Economic Coercion and Partner Violence against Wives in Vietnam: A Unified Framework?

ABSTRACT

Economic coercion refers to behaviors that control an intimate partner's ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources. Little is known about economic coercion in Vietnam. Using survey responses from 533 married women ages 18–50 years, we estimated multinomial logistic regression models to compare the determinants of exposure to economic coercion only, co-occurring economic coercion and any psychological, physical, or sexual intimate partner violence (IPV), and any IPV only, relative to no exposure. Women who, in their childhood, witnessed physical IPV against their mother had higher odds of exposure to co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV as an adult (*aOR* = 3.54, 95% CI 1.84- 6.83) and any IPV only (*aOR* = 1.75, 95% CI 1.00- 3.06), but not economic coercion only. Women who experienced violence as a child had higher odds of exposure to any IPV only (*aOR* =1.63, 95% CI 1.04- 2.56) but not economic coercion only. Women with more schooling had higher odds of exposure to economic coercion only (*aOR* = 1.17, 95% CI 1.03– 1.33) but not other forms of violence. Overall, the estimates from the three models differed significantly. Thus, the determinants of economic coercion and common forms of IPV may differ. More research should focus on men's perpetration of economic coercion.

Keywords: economic coercion, intimate partner violence, resources, social learning, status conflict, Vietnam

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INTRODUCTION

Intimate partner violence (IPV) refers to assaultive or coercive behaviors in dating, cohabiting, or marital unions that cause physical, sexual, or psychological harm (World Health Organization & London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2010). Globally, the prevalence of women's lifetime exposure to physical or sexual IPV is high (15%-71%) (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2005), including in historically patriarchal settings like Vietnam (32.7%-34.4%) (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2010; Vung, Ostergren, & Krantz, 2008). Typically, men's violence is more injurious, and men more often stalk, sexually assault, and coercively control their partners (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2010; Straus, 2004; Swan, Gambone, Caldwell, Sullivan, & Snow, 2008). Thus, the burden of exposure to IPV falls on women (Black et al., 2011; Breiding, Black, & Ryan, 2008; Gass, Stein, Williams, & Seedat, 2011) and predicts adverse health effects for women and their children (Heise, Ellsberg, & Gottemoeller, 1999; United Nations, 2006; Yount, DiGirolamo, & Ramakrishnan, 2011).

Yet, common measures for IPV may miss the "totality of violence" that women experience in intimate partnerships (Dutton & Goodman, 2005; Stark, 2007). An uncommonly and unevenly measured form of violence in partnerships is *economic coercion*. Economic coercion refers to behaviors by an intimate partner that control the victim's ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources (Adams, Sullivan, Bybee, & Greeson, 2008). Exposure to economic coercion has public-health relevance, as it threatens the victim's economic security and independence, limiting the capacity to leave abusive relationships and resulting in potentially

adverse mental health effects (Adams et al., 2008; Postmus, Plummer, McMahon, Murshid, & Kim, 2012).

Despite its potential public-health importance, economic coercion is understudied globally (Stylianou, Postmus, & McMahon, 2013). In the U.S., a few studies have assessed the lifetime frequency of discrete coercive acts or sub-domains of economic coercion (Adams et al., 2008; Postmus et al., 2012). Psychometric testing of these early measures has revealed high internal consistency (α .73–.93) and good convergent validity, being distinct from and positively associated with standard forms of IPV (Adams et al., 2008; Brush, 2002; Lehmann, Simmons, & Pillai, 2012; Riger, Ahrens, & Blickenstaff, 2000; Stylianou et al., 2013; Weaver, Sanders, Campbell, & Schnabel, 2009). In poorer settings, little is known about the nature, prevalence, and determinants of economic coercion against women. This gap is salient in settings like Vietnam, where most women are economically active but patriarchal norms and inequities in the family persist. In such settings, the evolving public and private roles of women may challenge customary ideas about patriarchal hierarchy in marriage, spurring men's use of economic coercion to reassert their dominance.

Here, we use survey data from 533 married women ages 18–50 years in Vietnam to compare the determinants of women's exposure to (1) any economic coercion alone, (2) co-occurring economic coercion and any psychological, physical, or sexual IPV (hereafter referred to as "any IPV or coercion"), (3) any psychological, physical, or sexual IPV only, and (4) no exposure to any IPV or coercion. To our knowledge, this study is the first to assess whether the determinants of economic coercion against women in a lower-middle income, rapidly changing non-Western setting mirror the determinants for commonly measured forms of IPV.

BACKGROUND

Vietnam Setting

Vietnam has undergone rapid social change, with mixed implications for women's roles in public life (Yount et al., 2014). Given three decades of mobilization for war, a socialist revolution that stressed gender-egalitarian workforce participation (Luong, 2003), and Confucianist ideas of women's familial duties (Korinek, 2004; Le, 1995), women's work outside the home has long been part of normative femininity (Korinek, 2004). Moreover, trends in schooling in the 1990s revealed increasing gender parity in education (Nguyen, 2004). Yet, weak state support for women's non-economic work has lessened the liberating effects of women's increased schooling and state-sponsored work (Hopkins, 1999). Despite men's return from war and market reforms of the 1980s, the demand for women's paid and unpaid work has continued (Hong, Duong, & Nguyen, 2010). Some women's labor migration has spurred their husbands to assume unpaid family work (Hoang & Yeoh, 2011), but most women still do this work (Bui et al., 2012; Luong, 2003) while sustaining high rates of market work (81.3% in 1990; 78.1% in 2010) (World Bank, 2013). Occupations remain gender-segregated (Bui et al., 2012; Hoang & Yeoh, 2011), with women more often doing unskilled activities (42.9% vs. 36.2% for men) (World Bank, 2011).

Still, the state's reformed legal framework is founded on the principle of gender equality in public life, and institutions exist to advance this agenda. In the 1990s, the state endorsed the *National Plan of Action for the Advancement of Vietnamese Women*, and the *National Committee for the Advancement of Women in Vietnam* extended its networks (Khiet, 2000). In 2007, the National Assembly adopted a new law on *domestic violence*, defining psychological, physical, sexual, and economic IPV along with strategies for prevention and intervention (National Assembly Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2007). The law outlines, on the one

hand, the right of survivors to supportive services, including healthcare, legal counseling, and shelter, as well as on the other hand, possible legal ramifications for perpetrators, such as administrative sanctioning, penal liability, and financial restitution (National Assembly Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2007). This law was seen as a dramatic improvement over one that was passed in the 1980s, which outlawed all physical violence against women and children but was unevenly enforced (Rydstrøm, 2003).

Despite these changes, inequitable gender norms and family relations persist (Bui et al., 2012; Thao, Hong, & Duong, 2011; Werner, 2009). Men remain the heads of household and wield authority over major decisions (Hong et al., 2010). Women are expected to adapt to changing social norms and dynamic kin relationships (Huong, 2012), and their perceived failure to do so may evoke blame or "punishment" (Bui et al., 2012). Taoist ideas of the body connect men with heat and women with coolness, legitimizing men's violence and pressuring women to endure it (Horton & Rydstrom, 2011). The Women's Union, a national women's organization, promotes women's progress in public life but still urges women to respect familial hierarchy and public harmony (Schuler et al., 2006).

Dramatic structural changes with sustained gender inequities in the family may create tensions that erupt in IPV and economic coercion. About one third of women in rural Northern Vietnam (32.7%) and nationally (34.4%) report lifetime exposure to physical or sexual IPV (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2010; Vung et al., 2008), exceeding rates elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Yount & Carrera, 2006). Thus, women's exposure to economic coercion may be high, and its determinants warrant study.

Defining Economic Coercion

Compared to research on psychological, physical, and sexual IPV, attention to economic

coercion is recent (Dutton & Goodman, 2005; Fawole, 2008; Stark, 2007). This prior focus may have resulted in an incomplete picture of the "totality of violence" in intimate partnerships (Cook & Parrott, 2009; Heise et al., 1999; United Nations, 2006).

Coercive control is a multi-dimensional, repetitive process of demands that ultimately ends in compliance because the victim expects penalties for noncompliance and rewards for compliance (Dutton & Goodman, 2005). In the case of economic coercion, the perpetrator *uses forceful tactics to control his or her partner's ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources*, threatening the victim's economic security and potential for self-sufficiency (Adams et al., 2008). Interference with the *acquisition* of economic resources includes efforts to prevent the victim from (1) obtaining education to augment work-related skills, (2) securing or sustaining market work (Galvez, Mankowski, McGlade, Ruiz, & Glass, 2011), (3) controlling personal earnings or assets, or (4) sharing rightful ownership of joint assets. Interference with the *use* of economic resources includes (1) withholding household resources, such as money, for basic needs, (2) hiding jointly earned money, (3) lying or withholding information about shared assets or finances, or (4) restricting access to shared assets. Interference with the ability to *maintain* economic resources includes (1) taking money against the victim's will, (2) incurring costs that the victim must pay, or (3) generating debt in the victim's name (Littwin, 2012, 2013). Here, we will explore the levels and determinants of three measures for a husband's economic coercion of his wife (one for each domain, above), including interference with her acquisition or maintenance of market work, his withholding of money for basic needs, and his partial or full control of her earnings.

Theoretical Perspectives on Partner Violence and Economic Coercion against Wives

Three perspectives have enhanced our understanding of IPV against wives and may

explain their exposure to economic coercion: social learning theory, resource theory, and status-conflict theory. *Social learning* theorists argue that behaviors are learned by observing those of others, and the associated rewards or penalties of the behavior (Bandura, 1974; Sellers, Cochran, & Branch, 2005). Accordingly, girls who witness IPV against their mother or who are hit or beaten as a child may come to view violence in marriage as normal. Evidence from Asia supports this perspective (Vung & Krantz, 2009; Yount & Carrera, 2006). In Cambodia, women who have witnessed father-to-mother physical IPV have had more than twice the odds as their counterparts of experiencing prior-year physical or psychological IPV (Yount & Carrera, 2006). Similarly, among married women 17–60 years in rural Vietnam, witnessing inter-parental violence as a child has been associated with more than twice the odds of physical or sexual IPV in adulthood (*OR*= 2.85, 95% CI 1.88–4.34) and the prior-year (*OR*= 2.33, 95% CI 1.31–4.10) (Vung & Krantz, 2009). The influence of women's exposure to violence in childhood on their risk of economic coercion in intimate partnerships is plausible but understudied.

According to *resource theory*, individuals lacking resources have less prestige and power, and thus have fewer means to achieve their goals. Such individuals may rely on force to achieve their objectives (Goode, 1971). Thus, when men lack money, education, or similar resources, they may resort to force–and economic coercion–to control their wives (Felson & Messner, 2000; Goode, 1971). In Asia, several measures for men's low socio-economic status have been associated with women's exposure to commonly measured forms of IPV. In parts of India, the unadjusted odds of wife beating have been higher in households owning fewer consumer durables (Jejeebhoy & Cook, 1997), and men who have worked for pay less than 12 months annually have had higher odds of perpetrating forced sex than their continuously employed counterparts (Go et al., 2010). In India, men's poverty and lower schooling attainment have been

positively associated with perpetrating physical IPV (Martin, Tsui, Maitra, & Marinshaw, 1999), and in urban Bangladesh, these characteristics have been positively associated with perpetrating both physical and sexual IPV (Sambisa, Angeles, Lance, Naved, & Curtis, 2010). In rural Bangladesh, household landholdings have been negatively associated with wife beating by a husband or his family (Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & Mozumder, 2003). In Bangkok, Thailand, an index combining family income with the husband's levels of schooling and occupational prestige has been negatively associated with physical IPV against wives (Hoffman, Demo, & Edwards, 1994). Finally, in Cambodia, a lower household standard of living, as measured by assets and amenities, has been associated with higher odds of women's exposure to physical IPV (Yount & Carrera, 2006). Observed resource-abuse relationships also corroborate stress theory, as low income may induce stress-related violence (Hoffman et al., 1994; Macmillan & Gartner, 1999). Thus, evidence links poverty with women's exposure to commonly measured forms of IPV, but data are lacking on the relationship of poverty with women's exposure to economic coercion.

Status conflict theorists argue that models of IPV or coercion against women must distinguish partnerships in which the distribution of resources disrupts the status quo (Anderson, 1997). Namely, if a woman's human and economic resources exceed those of her male partner or some normative level in a given context, atypical disadvantages in her partner's status may threaten his masculinity, spurring violence or coercion to reinstate his dominance (Connell, 1995; Thoits, 1992). Support for this theory in Southeast Asia is equivocal. In Bangkok, Thailand, absolute spousal differences in grades of schooling and scores for occupational prestige have not had adjusted associations with physical IPV against wives (Hoffman et al., 1994); yet, in Cambodia, women with more (and those with much less) schooling than their husbands have had higher odds of recent exposure to psychological IPV (Yount & Carrera,

2006). In Vietnam, men who were the same age or younger and earned less than their partners have had higher adjusted odds than their counterparts of perpetrating any IPV (Yount et al., forthcoming). In studies of women-targeted microcredit programs, researchers point to cases in which women recipients of microcredit did not control its use, lost control of the earnings from their productive activities, or experienced marital conflict when men, in turn, withdrew their earnings (Mayoux, 1999). Studies comparing the influence of status conflict in marriage on the risks of commonly measured forms of IPV and/or of economic coercion are needed.

Here, we compare the associations of measures for these three theoretical perspectives with women's exposure in Vietnam to (1) economic coercion only, (2) co-occurring economic coercion and any physical, sexual, or psychological IPV, or (3) any physical, sexual, or psychological IPV only relative to none of these exposures. Our findings clarify women's high exposure to economic coercion relative to commonly measured forms of IPV and offer a comparative explanatory model for economic coercion against wives in this context.

METHOD

Study Site

The study site was 12 communes and one district town of Mỹ Hào district, Hung Yen province (Yount et al., 2014). About 30km from Hanoi, Mỹ Hào is mainly rural and has 97,733 residents, almost all of Kinh ethnicity (Yount et al., 2014). As in other patrilocal societies, men live more often than do women in their commune of birth (95% vs. 58%) and in the same commune as their natal family (94% vs. 60%) (Yount et al., 2014). Joint household residence is common (40%) (Yount et al., 2014), and few residents (7%) live in *poor* households, which are below the official poverty line for rural areas (~$19 per capita per month) and qualify for specific state benefits (Badiani et al., 2013; Yount et al., 2014). Women and men have high average

schooling attainments (9.5 grades), and almost all men (98%) and women (97%) work for money (Yount et al., 2014). Residents often perform multiple types of work, including farming (64%), local factory work (30%), and self-employment in small enterprises (23%) (Yount et al., 2014). Women (50%) more often than men (23%) attend an organization at least once per year (Yount et al., 2014). Mass unions are present, and local reconciliation groups are charged with resolving conflicts. The Communist Party reinforces its ideology in the population at the national level, and Local People's Committees govern the communes. In this district, 37% of men reported perpetrating any physical, psychological, or sexual IPV against their current wife (Yount et al., forthcoming). Men more often than women were beaten as a child (72% vs. 50%), but one fourth of men (27%) and women (26%) witnessed as a child their mother being beaten (Krause, Gordon-Roberts, VanderEnde, Schuler, & Yount, forthcoming).

Sample

The sample frame was a household census of 75 villages (Yount et al., 2014). Married women and men 18–50 years were eligible for inclusion. To do so, villages were paired by the size of the eligible married population starting with the two largest villages. The smallest village was omitted because it was not paired and had too few married persons (n = 36), given the sample design. Twenty village pairs were selected with probability proportional to the size of the married population in the pair relative to the total married population in all 74 villages, and villages within pairs were randomly assigned to either the women's sample or the men's sample, to ensure privacy. In selected villages, in 12 communes, 27 households with at least one eligible participant were randomly selected, and one eligible respondent was selected randomly per household, again to ensure privacy. Expecting a 93.0% response rate and aiming for 1,000 interviews (500 men, 500 women), 1,080 persons (540 men, 540 women) were selected. Of the

1,069 eligible participants who were located, 1,055 (533 women, 522 men) or 98.7% were interviewed. Final response rates were similar across gender (99.3% women, 98.1% men) and study village (92.6% - 100%). This analysis included 533 married women 18–50 years.

Procedures

The questionnaire sequentially included modules on socio-demographic and economic background; attitudes about physical IPV against women and women's recourse after physical IPV; and perpetration of and exposure to IPV, exposure to violence in childhood, and knowledge of the laws concerning IPV. The Institutional Review Boards of Emory University and the Center for Creative Initiatives in Health and Population in Hanoi approved the study. Once verbal informed consent was obtained, interviews were held in private rooms at the commune health station to ensure confidentiality (World Health Organization, 2001). Survey participants and interviewers were gender-matched to enhance disclosure (World Health Organization, 2001).

Variables

The nominal outcome captured women's lifetime exposure to (1) any economic coercion only, (2) co-occurring economic coercion and any physical, sexual, or psychological IPV (3) any physical, sexual, or psychological IPV only, and (4) no exposure to any IPV or coercion [the reference]. Here, "lifetime exposure" refers to any such violence perpetrated by the respondent's current husband, because such violence by definition occurs in adulthood, the average age at first marriage for women in Vietnam is low relative to other countries in Southeast Asia (Jones & Yeung, 2014), and Vietnam has one of the lowest divorce rates in the world (Wisensale, 1999). The measure for *lifetime economic coercion* captured whether (= 1) or not (= 0) a woman reported that (1) her current husband ever refused to give her money for household expenses (7 "husband does not earn money," 1 "don't know," and 2 missing coded 0), (2) she ever gave up or

refused to take a job for money because her husband did not want her to take that job (1 "don't know" coded 0), or (3) she has to give all or part of her earnings to her husband (13 with no earnings coded 0). We selected these three questions to operationalize economic coercion as set by example in the *World Health Organization Multi-country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women* (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005). *Lifetime psychological IPV* captured whether or not a woman reported that her current husband ever (1) belittled or humiliated her in front of other people, (2) insulted her or made her feel bad about herself, (3) scared or intimidated her on purpose (1 "other" coded 0), (4) threatened to hurt her or someone she cared about, or (5) threatened to throw her out or threw her out of the home. *Lifetime physical IPV* captured whether a woman reported that her current husband ever (1) slapped her or threw something at her that could hurt, (2) pushed her, shoved her, or pulled her hair, (3) hit her with his fist or something that could hurt her, (4) kicked her, dragged her, or beat her up, (5) choked or burnt her on purpose, or (6) threatened to or used a gun, knife, or other weapon against her (1 "other" coded 0). *Lifetime sexual IPV* captured whether or not a woman reported that her current husband ever (1) physically forced her to have sexual intercourse, (2) had sexual intercourse with her when she did not want to because she was afraid of what he might do (1 "other" coded 0), or (3) forced her to do something sexual that she found degrading or humiliating (1 "other" coded 0). The measures for psychological, physical, or sexual IPV were combined into a single response category of ever exposure to any IPV only. The response category co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV includes women who experienced any form of economic coercion, along with any form (or combination) of any IPV.

The explanatory variables were divided into three sets. Two measures for *social learning about violence in childhood* captured whether or not the respondent, as a child, ever saw or heard

her mother being hit by her father or mother's husband or boyfriend (8 "don't know" coded 0), and whether the respondent was ever hit or beaten by a parent or other adult relative (9 "don't know" and 1 missing coded 0). Two measures for *household resources* included whether or not the household was on the official list of poor households in the commune (8 "don't know" coded to mode 0) and a household standard-of-living score, derived from the first component of a principle components analysis of household assets and amenities (full list available on request; mean value imputed for 2 missing values). Two measures for the woman's own resources were her completed grades of schooling and whether she performed any market work outside of farming, forestry, or fishing in the prior year for which she earned money (13 non-working women coded "no"). Two measures for *status conflict* in marriage captured a woman's schooling and earnings compared to her spouse. Relative schooling was calculated by comparing the respondent's report of highest grade completed (none, high school or less, secondary/professional college, university, post-secondary degree) for herself and her spouse, coded as fewer, the same as (reference), or more than her spouse (10 "don't know" schooling of husband coded as modal value, same as husband). Relative earnings were captured from the self-report of earnings in the past year relative to her spouse, coded as less than, the same as (reference), or more than her spouse (7 not earning money, 4 "don't know," 3 missing coded as modal value, less than husband).

Control variables included the respondent's age in years and number of live births, as well as three measures of formal and informal social networks, including whether or not she attends any organization at least once annually as well as whether or not she was living in the same village or commune as her birth family or with her husband's parents.

Analysis

We computed univariate statistics for the full sample to assess the completeness and distributions of all variables. As described above, missing values for explanatory variables and covariates were imputed with the mean or modal value from the observed sample. The results based on listwise deletion of observations with missing values were comparable (available on request). We then estimated bivariate associations between all outcomes, explanatory variables, and covariates, assessing significant differences using Chi-squared tests for categorical variables and student's t-tests for continuous variables (available on request). Finally, we estimated a multinomial logistic regression model of the main outcome to assess the adjusted associations of each outcome (relative to no exposure: neither any economic coercion nor any IPV) with measures for (1) social learning about violence in childhood, (2) resources, (3) status conflict in marriage, and (4) covariates. We tested for overall differences in the three estimated models (economic coercion only versus no exposure; co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV versus no exposure, and any IPV only versus no exposure) and in specific coefficients across the three models. We conducted all analyses using STATA 13.0, accounting for the complex survey design.

RESULTS

Women's Reported Exposure to IPV and Economic Coercion in Adulthood

Between 9% and 15% of women reported lifetime exposure to specific forms of psychological IPV, and 27% reported lifetime exposure to any psychological IPV (Table 1). Between 3% and 27% of women reported lifetime exposure to minor forms of physical IPV, and few (1%) reported lifetime exposure to more severe forms of physical IPV (such as being choked or burned or being threatened with or exposed to a gun, knife, or other weapon). Together, 29% of women reported lifetime exposure to any physical IPV. About 12% of women reported some

lifetime exposure to sexual IPV. Finally, between 3% and 21% of women reported exposure to specific forms of economic coercion, with giving up or refusing a job being the most common form (21%), followed by being denied money for household expenses (8%) and having to give all or part of their earnings to her husband (3%). In total, 28% of women reported lifetime exposure to some form of economic coercion, matching all rates for commonly measured forms of IPV (Table 1). More than half (54%) of women reported exposure to some form of economic coercion or to some form of psychological, physical, or sexual IPV in their lifetime. Together, a minority of women (46%) reported no prior exposure to either economic coercion or any IPV, 11% reported exposure to economic coercion only, 17% reported exposure to both economic coercion and any IPV, and 26% reported exposure to any IPV only.

[Table 1]

Women's Social Learning, Resources, Status-Conflict, and Demographic Characteristics

Over one fourth (26%) of women reportedly witnessed their mother being hit by an intimate partner (Table 2). Half of women reported that they were hit or beaten as a child by a parent or other adult relative. Less than 1 in 10 women reportedly lived in a household on the official list of poor households. Women, on average, had completed 9.47 grades of schooling, and just under one-third had worked outside of a customary occupation (farming, forestry, or fishing) in the prior year. A notable minority of women (27%) had more schooling than their husband. Otherwise, women, on average, were just over 34 years old and had had two live births. Half of women had attended a formal organization in the prior year, and just under half (42%) were living with their husband's family at the time of interview. A majority of women were living in the same village/ commune as their birth family (60%).

[Table 2]

Multivariate Results

Table 3 shows the adjusted odds ratios of economic coercion only, co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV, and any IPV only, relative to no exposure, for measures of social learning about violence in childhood, resources and status conflict in marriage, and control variables. Relative to women with less schooling, those with more schooling had higher adjusted odds of reporting economic coercion only (versus no exposure). That said, women with less schooling than their spouse had marginally higher adjusted odds than those with the same schooling as their spouse of reporting economic coercion only. Women who performed market work outside farming, forestry or fishing compared to those who worked in these customary occupations had a lower adjusted odds of reporting economic coercion only. Otherwise, women with more live births had marginally lower adjusted odds than women with fewer live births of reporting economic coercion only.

Measures of social learning in childhood and resources and status conflict in marriage were determinants of reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Women who witnessed IPV against their mothers had more than three times the adjusted odds of reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Having a higher household standard of living was marginally associated with lower adjusted odds of reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Women who completed more grades of schooling had a lower adjusted odds of reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV, but women with more schooling than their husband had a higher adjusted odds of reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV.

Regarding the determinants of reporting any IPV only, social learning, resources and status conflict, and other covariates were relevant. Women who had been hit or beaten as a child

and women who, as children, had witnessed violence against their mothers had higher adjusted odds of reporting any IPV only. Having a higher standard of living score was associated with a lower adjusted odds of any IPV only. Finally, being older was associated with a slightly higher adjusted odds of reporting any IPV only.

Comparing the estimated models for the three forms of economic coercion and IPV, relative to no exposure, was revealing. Witnessing or experiencing physical forms of violence in childhood was associated with traditional forms of IPV (models 2 and 3), but not economic coercion only (model 1). Higher household standard of living was associated with a lower adjusted odds in all models, although this variable did not reach significance in the economic coercion only model. We used adjusted Wald tests and global F-tests to determine whether we could combine the dependent variable of each model, economic coercion only, co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV, and any IPV only, into a single outcome variable (Long & Freese, 2006). Overall, F-tests for differences in model coefficients confirmed that the three estimated models were significantly different. Regarding specific coefficients, those for measures of social learning about violence in childhood, resources and status-conflict in marriage, and number of children differed significantly across the models 1 and 2, with witnessing IPV against one's mother being significantly positively associated with co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV but not with economic coercion only. In turn, having more schooling and completing fewer grades than the husband were both positively associated with reporting economic coercion only but were negatively associated and not associated with reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV, respectively. The number of live births was marginally negatively associated with reporting economic coercion only but was not associated with reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Otherwise, prior-year

work outside of farming, forestry, or fishing differed significantly between the two models. In comparing models 1 and 3, having more schooling was positively associated with reporting economic coercion only, while there was no association of schooling with report of any IPV only.

DISCUSSION

To our knowledge, this study is the first in a lower-income, non-Western setting to compare the determinants of economic coercion against wives with those for more commonly measured forms of IPV against wives. Several findings from this study are notable.

First, the lifetime prevalence of economic coercion against wives is high (28%) and matches the lifetime prevalence of more commonly measured forms of IPV. Of the 28% of women who reported experiencing any economic coercion, a large minority (40%) reported experiencing economic coercion alone (11% of all women), without co-occurring psychological, physical, or sexual IPV. Moreover, standard forms of IPV do not typically occur in isolation of economic coercion; 17% of all women experience co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Stated differently, of the women who reported some form of economic coercion or IPV (54% of all women), more than half (52%) reported co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Thus, economic coercion is widespread, often occurs without IPV, also often occurs alongside IPV, and therefore, is a common tactic to control women in this setting.

Second, there were significant patterns of association between conceptual sets of explanatory variables and either economic coercion only or any IPV, but the explanatory models differed across outcomes. For instance, measures of social learning about violence in childhood (witnessing IPV against mother), resources (household standard of living), and status conflict in marriage (wife has more schooling than her husband) all were associated in the expected ways

with reporting co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV, and any IPV only, versus no exposure. By contrast, having more schooling was the only variable that had significant ($p \leq 0.05$) adjusted associations with reporting economic coercion alone versus no exposure. These findings invite a reflection on the nature of economic coercion and its determinants vis-à-vis theoretical explanations for commonly measured forms of IPV.

In brief, the three theoretical perspectives discussed above (Yount, 2005; Yount & Carrera, 2006) have considerable joint explanatory power for understanding IPV against women in Mỹ Hào district; however, these theories offer less guidance for understanding economic coercion against women in this setting. Prior research suggests that women's economic contributions to the family are central to local norms of femininity in Vietnam (Korinek, 2004), as are expectations that women respect family hierarchy and uphold appearances of harmony. Moreover, men, as symbolic and practical heads of the household, still wield authority over major household decisions. In this context, husbands may exploit norms of femininity and masculinity (Schuler et al., 2006), by expecting their wives to work while retaining control over their access to jobs, earnings, and shared income. This set of circumstances could explain the nuanced findings related to women's schooling achievement and experiences of economic coercion and other forms of IPV. Women with more schooling in absolute terms have enhanced skills for the labor market and higher adjusted odds of experiencing economic coercion, alone or with commonly measured forms of IPV. Controlling for their grades of schooling, women with fewer completed grades than their husband have higher adjusted odds of experiencing economic coercion only, and women with more schooling than their husband have higher adjusted odds of experiencing co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV. Women with *more* schooling in absolute and relative terms may pose a 'threat' to their husbands' masculinity, leading men to

resort to violence and economic coercion to reassert their dominance; whereas, women with less schooling in relative terms are less of a 'threat' but still subject to economic coercion. Thus, a woman's economic capacity could be seen widely as a function of her femininity, and as such, under the control of her partner.

Some limitations of this study are notable. First, it was cross-sectional and so precludes causal inferences. Second, the study used three indicators of economic coercion, which may not fully capture all relevant experiences, reducing its content validity and making its determinants more difficult to identify. For example, the present study did not account for a woman's partner accruing debt, a common feature of economic abuse (Adams et al., 2008; Littwin, 2013; Postmus et al., 2012). Moreover, by comparison, one recently developed scale to measure economic abuse in the United States includes 28 items (Adams et al., 2008). In addition, while two questions captured lifetime experience of economic coercion, one question asked women employed during the prior 12 months about surrendering their earnings to their husband, capturing recent but not lifetime experiences of economic coercion. Nevertheless, our measures did cover all three conceptual domains of economic coercion, including interference with women's access to, use of, and maintenance of economic resources. A final limitation is that we split the study sample into four groups based on experiences (or lack thereof) of economic coercion and more commonly measured forms of IPV. Had our original sample been larger, we may have had more power to detect significant determinants of each outcome, as well as the differences between the coefficients of our models.

These limitations of our findings not withstanding, their implications in Vietnam are compelling. First, economic coercion is a common experience across demographically diverse groups of women. Second, the determinants of economic coercion against women are less well

understood, and perhaps more subtle, than those of commonly measured forms of IPV. Our findings highlight the role of women's schooling as a distinguishing determinant of their risk of economic coercion. More schooling may coincide with variables, such as greater relative income or with ideas about femininity and family that contradict dominant norms in local context. The higher risk of economic coercion, as an 'unintended consequence' of women's greater schooling attainment, does not imply that policies should restrict women's schooling attainment as a protective measure. Rather, practitioners might provide educational information to engaged and newly married women about the forms of economic coercion that may arise in marriage. Practitioners also may devise supportive services that address the needs of women experiencing economic coercion, either in conjunction with or separate from other forms of IPV. Finally, interventions designed to challenge gender norms and highlight women's schooling attainment as an asset in marriage might be offered through the educational system. By doing so, such interventions would reach women students and their prospective partners, to promote more equitable gender attitudes among women and men before they enter into marriage.

The findings also suggest important avenues for research. Studies should explore fully the measurement of economic coercion in international context, developing and psychometrically testing a more complete set of items to measure economic coercion against wives. Longitudinal research should explore the influence of women's prior attitudes about gender and financial contributions to the household on their risks of experiencing economic coercion, the determinants of men's coercive economic control, and the potential mental and physical health consequences of women's exposure to economic coercion, net of their exposure to other, more commonly measured forms of IPV. Qualitative research also is needed in lower- and higher-income countries to develop conceptual models and new hypotheses about the determinants of

economic coercion against wives. With contextually grounded models and robust, validated measures for economic coercion, researchers will better estimate the levels of, trends in, determinants of, and consequences of economic coercion against women in diverse settings.

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Table 1. *Exposure to Economic Coercion and Intimate Partner Violence, by Type, Married Women* (*N* = 533) *18-50 Years in Mỹ Hào District, Vietnam*

Domain of IPV	Prop.	*SE*
Psychological		
Belittled or humiliated you in front of other people	0.13	0.02
Insulted you or made you feel bad about yourself	0.12	0.02
Done things to scare or intimidate you on purpose	0.09	0.02
Threatened to hurt you or someone you care about	0.15	0.02
Threatened to throw you out or thrown you out of the home	0.10	0.01
Any psychological IPV	0.27	0.03
Physical		
Slapped you or threw something at you that could hurt	0.27	0.03
Pushed you, shoved you, or pulled your hair	0.08	0.02
Hit you with his fist or something that could hurt you	0.06	0.01
Kicked you, dragged you, or beat you up	0.03	0.01
Choked or burnt you on purpose	0.01	0.00
Threatened to use or used a gun, knife, or other weapon against you	0.01	0.00
Any physical IPV	0.29	0.03
Sexual		
Physically forced you to have sexual intercourse	0.00	0.00
Had sexual intercourse with you when you did not want to because you were afraid of what he might do	0.12	0.02
Forced you to do something sexual that you found degrading or humiliating	0.01	0.01
Any sexual IPV	0.12	0.02
Economic Coercion		
Has your husband ever refused to give you money for household expenses	0.08	0.01
Have you ever given up or refused to take a job for money because your husband did not want you to take that job	0.21	0.02
Has to give all or part of earnings to husband	0.03	0.01
Any economic coercion	0.28	0.03
Four-category response variable		
Neither economic coercion nor any IPV	0.46	0.03
Economic coercion only	0.11	0.01
Co-occurring economic coercion and any IPV (psychological, physical, sexual)	0.17	0.03
Any IPV only (psychological, physical, sexual)	0.26	0.02

Table 2. *Sample Characteristics, Married Women* (*N* = 533) *18-50 Years in Mỹ Hào District, Vietnam*

	M/ Prop.	*SE*	Min	Max
Social learning about violence in childhood				
Saw/heard mother being hit by partner (ref: no)	0.26	0.02	0	1
Hit/beaten as child by parent or other adult relative (ref: no)	0.50	0.03	0	1
Resources and status-conflict in marriage				
Poor household (ref: no)[a]	0.07	0.01	0	1
Household standard of living score	0.06	0.17	-4.45	4.70
Grades completed	9.47	0.25	0	18
Market work outside farming, forestry or fishing (ref: no)[b]	0.30	0.03	0	1
Grades completed relative to current husband				
Fewer than husband	0.32	0.02	0	1
Same as husband	0.41	0.02	0	1
More than husband	0.27	0.03	0	1
Control variables				
Lives in same village/commune as natal family (ref: no)	0.60	0.03	0	1
Lives with husband's parents (ref: no)	0.42	0.03	0	1
Attends any organization at least once a year (ref: no)	0.50	0.03	0	1
Age, years	34.20	0.44	18	50
Number of live births	2.02	0.05	0	5

[a] Household belongs to official list of "poor households" in the commune.
[b] Only 1% of women reported forestry or fishing.

Table 3. *Adjusted Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals from Multinomial Logistic Regression of Lifetime Exposure to Economic Coercion Only, Co-occurring Economic Coercion and Any IPV, or Any IPV Only, Relative to No Exposure, Married Women* (*N* = 533) *18-50 Years in Mỹ Hào District, Vietnam*

	Economic Coercion Only (vs. Neither Economic Coercion nor any IPV)		Co-occurring Economic Coercion and Any Psychological, Physical, or Sexual IPV (vs. Neither Economic Coercion nor any IPV)		Any Psychological, Physical, or Sexual IPV Only (vs. Neither Economic Coercion nor any IPV)		F- test, (1) vs. (2)	F- test, (1) vs. (3)
	aOR (1)	(95% CI)	*aOR* (2)	(95% CI)	*aOR* (3)	(95% CI)		
Social learning about violence in childhood								
Saw/heard mother being hit by partner (ref: no)	1.04	(0.55, 1.98)	3.54***	(1.84, 6.83)	1.75*	(1.00, 3.06)	7.30*	2.16
Hit/beaten as child by parent or other adult relative (ref: no)	1.00	(0.45, 2.22)	1.09	(0.57, 2.11)	1.63*	(1.04, 2.56)	0.04	1.41
Resources and status-conflict in marriage								
Poor household (ref: no)[a]	1.39	(0.51, 3.85)	0.80	(0.26, 2.45)	0.91	(0.51, 1.63)	0.44	0.56
Household standard of living score	0.83	(0.65, 1.07)	0.80†	(0.62, 1.04)	0.75**	(0.63, 0.89)	0.06	0.95
Grades completed	1.17*	(1.03, 1.33)	0.87**	(0.78, 0.96)	1.01	(0.92, 1.11)	15.74***	3.65†
Market work outside farming, forestry or fishing (ref: no)[b]	0.36*	(0.13, 0.98)	1.45	(0.80, 2.62)	0.63	(0.33, 1.23)	7.02*	1.43
Grades completed relative to current husband								
Fewer than husband	1.85†	(0.94, 3.65)	0.64	(0.28, 1.45)	1.49	(0.83, 2.69)	5.35*	0.21
Same as husband (ref)								
More than husband	1.32	(0.71, 2.45)	1.82*	(1.05, 3.14)	1.58	(0.91, 2.77)	0.43	0.16
Control variables								
Lives in same village/commune as natal family (ref: no)	1.23	(0.77, 1.97)	0.76	(0.47, 1.22)	1.25	(0.75, 2.07)	2.53	0.00
Lives with husband's parents (ref: no)	0.81	(0.45, 1.46)	0.85	(0.50, 1.46)	1.06	(0.59, 1.90)	0.02	0.48
Attends any organization at least once a year (ref: no)	0.57	(0.29, 1.14)	0.67	(0.40, 1.12)	0.68	(0.42, 1.10)	0.18	0.20
Age, years	1.03	(0.97, 1.08)	1.03	(0.98, 1.08)	1.03*	(1.00, 1.07)	0.00	0.12
Number of live births	0.64†	(0.40, 1.02)	1.17	(0.70, 1.95)	0.97	(0.74, 1.28)	3.33†	2.47
Overall model difference (1) vs. (2)							8.67***	
Overall model difference (1) vs. (3)								3.91**

† $p \leq 0.10$ *$p \leq 0.05$ **$p \leq 0.01$ ***$p \leq 0.001$

[a] Household belongs to official list of "poor households" in the commune.

[b] Only 1% of women reported forestry or fishing.