IMMIGRANT VISIBILITY AND XENOPHOBIA IN SWITZERLAND

Shabnam Shenasi, Ph.D.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to answer the following overarching question: *how does ethnic diversity impact xenophobia?* This is an important question because native attitudes toward immigrants can impact immigrant integration outcomes. Many studies answer it by examining the effects of relative immigrant group size. Some scholars argue that a greater presence of immigrants leads to heightened perceptions of immigrant threat, or xenophobia. Others say that proximity to immigrants causes familiarity and thereby a reduction in anti-immigrant sentiment. I argue that immigrant group size increases xenophobia when immigrants are ethnically visible, crossing salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. I test this thesis in the Swiss context using multilevel modeling. I find the expected relationship, except when group size is measured in terms of the racially visible. I discuss implications of the findings for group threat theory and broader discussions about religious exclusion in Switzerland.

Keywords: immigration, xenophobia, social exclusion, Switzerland, multilevel modeling

Introduction

Widespread xenophobia in Europe has attracted much public and academic attention. The examples of its manifestations are numerous. Its presence is evident in the influence of radical right populist political parties such as the Golden Dawn in Greece, Swiss People's Party (SVP), Swedish Democrats, and National Front in France. Anti-immigrant hostility shows up in bouts of violence against Muslims in Greece, the 2011 attacks on a summer camp and Oslo in Norway, and in less publicized ways throughout Europe. Eight European countries experienced a rise in recorded racist crime from 2000 to 2006 (Human Rights First 2008:1). In this context, many ask whether growing ethnic diversity leads to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment.

One point of academic debate revolves around the effect of immigrant group size on negative attitudes towards immigrants. Scholars adopting a conflict-based theoretical perspective argue that immigrant presence amplifies anti-immigrant sentiment. For some, this is because greater immigrant presence threatens individual interests, increasing competition over scarce resources such as jobs, housing, and social benefits. For others, when there are more immigrants the native majority is more likely to view them as a threat as to its political status, cultural influence, or other collective interests. Scholars with a contact-based approach argue that greater immigrant group size diminishes negative attitudes toward immigrants. According to this view, since residents of immigrant-rich areas are more likely to have intergroup contact, they tend to be more familiar with immigrants and, thus, harbor less prejudice toward them. Many studies find a positive effect for immigrant group size and still others a negative or no effect. The questions remain of how and under what conditions immigrant group size impacts anti-immigrant attitudes.

The present study examines how the ethnic composition of local immigrant presence affects xenophobia. I argue that xenophobia is higher among individuals living in communities with larger shares of ethnically visible immigrants. According to one interpretation of realistic group threat theory, xenophobia increases in response to objective *sources* of threat (cf. Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). I conceive of ethnic visibility as an objective source of cultural threat. I use the term "ethnic visibility" to refer to immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. Aside from the racially visible, such immigrants are not necessarily visually distinct, but are conspicuous because of accent, name, religious garb, and other ethnic markers. Employing multilevel modeling, I determine the effects of municipal-level immigrant visibility

on xenophobia. The results demonstrate that xenophobia is higher in communities containing a greater share of ethnically visible immigrants.

Theoretical Background

The primary purpose of this investigation is to determine whether, net of immigrant group size, visible immigrant group size is positively related to xenophobia. This study reframes difference in terms of ethnic visibility, measured as the share of immigrants that cross salient linguistic, religious, or racial boundaries. Reframed thus, the question is whether people living in communities with more ethnically visible immigrants feel more anti-immigrant sentiment. The word "xenophobia" stems from the Latin roots *xenos* and *-phobos*, which mean "stranger" and "fearing," respectively ("xenophobia"). I define xenophobia as a generalized perception of immigrants as threatening, be it to cultural life, jobs, safety of neighborhoods, or overall quality of life in the country.

Contact Theory

According to contact theory, developed by Allport (1954) and elaborated extensively ever since, contact with an outgroup leads to reduced prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole. Based on a meta-analysis of over 500 published and unpublished studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conclude that intergroup contact *causes* prejudice reduction. Prejudiced people tend to avoid intergroup contact (Herek and Capitanio 1996), but the path from contact to prejudice reduction is generally much stronger (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Van Dick et al. 2004). Experiences of negative intergroup contact *can* lead to increases in prejudice, but occur less

often than positive intergroup contact and friendship (Pettigrew 2008:196). Intergroup contact is more likely to lead to prejudice reduction when the contact is not superficial and salience of the group is sufficiently high (Pettigrew et al. 2011:276). Based on contact theory, many scholars argue that larger immigration presence increases the odds of intergroup contact, thereby leading to less xenophobia.

Conflict Theories

A number of theories conceive of anti-immigrant attitudes as stemming from conflict over either individual or collective interests. Competitive threat theory argues that those who stand to compete most with immigrants over jobs, housing, and other material goods have the highest xenophobia. Since more immigrants are of low socioeconomic status (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), natives who are of similarly low socioeconomic status or unemployed feel the most threatened, since they see immigrants as challenging their individual interests. Group conflict theory argues anti-immigrant attitude is more intense when immigrants are seen as threatening collective economic, cultural, or religious interests (Fetzer 2000a; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). According to this understanding, xenophobia arises from the fear that immigrants could alter the prevailing way of life or foundation of national identity (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Within the group threat framework, scholars in the "realistic group threat theory" school (Bobo 1983; Sears and Jessor 1996) say anti-immigrant attitudes are based on 'real' experiences and interests. Those in the "perceived threat" school say it only matters whether the circumstances are *perceived* as threatening, not whether immigrants have a 'real' negative impact on the host society. Empirical studies with the latter perspective use subjective indicators

(Fetzer 2000a; McLaren 2003), such as perceptions of one's financial situation, while studies grounded in the former use objective indicators (Bobo 1988; Quillian 1995), such as the unemployment rate. According to one interpretation of realistic group threat theory, xenophobia may have objective *sources*, even if it is based on purely imagined threats (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011:817). According to this view, xenophobia is based on objective *sources* of potential threat, such as the size of the low-skilled immigrant population (economic threat). This study looks at visible population size as an objective *source* of potential cultural threat.

Effects of Immigrant Group Size

Studies of regional and local contexts of immigrant presence often find a negative effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Wagner et al. 2003), though there is still some variation. Some studies find a positive (Schlueter and Davidov 2013) or no effect (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; 2010; O'Neil and Tienda 2010). Hjerm (2009) finds that overall municipal immigrant group size has no effect on perceived immigrant threat, but the size of the socially distant immigrant population is *negatively* related to xenophobia. Some scholars speak of a curvilinear 'familiarization effect', whereby low levels of outgroup size stimulate perceived threat but higher levels lead to familiarization and less threat. Schneider suggests this is because "there is an effect of familiarization over and above individual contact" (2008:55). Still, it seems the bulk of studies find that larger regional and local immigrant group size leads to less perceived group threat.

Ethnic Visibility

Based on realistic group threat theory, I argue that visible immigrant group size, understood as an objective source of cultural threat, is positively related to xenophobia. Some European studies measure immigrant group size as the share of non-Western or non-EU (Quillian 1995) immigrants, under the view that only this more culturally different population evokes threat. However, such measures are too broad, for they capture differences such as socioeconomic disadvantages and differences in rights and mobility stemming from whether one has EU citizenship. A few studies have used more fine-grained measures of cultural difference, examining the share of immigrants that are linguistically unassimilated (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011), Muslim (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schneider 2008), or perceived to be socially distant (Hjerm 2009). Instead, I conceptualize immigrant difference in terms of linguistic, religious, and racial visibility, which I measure as the shares of immigrants who lack country language proficiency, are Muslim, or hail from Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.[1] In what follows, I cite evidence that suggests immigrant ethnic visibility leads to higher xenophobia.

Linguistic Visibility

There are good reasons to suspect that xenophobia would be higher in locales where many immigrants do not speak at least one of the country or regional languages well. After all, language is a central element of culture. It is also one of the best predictors of integration outcomes (Esser 2006). Paxton and Mughan (2006) find that natives feel threatened when immigrant minorities do not assimilate. They argue that assimilation is a key element of cultural threat. Immigrants that speak the common language poorly may be seen as more foreign and

[1] Not accounted amongst the racially visible are immigrants originating from the Middle East, North Africa, and post-Soviet republics.

perhaps even *unwilling* to assimilate. In a group discussion involving Dutch participants, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) found that the majority of Dutch participants felt uncomfortable when participants spoke other languages in front of them. When immigrants do not predominantly speak the country language or speak it well, they may be seen as more culturally threatening.

In the Dutch context, Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) find that ethnic minority members in more ethnically concentrated neighborhoods ethnic minorities speak Dutch more poorly. They note that this can be a circular effect; relative to mixed neighborhoods, ethnic minorities in ethnically concentrated neighborhoods have both 1) fewer opportunities for contact with native Dutch; and 2) less necessity to learn the country language. They have fewer opportunities to practice the language, so their language skills improve more slowly than do those of immigrants in other types of neighborhoods. This lack of proficiency exacerbates views of immigrant foreignness, leading to greater perceptions of immigrant threat in locales with many linguistically disadvantaged immigrants. One can expect more anti-immigrant sentiment and fewer possibilities for intergroup contact in communities where the immigrants in question have difficulty communicating with the native population.

Compared to other European countries, Switzerland does not have high rates of residential segregation on the basis of ethnicity (Koopmans 2010). Still, the ethnic concentrations of Turks, former Yugoslavs, and Muslims in Swiss cities are substantial.[2] Their geographic isolation and generally lower socioeconomic status are reflected in the lower linguistic integration outcomes of their children. While 80 percent of Swiss-born Spanish

[2] In 2000, the segregation indices for Turks in Zurich and Bern were 26 and 36, respectively (Arend, Baur and Schuler 2005:69). The segregation index for Muslims in Bern was 27 (Koopmans 2010:16), and for former Yugoslavs in Basel and Lucerne were 35 and 36, respectively (Arend, Baur and Schuler 2005:69).

immigrants claim one of the national languages as their primary language, the same is true of only 69 percent of Portuguese,[3] 65 percent of Turks, and 58 percent former Yugoslav immigrants born in Switzerland (Piguet 2004:100). Ethnic concentration may slow the language integration of immigrants and consequently contribute to heightened perceptions of immigrant threat among native Swiss.

Religious Visibility

The Muslim population in Switzerland is comprised primarily of immigrants from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Albania (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010:180).[4] A number of these came in the 1970s during the postwar era as low-skilled guest workers. Their stays were expected to be temporary, and migration policies were specifically constructed to make permanent residence difficult and undesirable.[5] In the 1990s large numbers of people fled the former Yugoslavia to Switzerland as refugees. Despite their heterogeneous origins, Muslim immigrants in Switzerland tend to be of low socioeconomic status (Afonso 2005). Over 9,000 former Yugoslav nationals have a provisional permit (permit F), which—meant as it is for only temporary asylum—places many obstacles to integration to (unsuccessfully) prevent permanent settlement.[6] By the mid-1980s, asylum "emerged as a metaphor for undesirable immigrants"

[3] Portuguese immigrants are also somewhat spatially segregated, but to a lesser extent than are Turks and former Yugoslavs.

[4] Small numbers come from Arab countries and Africa, but their numbers are smaller. In 2000, Switzerland had about 59,000 Turkish-born residents and nearly 277,000 born in the Balkan region, compared to about 26,000 from North Africa; 18,000 from the Middle East; 41,000 from the rest of Africa; 34,000 from South Asia; and 48,000 from the rest of Asia.

[5] The federal government placed restrictive conditions on family reunification and increased the period of residence required for obtaining a permanent residence permit from five to ten years (D'Amato, 2011, p.168).

[6] One study found that 60 percent of those with such a permit had been living in Switzerland for at least five years and another 21 percent for over 10 years (Piguet 2004:107). Holders of this permit face many obstacles to integration, including the following: 1) no right to family reunification; 2) limited access to the labor market, with

(D'Amato 2011:190). In public debates, refugees were often called the derogatory term "asylants" to suggest they did not deserve refugee status (2011:170). Altogether, Muslim immigrants in Switzerland tend to have multiple layers of marginality.

Findings on attitudes towards different ethnic groups in Switzerland suggest that animosity directed toward Muslim immigrants is not explained away simply by their lower socioeconomic position. In the 2002 UNIVOX survey, three-quarters of respondents said Albanians are either "out of place (in Switzerland)" or "sometimes a source of concern" (Piguet 2004:111).[7] The figures were 72 percent, 71 percent, and 61 percent for Serbians, Bosnians, and Turks, respectively.[8] By comparison, only eight percent of respondents held similar views toward Portuguese immigrants, who entered the country as guest workers around the same time with similarly low socioeconomic background and, like Yugoslavs and Turks, have faced difficulties with integration. Over a fifth of respondents saw Portuguese immigrants as enriching to Swiss society,[9] while only 6 percent said the same for Turks and 2 percent for each of the Yugoslav groups. Helbling (2008) finds that in Switzerland those from former Yugoslavia, Turks, and Arab countries are the least liked groups.[10] Something about the religion or the cultural difference Islam is seen to represent at least partly explains the much more negative views toward Muslim immigrants than Portuguese immigrants.

---

preference given to Swiss citizens and foreign residents; 3) restrictions in the access to post-compulsory education; 4) and restrictions on the inter-cantonal mobility (2004:107-8).

[7] My translation. The original wording is "*pas à sa place (en Suisse)*" and "*parfois source de preoccupation*."

[8] The shares of people who said those groups were out of place were 34, 25, 25, and 15 percent for Albanians, Serbians, Bosnians, and Turks, respectively. Note that many immigrants of these origins are Muslim.

[9] "Un enrichessement."

[10] The shares of people who said immigrants from former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Arab countries were little or not at all likeable were 19, 23, and 33 percent, respectively. Another Swiss study finds Turks, Africans, Tamils, and those from the former Yugoslavia are common targets of prejudice (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al: 72-77).

In Switzerland, non-Western immigrants, particularly those from Muslim countries, face discrimination in the areas of hiring and naturalization. Fibbi, Kaya and Piguet (2003) found discrimination in hiring when they sent job applications of candidates that were identical in everything except nationality. Out of 100 applications in which a Swiss candidate got an interview, a Turkish candidate was rejected 30 times and a Kosovo Albanian 39 times. Non-Europeans, especially those from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey, face a more difficult time getting naturalized. Municipalities stipulate their own naturalization criteria.[11] Those with less formalized naturalization procedures require candidates "to prove that they have adopted the 'values and traditions of the local community'" (Mahnig and Wimmer 2003:148). Under this system, non-Western immigrants have been denied political rights more so than others. Naturalization rejection rates increase immensely when naturalization decisions are settled by popular vote (Helbling 2008:87), even more so when the applicants hail from Muslim countries (2008:91).[12] Evidence of discrimination in hiring and naturalization decisions provide further evidence that immigrants that are Muslim or assumed to be Muslim are not well-regarded.

Racial Visibility

Research in the U.S. context demonstrates that racial group size impacts racial prejudice, generalized trust, and perceptions of insecurity, though not for all racial minorities equally. Putnam (2007) finds lower generalized and ingroup trust among residents of ethnoracially diverse neighborhoods. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) find that individual perceptions of

[11] A potential candidate must meet separate national, cantonal, and municipal criteria to be eligible for citizenship.

[12] Helbling (2008) uses a sample of 74 municipalities, which he argues is nationally representative. The coefficient for "popular votes at ballot" is 28.4 when the outcome is overall rejection rate, but 53.2 when the outcome is the rejection rate for applicants from Muslim countries (2008:87, 91). By "Muslim countries" Helbling is referring to applicants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey.

neighborhood disorder are more shaped by the concentration of black and Latino residents than by objective neighborhood conditions. Taylor (1998) finds that a large black presence in the local population leads to an increase in prejudice, but large shares of Hispanics or Asians do not. Similarly, the share of blacks in the metropolitan area or county is positively related to anti-black prejudice, but the share of Asians is weakly but negatively related to anti-Asian prejudice and the share of Hispanics is unrelated to anti-Hispanic prejudice (Dixon 2006:2192). Superficial contact with a targeted minority member has no effect on prejudice against that minority when the minority in question is black, but has a negative effect when the minority is Asian or Hispanic (Dixon 2006:2196). These findings suggest that in the American context the prejudice-reducing effects of contact seem to vary by race, being strongest where the racial line is most salient. They also show that the impact of outgroup size on prejudice varies by the racial outgroup in question.

Many scholars argue that race does not operate in the European context or at least not to the same extent as it does in the United States. In several countries, including France and Germany, race is not an acceptable terminology. In Britain today, state policies construct difference and diversity in terms of 'faith', rather than 'race relations'.[13] In the Netherlands, when Dutch policymakers refer to "black schools," they are talking about schools where a large proportion of students are first- and second generation Moroccans and Turks (Lucassen 2005:12).[14] At least in Western Europe, a discursive shift has occurred in which biologically-grounded racial categories have "increasingly given way to a wider presupposition of cultural

[13] They shifted from addressing "race relations" in the 1950s and 1960s to 'ethnicity', 'culture', and finally 'faith' (Grillo 2010:50).

[14] By contrast, Surinamese immigrants, who would be viewed as black in the U.S., are seen as less "black" because they do better in school and the job market (Lucassen 2005:12).

difference as the fundamental and immutable basis of identity and belonging" (Silverstein 2005:365-66). Whether perceived as cultural or racial difference, some immigrant origins are seen as more threatening than others. Hungarians report the least tolerance toward Chinese immigrants, Arabs, Africans, Afghans, and Gypsies (Nyíri 2005:660-61). Hagendoorn et al. (1998) and Van Oudenhoven, Groenewoud and Hewstone (1996) find clear preference hierarchies in Europe for different ethno-cultural and immigrant groups.[15] Differences in tolerance and ethnic perceptions suggest that some ethnic origins are seen as more foreign and less acceptable than others. The question remains whether larger shares of these ethnically more visible immigrants in a country or region lead to higher xenophobia among natives living there.

The term "race" may not be a meaningful concept in Switzerland today. Racial terminology is not used in mainstream discourse, nor is official data on race collected.[16] Some studies based on survey data find that religious boundaries are weak in the Swiss context (Bail 2008; Duemmler 2013), though this was not always the case. From the 1920s to the 1960s federal and local Swiss governments tried to regulate the reproductive sexuality of Jews, the Yenish ('Gypsies'),[17] and other so-called 'bad weeds' to eliminate difference and control what it meant to be Swiss (Mottier 2008). From 1926 to 1972, they forceful removed over 600 Yenish and other 'traveler' children from their families, partly on the grounds that traveler children were "racially inferior" (2008:266).[18] Although biological notions of race are in disrepute, it is still

[15] By ethnic group I am referring to people of immigrant origin but who did not themselves immigrate.

[16] However, non-governmental organizations such as the Swiss Foundation against Racism and Antisemitism do monitor incidence of racism and xenophobia in the country.

[17] The Yenish are a people found predominantly in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and France who have traditionally led a nomadic lifestyle (Mottier 2008:265). About 30,000 Yenish lived in Switzerland in 2008 and several hundred thousand in Europe overall.

[18] The children were sent to be raised in penal institutions, orphanages, foster homes, workhouses, and psychiatric facilities.

plausible that immigrants who stand out as more phenotypically different are disproportionately the targets of xenophobia. In Switzerland today, prejudice is directed toward Turks, Tamils, Africans, and immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (Hoffmann-Nowotny et al. 1997:72-77). In 2007, the principal victims of racist violence in Switzerland were Muslims, people of African origin, and Jews (Human Rights First 2008:10). Immigrants in Switzerland from Africa and Asia also tend to be marginal in terms of residential status, which can lead them to be seen even more negatively.[19] Measuring racial visibility as the share of "migrant stock" from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, this study looks at whether immigrants that would be considered racially identifiable as "black" or "Asian" in the American context are regarded with increased threat in the Swiss setting.

Findings on Visible Immigrant Group Size

Findings on the effects of visible immigrant group size have been mixed. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) measure visibility in terms of the size of the population that is not linguistically assimilated, but find no effect. Additional studies have considered the effects of Muslim population size in a country on perceived immigrant threat (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Strabac and Listhaug 2008) and either found a positive (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2011) or no effect (Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Hjerm (2009) finds the municipal share of culturally distant immigrants is negatively related to xenophobia, while overall group size has no effect. Overall, the findings are inconclusive. More work needs to be done in both national and more local contexts to determine

---

[19] Approximately 8,000 Cambodians and Vietnamese escaping newly-established communist regimes were let admitted between 1979 and 1982 on the basis of yearly quotas (D'Amato 2011:169). Sri Lankans make up 27 percent of Permit F holders and Somalis, 13 percent (Piguet 2004:107).

whether ethnic visibility, measured in terms of language use, minority religious affiliation, or race, has an effect on xenophobia.

Literature on immigration in various European and American contexts suggests that immigrants seen as standing out in terms of language, religion, or race, are regarded as particularly threatening to the dominant native majority. Compared to other immigrants, ethnically visible immigrants may be viewed as a symbolic threat to the culture, traditions and customs of the country. Based on realistic group threat theory and past studies looking at immigrants that cross linguistic, religious, and racial boundaries, I arrive at the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Immigrant visibility is positively related to xenophobia.

In this study, I test whether, net of overall immigrant group size, xenophobia is higher in municipalities where more of the immigrants are ethnically visible.

Data and Measurement

Data

For the present analysis I use Switzerland's restricted-use data from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS) (Joye, Schöbi and Wälti 2005), carried out from 2002 to 2003. The survey is based on a stratified multi-stage probability sample. It is representative of all persons age 15 and over living within private households, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. The original dataset contains 2,040 individual observations from 198 municipalities.[20] This investigation draws from responses to a 58-item rotating module on

[20] Switzerland has 26 cantons total. It had 6,806 municipalities in January 2002 [Raumgliedrung_Jan_2002.xls]. Municipality boundaries changed considerably and many new ones have been created since then.

immigration and asylum issues, available only in Round 1 of the ESS. I supplement the dataset with contextual data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO).

I narrow the sample in two ways. First, I restrict the sample to respondents age 18 and older. By age 18, many individuals have completed their formal education and entered the work force. Second, I only analyze the responses of *nonimmigrant* respondents, whom I define as individuals born in Switzerland to Swiss-born parents.[21] I use casewise deletion to eliminate observations with missing responses on the variables of interest. The final sample contains responses from 1,354 individuals and 197 municipalities.[22]

Multilevel Regression Modeling

I test the two sets of hypotheses using multilevel regression modeling. For this investigation, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are not appropriate because they assume observations are independent. Individual observations within the same country may be statistically dependent on unmeasured factors. Individuals within the same municipality may resemble one another in certain ways due to shared political, economic, and social environments. When looking at a cross-level effect, such as that of municipal-level immigrant presence on individual-level xenophobia, it is important to use a model that accounts for the nestedness of observations in hierarchically structured data. Models that do not do this estimate standard errors of regression coefficients too small. Multilevel regression modeling accounts for data clustering and adjusts the standard errors accordingly.

[21] All but nine of the included respondents are Swiss citizens.

[22] The restricted-use dataset does not report municipality of residence, but instead zip code and locality of residence. I determine municipality of residence from zip code and locality of residence using a macro file ("Liste des communes et des localités, 2002") I obtained directly from the FSO. The file lists municipalities by locality and zip code according to 2002 classifications.

I use *HLM 7.0* to run these models. I report results based on *robust* standard errors, which are consistently higher than asymptotic standard errors. I compare goodness-of-fit of models using the Wald test. According to Treiman (2014:222), it is not appropriate to estimate the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) on weighted or clustered samples because such designs are based on pseudolikelihood functions. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), likelihood ratio test, and BIC are all based on true log likelihood. Since the models in this study are estimated with robust standard errors and are, thus, based on log pseudolikelihood, none of these are suitable options for comparing goodness-of-fit. The Wald test is appropriate for comparing nested models estimated with robust standard errors.[23]

Research Setting

Switzerland is like a number of Western European countries, but stands apart in some ways. Immigration figures highly in Swiss politics and receives a lot of press. Swiss citizens see immigration as one of the country's most pressing problems (Nicolet and Sciarini 2006). Switzerland has a very large share of immigrants,[24] second after Luxembourg, but does not consider itself an immigration country (D'Amato 2011:165). Like many countries, Switzerland engaged in extensive postwar labor recruitment from Turkey and Southern Europe (Bail 2008:39).[25] It has a large, culturally heterogeneous Muslim population,[26] comprised mostly of

[23] I estimate all models without weights. In addition, even though the ESS dataset comes with individual-level sampling weights I carry out all analyses without weights. I explain the decisions to use casewise deletion and estimate unweighted models in the Chapter 2 Appendix.

[24] In 2000, 20.5 percent of the population was made of Swiss- and foreign-born foreign nationals (Wanner 2012:25). Another 7.4 percent of the population was comprised of Swiss- and foreign-born naturalized Swiss citizens. In total, 27.9 percent of the Swiss population was of immigrant origin.

[25] France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain, Sweden, Austria, and Luxembourg also did this.

immigrants from Albania, former Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010:180). Even though the Swiss appear to be less opposed to immigrants and immigration than many EU countries and the U.S., they are also the most opposed to living next to Muslims (Helbling 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007).

Analytic Approach

In these analyses, I test the hypothesis that people living in municipalities with a larger share of ethnically visible immigrants tend to be more xenophobic. The hypothesis is tested using the following models:

$$XEN_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{01}*(\text{overall immigrant group size})_j + \gamma_{02}*(\text{visible immigrant group size})_j + u_{0j} + r_{ij}$$

I define **xenophobia** as a generalized perception of immigrant threat. I construct the variable as an additive index based on responses to six survey items that ask respondents their opinions about the effects of immigrants on the economy, cultural life, crime rates, and other aspects of the country of residence. Answers ranged from 0 to 10 on a Likert scale, with 0 representing the most negative view toward immigrants. I added respondent scores for these 6 items, reversed their direction so that higher scores would indicate more perceived threat, and rescaled the index to range from 0 to 100. I calculated a value for all individual cases with nonmissing responses to at least 4 of the 6 survey items.[27] Using principal component analysis,

[26] According to the 2000 census, 4.3 percent of the country population was Muslim. Only 12 percent of them had Swiss citizenship (Based on compiled data obtained directly from the FSO: "Réligions par communes, sexe, et nationalité, 2000.").

[27] I counted the following responses as missing: 1) refusal to answer; 2) don't know; and 3) no answer.

Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) find that these six items produce a one-factor solution in all the countries they investigate. Also, the loadings on that factor are very similar across countries. These results suggest that people do not make distinctions about their views toward immigrants in these questions; "they are simply positive or negative towards immigrants in general" (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011:824).[28] This provides justification for combining the six survey items into a single indicator of xenophobia.

X is a vector of individual respondent characteristics. I include variables for age, gender, educational attainment, political orientation, and urban residence. The last is based on a survey item that asked individuals to rate their political orientation on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means left and 10 means right.[29] Also included among the controls is a variable for friendship contact. This is based on a survey question that asked respondents to indicate with they had several, few, or no immigrant friends. Responses of "several" or "a few" were coded as 1 and responses of "none at all" as 0. Some might argue against including this variable, since it can lead to selection bias in the results—those who are less xenophobic may choose to have immigrant friends. The same models without this variable yielded the same qualitative results.

The main variables of interest are immigrant group size, religious visibility, linguistic visibility, and racial visibility. The variable for **municipal immigrant group size** is measured as the share of foreign-born residents out of the total resident population in 2000.[30] **Religious visibility** is measured as the share of Muslim foreigners out of the total municipal resident

---

[28] They find similar results when they do the same analysis with comparable questions from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).

[29] I recode responses of "don't know" to a score of 5.

[30] Based on compiled data obtained directly from the FSO: "Wohnbevölkerung nach Staat zur Zeit der Geburt und Gemeinden, 2000."

population.[31] I measure **linguistic visibility** with data from an index constructed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) to determine the extent of linguistic non-integration in different parts of the country (Office fédéral de la statistique 2005). On the basis of individual level 2000 census data, the FSO counts as linguistically non-integrated the following populations: 1) those who do not speak the regional language at home; 2) who speak the regional language neither at home nor at work; 3) those who do not speak a Swiss language or English (the *lingua franca*) at home or at work either; and 4) those whose main language (in which they think, typically the language they learned first) is not a German or Romance language. The index is measured as the share of linguistically non-integrated peoples out of the total municipal population.

I measure **racial visibility** as the share of residents born in any part of Africa or Asia not including North Africa, the Middle East, or former Soviet states.[32] Through my chosen measurement, I essentially assume racial phenotype from country of birth. This may be a strong assumption, particularly given Africa's long colonial history—immigrants from South Africa, the Congo, and other African countries may be European descendants. In the absence of data on race, this is the available alternative. I exclude immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet states, which comprise much of Switzerland's Muslim population. This way the religious and racial visibility measures are more distinct.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

[31] By foreigner I am referring to residents with foreign citizenship.

[32] By using this measurement I build upon a previous study in which I look at racial visibility in a cross-national context. The difference is that in this country I use information on country of *birth*, rather than country of citizenship.

The final sample consists of 1,354 individuals nested in 197 Swiss municipalities. Some municipalities are represented by as little as two observations, while others by up to 55. The average respondent is middle aged, has completed an upper secondary level of education and is politically centrist (see Table 1). The sample is nearly evenly divided between men and women. Respondents average 52 points on the xenophobia index, which means that on average they chose the middle response to each of the index questions. Also, 71 percent of them have either some or many immigrant friends. The average municipality in the sample has an immigrant group size of 19 percent. By comparison, the average municipality in Switzerland has an immigrant group size of 13 percent.[33] Racial visibility is rather uncommon, while linguistic visibility is very prevalent. On average, Muslims do not make up a large share of the municipal population.

[Table 1 here]

Looking at the municipal-level variable correlations, it is evident that overall immigrant group size is substantially correlated with linguistic and racial visibility, but less so with religious visibility (see Table 2). These findings are not surprising. Linguistic visibility will tend to be highest where immigrant presence is largest. Racially visible immigrants tend to come from more recent migration flows and concentrate in the cities, where immigrant presence is highest. Altogether, the municipal-level correlations demonstrate that the various measures of immigrant group size are understandably related, but still somewhat distinct.

[Table 2 here]

Ethnic Visibility

[33] This calculation is based on data from the 2000 Swiss census.

The results support the second hypothesis; people living in municipalities with larger shares of linguistically or religiously visible immigrants perceive more immigrant threat (see Table 3). Net of controls and immigrant group size, a one point increase in linguistic visibility corresponds to a 0.28 point increase in xenophobia index score (Model 3). Similarly, all other things equal, a one point increase in Muslim population size contributes an increase of 0.75 in xenophobia index score (Model 4). Wald test results indicate these models improve considerably upon the control model (Model 2). Variance estimates show that both linguistic and religious visibility models explain 44 percent of municipal-level variance, compared to the intercept (null) model. Notably, the negative effect of overall immigrant group size intensifies when either linguistic or religious visibility is introduced into the model (compared to Model 2). This suggests that when few of the immigrants in a municipality are ethnically visible, immigrant group size has a stronger downward effect on xenophobia.

The findings for racial visibility do not support the second hypothesis (see Model 5). Net of controls and immigrant group size, racial visibility has a *negative*, but statistically insignificant effect on xenophobia. Including racial visibility in the model causes the coefficient for immigrant group size to decrease and lose statistical significance. The Wald test result demonstrates that the racial visibility model offers little improvement upon the control model. Ancillary analyses reveal that measuring visibility in terms of sub-Saharan African or Asian populations separately does not produce a positive effect, either.[34] The presence of racially visible immigrants in a municipality does not appear to evoke increased xenophobia.

[Table 3 here]

[34] Net of overall immigrant group size, the size of the sub-Saharan African population has a statistically insignificant negative effect. Asian group size does not have a statistically significant net or gross effect on xenophobia.

The positive effect of linguistic visibility on xenophobia can be interpreted as a response to non-Western immigrant presence. The measure of linguistic visibility counted only people who did not speak 1) a Swiss language; 2) English; or 3) a romance language. This would exclude immigrants from Italy; France; Germany; Portugal; Spain; South America; and Francophone or Anglophone countries. Given Switzerland's immigration history, the measure of linguistic visibility primarily counts immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, but also includes immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Many of the immigrants from these countries arrived as guest workers, family members of guest workers, or asylum seekers and tended to be socially disadvantaged.[35] The positive effect of linguistic visibility on xenophobia may stem from native Swiss reacting to local immigrants' multiple layers of difference and disadvantage both in terms of language ability, culture, and socioeconomic background.

Altogether, the results provide support for the hypothesis. Linguistic and religious visibilities are each negatively related to xenophobia, as expected. These findings suggest that a larger presence of immigrants viewed as culturally different leads to amplified perceptions of immigrant threat.

Discussion

The findings of this study provide support for both contact- and conflict based explanations of xenophobia. In line with contact theory, a greater overall presence of immigrants in a community generally leads to more opportunities for intergroup contact, leading to lower

[35] Among the refugees, some came from a rural background, some had not finished primary school, and still others had university degrees not recognized in Europe (D'Amato 2011:170). Immigrants from these regions who entered as highly-qualified immigrants probably came in with some proficiency in English or a Swiss language.

xenophobia. In line with realistic group threat theory, xenophobia is greater where there is a larger objective source of cultural threat—in this case, the size of the ethnically visible immigrant population. Net of overall group size, people living in communities with a larger visible immigrant population are more anti-immigrant. Other studies have found similar visibility effects in Spain and the Netherlands (Savelkoul et al. 2011; Schlueter and Davidov 2013).[36] Visible immigrant group size is positively related to xenophobia because, more so than other immigrants, those that stand out ethnically will be seen as more threatening to the culture, ideals, and traditions of the country.

Placing this study's findings in the context of the literature, the positive effect of immigrant visibility can be said to result from both less intergroup contact and higher cultural threat. Through multilevel structural equation modeling, Schlueter and Wagner (2008) find that immigrant group size both directly increases perceived immigrant threat and indirectly decreases it by increasing intergroup contact. In their study the net effect of overall immigrant group size is negative. However, the positive effect of immigrant group size on intergroup contact appears to be weaker when the measure is limited to visible immigrants (Green, Fasel and Sarrasin 2010).[37] Also, the direct positive contribution of immigrant group size to perceived threat is probably higher when immigrants are visible. Thus, the finding of a positive effect of immigrant visibility conforms to group threat theory, but is a result of both contact and threat dynamics.

What is interesting about the observed effects of ethnic visibility is that they occur in a multicultural country. This may be because although Swiss national identity may appear

[36] Neither study controls for overall group size. Schlueter and Davidov (2013) measure group size in terms of the share of non-Western foreigners. Savelkoul et al.'s (2011) study looks at the effect of Muslim group size.

[37] Green, Fasel and Sarrasin (2010) find that Northern and Western European immigrant group size in a municipality is more positively associated with intergroup contact than is Muslim group size.

ethnically diverse and expansive, at the regional level it is mono-ethnic. As Mahnig and Wimmer point out, "Swiss national identity is dominated by the projection of local particularities on the national level" (2003:152). This makes it possible for regional and linguistic diversity to be seen as elements of the national ingroup. The present study shows that despite this expansive national understanding and purportedly weak symbolic boundaries (Bail 2008; Duemmler 2013), Switzerland has a salient cultural boundary that marks certain non-Westerners and particularly Muslims as unwanted outsiders. This is perhaps already apparent in its immigrant admissions policies, which have been partly motivated by the desire to limit the *Grad der Überfremdung*, or "degree of overforeignization."[38] The concept of "overforeignization" sets the boundaries of national identity by marking what the Swiss nation is *not*. In the 1960s and 1970s, Italian migrants were seen as the prominent threat to Swiss national identity (Mahnig and Wimmer, p.152). Today, Muslims seem to be seen as the primary source of Überfremdung.

Practically speaking, the findings on religious and linguistic visibility are particularly concerning in the Swiss context because of what increased threat can mean for the chances of integration of a large segment of the immigrant population, particularly those from Muslim countries. Immigrants that do not meet stringent municipal standards of linguistic and cultural assimilation are denied citizenship and, thereby, secure residential status. Until 2003, citizens in many Swiss municipalities could decide on naturalization requests by popular vote. In such places, the views of the native majority toward immigrants had very real consequences on the latter's abilities to integrate successfully into Swiss society. It has meant greater rejection rates of citizenship requests for Muslim applicants than for others. While this particular source of

[38] According to D'Amato, "Nationwide political census to ensure cultural purity in Switzerland prevented the drafting of any consistent immigrant policy until very recently" (2011:167).

potential discrimination has largely disappeared,[39] there remain many other ways that Swiss natives lead to the marginalization of certain segments of the immigrant population. In a country where citizens can and do vote on many issues,[40] local dynamics of xenophobia have real consequences for immigrants. Campaigns to promote intergroup contact, depict immigrants in a more nuanced way, and put in place and enforce more binding anti-racism laws would help immigrants to integrate into the society more and on a more equal footing with native Swiss.

The main limitation of this study was the potential for residential selection bias. It is possible that people who are more xenophobic will move to more ethnically Swiss municipalities. Since immigrants tend to concentrate in urban centers, it seems that, if anything, such "flight" would probably downwardly bias the effects of immigrant group size. Thus, part of the negative effect of immigrant group size could owe in part to self-selection of more xenophobic individuals into ethnically homogeneous communities. Residential mobility is more extensive in Switzerland than it is in many other European countries (Strassmann 2001), so such movement is feasible.[41] Past research demonstrates that Swiss inhabitants do not move when the percentage of immigrants increases (Arend 1982:361-72). To the extent this pattern still holds, the bias of residential selection on study results should be minimal. Future studies may want to find a way to account for residential mobility. Wagner et al. (2006) do this by controlling for migration into and out of the area of residence.

Many studies have debated how, if at all, immigrant group size affects attitudes toward immigrants and which theories describe such dynamics. This study finds evidence that both the

[39] In July 2003, popular voting to decide on naturalization requests was declared unconstitutional in most municipalities.

[40] Note that there is a very high voter participation rate in Switzerland, particularly among Swiss men.

[41] According to 1986 figures, annual mobility was 16.0 percent in the five largest Swiss urban agglomerations (Strassmann 2001:13).

contact hypothesis and realistic group conflict theory help explain the phenomenon. More research is needed to understand how and under what circumstances immigrant visibility and the geographic proximity of immigrant populations impact xenophobia. Future studies may want to look at the relationships of different types of intergroup contact with xenophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes to better understand how the latter two are related to see whether, as Helbling (2008) and others (Kuhnel and Leibold 2007; Stolz 2005) argue, whether in Switzerland today Islamophobia is simply a concretization of anti-immigrant sentiment. Studies that account for local political climate would help show how the size of the religious visible population comes to be interpreted as a sign of greater immigrant threat.

Tables

Table 1. Individual- and municipal-level variable means and standard deviations. 1354 individual observations and municipalities.

Individual-level	Mean	S.D.
Xenophobia	52.40	13.27
Contact	71%	
Political orientation	4.96	1.74
Educ: Second stage of tertiary	3%	
Educ: First stage of tertiary	11%	
Educ: Post-secondary, non-tertiary	13%	
Educ: Upper secondary	58%	
Educ: Lower secondary	12%	
Educ: Primary not completed	3%	
Female	51%	
Age	49.45	16.84
Municipal-level		
Immigrant group size	19.39	9.03
Neighboring immigrant group size	24.16	8.42
Religious visibility	3.51	2.58
Linguistic visibility	48.80	7.44
Racial visibility	1.41	0.91

Table 2. Municipal-level variable correlations. N=197.

	Immigrant group size	Linguistic visibility	Religious visibility	Racial visibility
Immigrant group size	1.000			
Linguistic visibility	0.649	1.000		
Religious visibility	0.378	0.772	1.000	
Racial visibility	0.693	0.550	0.342	1.000

Table 3. Relationships between immigrant visibility and xenophobia.

	M1: Unconditional model		M2: Controls		M3: Linguistic visibility		M4: Religious visibility		M5: Racial visibility	
	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.	coeff.	s.e.
Intercept	52.38 ***	0.47	54.14 ***	3.44	43.13 ***	4.23	53.18 ***	3.47	54.11 ***	3.45
Individual-level										
Age			0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
Female			2.04 **	0.73	2.12 **	0.73	2.14 **	0.72	2.07 **	0.73
Political orientation			1.17 ***	0.23	1.16 ***	0.23	1.15 ***	0.23	1.15 ***	0.23
Educ: Lower secondary			1.60	2.48	1.82	2.43	1.53	2.49	1.72	2.49
Educ: Upper secondary			-2.61	2.34	-2.48	2.29	-2.73	2.35	-2.49	2.34
Educ: Post-secondary, non-tertiary			-3.70	2.52	-3.57	2.46	-3.79	2.54	-3.51	2.51
Educ: First stage of tertiary			-8.60 ***	2.50	-8.30 ***	2.45	-8.53 ***	2.52	-8.39 ***	2.50
Educ: Second stage of tertiary			-10.20 ***	2.65	-10.01 ***	2.62	-10.13 ***	2.66	-9.78 ***	2.65
Friendship contact			-4.76 ***	0.79	-4.77 ***	0.79	-4.75 ***	0.78	-4.78 ***	0.79
Municipal level										
Immigrant group size			-0.14 **	0.05	-0.30 ***	0.06	-0.22 ***	0.05	-0.05	0.07
Linguistic visibility					0.28 ***	0.07				
Religious visibility							0.75 ***	0.19		
Racial visibility									-1.17	0.64

Notes: *** p<.001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. Models are based on 1,354 individuals and 197 municipalities. Omitted category for educational attainment is "primary education not completed".

Table 3. (Continued)

	M1: Unconditional model		M2: Controls		M3: Linguistic visibility		M4: Religious visibility		M5: Racial visibility	
	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.	variance component	s.d.
Random effects										
Municipal level	17.65 ***	4.20	12.07 ***	3.47	9.88 ***	3.14	9.90 ***	3.15	11.27 ***	3.36
% explained			31.62		44.01		43.92		36.17	
Individual level	158.94	12.61	137.65	11.73	137.52	11.73	137.14	11.71	137.78	11.74
% explained			13.4		13.48		13.72		13.31	
Model fit										
Wald test (compared to M2)										
$\chi 2$ statistic					14.39		14.65		3.37	
Degrees of freedom					1		1		1	
p -value					0.000		0.000		0.066	

Bibliography

Afonso, Alexandre. 2005. "When the Export of Social Problems Is No Longer Possible: Immigration Policies and Unemployment in Switzerland." *Social Policy & Administration* 39(6):653-68.

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, Mass.,: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

Arend, Michal. 1982. "Sozialökonomische Analyse Der Kleinräumigen Ausländerverteilung in Zürich." Pp. 294-374 in *Ausländer in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Und in Der Schweiz: Segregation Und Integration: Eine Vergleichende Untersuchung*, edited by H.-J. Hoffmann-Nowotny and K. O. Hondrich. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag.

Arend, Michal, Martin Baur and Martin Schuler. 2005. *Bevölkerungszusammensetzung, Integration Und Ausgrenzung in Urbanen Zonen*: Office fédéral de la statistique.

Bail, Christopher A. 2008. *The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe*.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *Pacific Sociological Review*:3-7.

Bobo, Lawrence. 1983. "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45(6):1196.

Bobo, Lawrence. 1988. "Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes." Pp. 85-114 in *Eliminating Racism*: Springer.

Bobo, Lawrence D. 1999. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." *Journal of Social Issues* 55(3):445-72.

D'Amato, Gianni. 2011. "The Case of Switzerland." Pp. 444 p. in *Migration Policymaking in Europe : The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*, edited by G. Zincone, R. Penninx and M. Borkert. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Duemmler, Kerstin. 2013. "Boundaries against Immigrants and Their Subjectively Felt Discrimination." in *FORS Working Paper Series, paper 2013-6*. Lausanne: FORS.

Escandell, Xavier and Alin M Ceobanu. 2009. "When Contact with Immigrants Matters: Threat, Interethnic Attitudes and Foreigner Exclusionism in Spain's Comunidades Autónomas." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32(1):44-69.

Escandell, Xavier and Alin M Ceobanu. 2010. "Nationalisms and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Spain." *South European Society and Politics* 15(2):157-79.

Esser, Hans. 2006. "Migration, Language, and Integration. Aki Research Review 4. Berlin: Programme on Intercultural Conflicts and Societal Integration (Aki)." *Social Science Research Center, www. wzb. eu/zkd/aki/files/aki_research_review_4 (21.12. 2007).*

Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fibbi, Rosita, Bülent Kaya and Etienne Piguet. 2003. "Le Passeport Ou Le Diplôme? Etude Des Discriminations À L'embauche Des Personnes D'origine Étrangère Sur Le Marché Du Travail Suisse." Neuchâtel: Forum suisse pour l'étude des migrations et de la population.

Fibbi, Rosita, Mathias Lerch and Philippe Wanner. 2006. "Unemployment and Discrimination against Youth of Immigrant Origin in Switzerland: When the Name Makes the Difference." *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale* 7(3):351-66.

Gijsberts, Merove and Jaco Dagevos. 2007. "The Socio-Cultural Integration of Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands: Identifying Neighbourhood Effects on Multiple Integration Outcomes." *Housing Studies* 22(5):805-31.

Green, Eva GT, Nicole Fasel and Oriane Sarrasin. 2010. "The More the Merrier? The Effects of Type of Cultural Diversity on Exclusionary Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4(2):177-90.

Grillo, Ralph. 2010. "British and Others: From 'Race' to 'Faith'." Pp. 50-71 in *The Multiculturalism Backlash : European Discourses, Policies and Practices*, edited by S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf. London ; New York: Routledge.

Hagendoorn, Louk, Rian Drogendijk, Sergey Tumanov and Joseph Hraba. 1998. "Inter-Ethnic Preferences and Ethnic Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Union." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 22(4):483-503.

Helbling, Marc. 2008. "Islamophobia in Switzerland: A New Phenomenon or a New Name for Xenophobia?" Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) 3 - 6 April 2008, Chicago.

Herek, Gregory M and John P Capitanio. 1996. "" Some of My Best Friends": Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes toward Gay Men and Lesbians." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22:412-24.

Hjerm, Mikael. 2009. "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Cross-Municipal Variation in the Proportion of Immigrants." *Acta Sociologica* 52(1):47-62.

Hjerm, Mikael and Kikuko Nagayoshi. 2011. "The Composition of the Minority Population as a Threat: Can Real Economic and Cultural Threats Explain Xenophobia?". *International Sociology* 26(6):815-43.

Hoffmann-Nowotny, Hans-Joachim, Andi Bösch, Gaetano Romano and Jörg Stolz. 1997. *Das Fremde in Der Schweiz-1969 Und 1995*. Zurich: Soziologisches Institut der Universität Zürich.

Human Rights First. 2008. "Violence Based on Racism and Xenophobia: 2008 Hate Crime Survey." Washington DC: Human Rights First.

Joye, Dominique, Nicole Schöbi and Nanette Wälti. 2005. "European Social Survey, Switzerland – 2002 ". Schweizerischer Informations- und Daten-Archivdienst für die Sozialwissenschaften – SIDOS, Neuchätel: FORS, Lausanna.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2010. "Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective." *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 36(1):1-26.

Kuhnel, S and J Leibold. 2007. "Islamophobie in Der Deutschen Bevolkerung: Ein Neues Phanomen Oder Nur Ein Neuer Name? Ergebnisse Von Bevolkerungsumfragen Zur Gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit 2003 Bis 2005." *SOZIALE WELT SONDERBAND* 17:135.

Lucassen, Leo. 2005. *The Immigrant Threat : The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Mahnig, Hans and Andreas Wimmer. 2003. "Integration without Immigrant Policy: The Case of Switzerland." Pp. 135-64 in *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies : National Differences and Trends of Convergence*, edited by F. Heckmann and D. Schnapper. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.

McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social forces* 81(3):909-36.

Mottier, Véronique. 2008. "Eugenics, Politics and the State: Social Democracy and the Swiss 'Gardening State'." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 39(2):263-69.

Nicolet, Sarah and Pascal Sciarini. 2006. "When Do Issue Opinions Matter, and to Whom? The Determinants of Long-Term Stability and Change in Party Choice in the 2003 Swiss Elections." *Swiss Political Science Review* 12(4):159-90.

Niessen, Jan, Tom Huddleston, Laura Citron, Andrew Geddes and Dirk Jacobs. 2007. "Migrant Integration Policy Index." Brussels: British Council & Migration Policy Group.

Nyíri, Pál. 2005. "Global Modernisers or Local Subalterns? Parallel Perceptions of Chinese Transnationals in Hungary." *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 31(4):659-74.

O'Neil, Kevin and Marta Tienda. 2010. "A Tale of Two Counties: Natives' Opinions toward Immigration in North Carolina1." *International Migration Review* 44(3):728-61.

Paxton, Pamela and Anthony Mughan. 2006. "What's to Fear from Immigrants? Creating an Assimilationist Threat Scale." *Political Psychology* 27(4):549-68.

Pettigrew, Thomas F and Linda R Tropp. 2006. "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(5):751–83.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 2008. "Future Directions for Intergroup Contact Theory and Research." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 32(3):187-99.

Pettigrew, Thomas F, Linda R Tropp, Ulrich Wagner and Oliver Christ. 2011. "Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 35(3):271-80.

Pettigrew, Thomas F and Linda R Tropp. 2013. *When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact*: Psychology Press.

Piguet, Etienne. 2004. *L'immigration En Suisse : Cinquante Ans D'entrouverture*. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American sociological review* 60(4):586-611.

Savelkoul, Michael, Maurice Gesthuizen and Peer Scheepers. 2011. "Explaining Relationships between Ethnic Diversity and Informal Social Capital across European Countries and Regions: Tests of Constrict, Conflict and Contact Theory." *Social Science Research* 40(4):1091-107.

Savelkoul, Michael, Peer Scheepers, Jochem Tolsma and Louk Hagendoorn. 2011. "Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from Ethnic Competition Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory." *European Sociological Review* 27(6):741-58.

Scheepers, Peer, Mérove Gijsberts and Marcel Coenders. 2002. "Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries. Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat." *European Sociological Review* 18(1):17-34.

Scheve, Kenneth F and Matthew J Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1):133-45.

Schlueter, Elmar and Ulrich Wagner. 2008. "Regional Differences Matter : Examining the Dual Influence of the Regional Size of the Immigrant Population on Derogation of Immigrants in Europe." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 49(2-3):153–73.

Schlueter, Elmar and Peer Scheepers. 2010. "The Relationship between Outgroup Size and Anti-Outgroup Attitudes: A Theoretical Synthesis and Empirical Test of Group Threat-and Intergroup Contact Theory." *Social Science Research* 39(2):285-95.

Schlueter, Elmar and Eldad Davidov. 2013. "Contextual Sources of Perceived Group Threat: Negative Immigration-Related News Reports, Immigrant Group Size and Their Interaction, Spain 1996–2007." *European Sociological Review* 29(2):179-91.

Schneider, Silke L. 2008. "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: Outgroup Size and Perceived Ethnic Threat." *European Sociological Review* 24(1):53-67.

Sears, David O and Tom Jessor. 1996. "Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes: The Role of White Racism." *Social Science Quarterly* 77(4):751-59.

Semyonov, Moshe and Anya Glikman. 2009. "Ethnic Residential Segregation, Social Contacts, and Anti-Minority Attitudes in European Societies." *European Sociological Review* 25(6):693-708.

Semyonov, Moshe , Rebeca Raijman and Anastasia Gorodzeisky. 2006. "The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment in European Societies, 1988-2000." *American sociological review* 71(3):426-49.

Sides, John and Jack Citrin. 2007. "European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information." *British Journal of Political Science* 37(3):477-504.

Silverstein, Paul A. 2005. "Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe." *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 34:363-84.

Sniderman, Paul M and Aloysius Hagendoorn. 2007. *When Ways of Life Collide : Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stolz, Jörg. 2005. "Explaining Islamophobia. A Test of Four Theories Based on Thecase of a Swiss City." *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 31(3).

Strabac, Zan and Ola Listhaug. 2008. "Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data from 30 Countries." *Social Science Research* 37(1):268-86.

Strassmann, W Paul. 2001. "Residential Mobility: Contrasting Approaches in Europe and the United States." *Housing Studies* 16(1):7-20.

Treiman, Donald J. 2014. *Quantitative Data Analysis: Doing Social Research to Test Ideas*: John Wiley & Sons.

Van Dick, Rolf, Ulrich Wagner, Thomas F Pettigrew, Oliver Christ, Carina Wolf, Thomas Petzel, Vanessa Smith Castro and James S Jackson. 2004. "Role of Perceived Importance in Intergroup Contact." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87(2):211.

Van Oudenhoven, Jan Pieter, Jan Tjeerd Groenewoud and Miles Hewstone. 1996. "Cooperation, Ethnic Salience and Generalization of Interethnic Attitudes." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26(4):649-61.

Wagner, Ulrich, Rolf Van Dick, Thomas F Pettigrew and Oliver Christ. 2003. "Ethnic Prejudice in East and West Germany: The Explanatory Power of Intergroup Contact." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 6(1):22-36.

Wagner, Ulrich, Oliver Christ, Thomas F Pettigrew, Jost Stellmacher and Carina Wolf. 2006. "Prejudice and Minority Proportion: Contact Instead of Threat Effects." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69(4):380-90.

Wanner, Philippe. 2012. *La Démographie Des Étrangers En Suisse*. Zurich: Seismo.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.