0.104)
Constant	28.050*** (5.911)	20.694*** (5.144)	12.450*** (1.815)	9.189*** (1.726)
Observations	530	662	530	662
R-squared	0.014	0.085	0.000	0.106
Mean of dep var in control	28.050	28.050	12.450	12.450
Panel B: Non-Participants				
Dependent var: Endline Response to	Endline Number of female friends (OR)		Endline Number of female friends (AND)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T2	-1.666 (6.777)	-1.237 (5.875)	1.492 (2.888)	0.550 (2.664)
Baseline Response		0.382*** (0.084)		0.410*** (0.104)
Constant	28.050*** (5.910)	20.694*** (5.144)	12.450*** (1.814)	9.189*** (1.726)
Observations	662	662	662	662
R-squared	0.002	0.085	0.005	0.106
Mean of dep var in control	28.050	28.050	12.450	12.450

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sample restricted to girls who have a nonzero number of friends at endline.