Occupy Europe? Political Participation among the Immigrant Second Generation

Working Paper. Please do not cite.

Dated: April 10, 2015

Author:	Sali Thorkelson
Affiliation:	Sociology Department and
Office of & Population Research	
Princeton University	
Address:	Wallace Hall 107, Princeton, NJ,
	08544 USA
Phone:	(347) 922-1481
Electronic address:	cthorkel@princeton.edu

Abstract

Do children of immigrants participate in European politics at rates equivalent to those of their native-born peers? This question affects the future of social cohesion in twenty-first century multiethnic Europe and beyond. Using individual-level data for 28 countries from the European Social Survey and the United States General Social Survey, I first establish rates of voting, electoral, and informal political participation for immigrants, the second generation, and native-parentage individuals. I then test whether hospitable or hostile contexts of reception for immigrants are more conducive to second generation participation. The results show that the second generation participates in electoral and non-electoral political activities at rates as high as or higher than their native-origin peers, but voting rates lag behind. Countries where immigrants' rights are weak have lower rates of involvement both for all adults born in the country, regardless of parental origin. Overall, the evidence suggests that children of immigrants are for the most part becoming involved in domestic politics to the nearly same extent as their native-origin peers, undermining popular pessimistic portrayals in the media and far-right rhetoric and underscoring the importance of the context of reception.

As children of immigrants come of age in developed democracies, do they get involved in politics to the same extent as children of natives? The extent of political integration receives less scholarly attention than other dimensions of immigrant integration like intermarriage, language acquisition, employment and educational outcomes. Yet, in a fundamental sense, the extent to which new citizens (and successive generations in their families) participate in domestic politics is at least as important a metric of the overall success of national integration policies in democratic countries. Indeed, it touches the heart of the definition of democracy. In this cross-national study, I examine the relative rates of political activity among children of foreign- and native-born parents. Then I test whether more permissive integration policies produce greater rates of political participation for children of immigrants (hereafter called 'the second generation').

One must be a citizen of a country in order to participate in most aspects of electoral politics.[1] The majority of children of immigrants in developed democracies have citizenship, either by the principal of birthplace (i.e. *jus sanguinis*) or because a parent has acquired citizenship (*jus soli*).[2] This makes their political participation, in contrast to that of their parents, less a

1. Two important exceptions are the extension of local election voting rights to non-citizens (in e.g. Spain, Sweden, Hungary, etc., and some subnational locales) after a certain period of residence, and the extension of voting rights to citizens of member states in supranational groups, e.g. the European Union and the Commonwealth of Nations (Ohrvall 2008).

2. Of course, parents' ability to acquire residency permits and citizenship will affect their children's citizenship in many countries. That issue is beyond the scope of this paper, however.

question of the *right* to do so and more a question of institutional and social conditions that promote or impede participation among the members of that society.

I first test whether members of the immigrant second generation differ from their peers of native parentage in their rates of political participation. I define political participation as activity aimed at affecting politics and measure participation in several different forms, described in more detail below. I employ individual-level data on political participation and country-level data on political climate (see Table 1 and Data section). Given that family socialization is an important factor in political participation (Verba et al. 1995; Fox and Lawless 2005; Jennings et al. 2009), there are a number of reasons to expect that immigrant parents differ from native-born parents in the effect they have on their offspring's likelihood of participating in political activities.

Many immigrants from less-developed countries have grown up under non-democratic regimes, particularly amongst refugees or asylum seekers who fled war or persecution.[3] They may be disillusioned, apathetic, or wary, or simply lack knowledge about politicians and political parties (Al-Ali et al. 2001). Even immigrants from democratic countries are likely to be less familiar than natives with the practices and norms of political activity in destination countries, net of socioeconomic background. On the other hand, some parents

3. Of course, many people seek asylum because their political activities have made them targets, e.g. Chileans and Iranians in the early 1980s.

may have become politicized due to the circumstances of their migration decision or due to perceived injustice or discrimination in the context of reception. And living under dictatorial rule does not automatically translate into weaker commitment to democratic processes and values (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

The second research question is whether the national-level context of immigrant reception is associated with rates of participation among the second generation across developed immigrant-receiving countries. I concentrate on two aspects of the context of reception that seem most likely to influence second generation members' feelings of belonging (vs. alienation) and their experiences of discrimination. The first encompasses legislative policies that relate to migrant rights, and the second to the level of open hostility towards immigrants in the society. I operationalize the former with migrant/minority policy indices, and the latter as the vote share of far-right populist parties in parliamentary elections. Although using a measure of individuals' attitudes towards immigration is also a possibility, it has the disadvantage of being subject to the degree of social desirability bias in each country (which varies widely). I avoid this issue by using measures of either legislation or legislative intent that is pro- or anti-migrants' rights.

Note that I am studying the effect of the rights of *immigrants* on their *children's* involvement in politics. This is important because the pathway of rights policies on the immigrant generation is different from its effect on the second generation. Whereas the effect on migrant rights' policies

on migrants themselves is direct–e.g. do third country nationals have the right to compulsory age education?–the effects on the second generation are indirect. I argue that more restrictive legislation on migrant rights sends a signal to the second generation about the degree to which they are accepted as legitimate members of the society, and that this can affect their involvement in politics in various ways. The same type of indirect effect applies to the electoral success of far right populist parties in national elections.

Previous research

Numerous scholars have debated whether post-1965 immigrants to the United States have acces to the opportunities for upward mobility that earlier waves of migrants did (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Alba and Waters 2011; DeWind and Kasinitz 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993). This literature highlights the importance of the context of reception in shaping integration outcomes, rather than paying attention only to migrants' individual or family traits (Alba and Waters 2011; Crul and Schneider 2010; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). In this vein, the present study measures the effect of the political context– particularly, indicators of legislative restrictiveness/permissiveness towards immigrants, and of hostility to immigration among political parties – on second generation members' involvement in politics.

Relatedly, some scholars of migration have pointed out that integration is dual-directional (Massey and Sanchez 2010). In the case of political integration, this could manifest as a change in the existing political system to

encourage or accommodate participation by immigrants and their children. One element of such a (re)definition of integration is the attention paid by political parties to immigrant-origin voters. However, experiences of Latino migrants in the United States suggest that this process may be slow: according to De la Garza, "both parties essentially ignored Latinos" until the 1996 elections (2004:101).

I now turn to research specific to political integration of immigrants and their children. There is a larger body of research on immigrant political involvement than on the participation of their children. These two groups differ in many ways relevant to political participation, however, so some of the assumptions about immigrant political incorporation require rethinking. Members of the 1.5 and second generation have, on average, several advantages over their parents: they usually speak the host language fluently, are citizens, and have often attended public schools with civics or social studies courses (see Table 2 for citizenship rates among the second generation).

Unequal voter turnout across education and income levels is a well-established pattern in many countries, although class differentials vary across countries (Gallego 2007). Differences in unemployment rates among natives and immigrants could be a source of politically-motivating grievances for the second generation. Other structural factors like residential segregation, unequal access to high-quality education, or perceived police mistreatment could also give members of the second generation motivation to become involved in politics.

Immigrants from nondemocratic regimes are less likely to vote than other immigrants (Bueker 2005; Just et al. 2014). This could be due to unfamiliarity with democratic processes, or it could relate to fear of retribution for activism with experience of repressive regimes. In either case origin effects are likely to be attenuated, but perhaps not to disappear entirely, among the second generation. This issue is partially addressed in the models below with an indicator for whether immigrants and the second generation have origins in the EU or elsewhere.

Research on political incorporation begs the question: incorporation into what? There are many ways to become involved in politics. Voting is sometimes viewed as the fundamental act of participation in representative democracies. However, voting differs from many other types of political activity in that it is poorly predicted by political interest and political knowledge (Verba et al. 1995).

Following political science conventions, I distinguish between electoral and non-electoral activities (also called formal and informal politics) (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Togeby 2004). For example, working for a political party or voting would count as formal, while participating in demonstrations, petitions or boycotts would be considered informal or non-electoral political activity. Because of disadvantages with respect to family socialization, I expect that the second generation will be less involved in formal politics than their peers of native origin. Perceived exclusion from the public's imagination from 'the nation' could also cause lower levels of investment in domestic

politics, and therefore lower levels of formal political involvement.

The latter is expected to vary with the indices of integration policy, because such policies reflect the general climate of tolerance vis-à-vis hostility towards immigrants in general, and the second generation may be more highly aware of this climate than their parents. It may also vary with the share of right-wing populist voters– who could have a suppressive effect on second generation activism through intimidation or rhetorics of exclusion, or, alternatively, who might inspire counter-mobilization. This is tested empirically in the models described later.

Rates of informal participation, on the other hand, are expected to be as high or higher than that of young natives, because of a greater incidence of grievances on the one hand and lower institutionalized barriers to participation on the other. The degree of barriers to entry into electoral politics is to be studied through a survey of the recruitment practices among youth wings of Swedish and Danish political parties.

Finally, the question of what opportunities there are for political action needs to be addressed. The influence of far-right, anti-immigrant populist political parties is important here. Their election to European Parliaments appears to have led other parties to shift their immigration policies towards restrictiveness. This could make party politics as a whole less hospitable to the second generation, because it increases parties perception of risks associated with courting 'the immigrant vote' for center and right-wing parties (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Bale et al. 2010). If this is the case, we

should expect to see more involvement in left-wing than center/right party politics among second generation young adults (an issue to be addressed in later work). We can also expect to see a negative association between far-right party vote shares and second generation involvement in formal politics, because they would have fewer appealing opportunities for participation as the party options become less 'immigrant' friendly.

Data

I have combined publically available data from a variety of sources for this study (Table 1). Political involvement– the outcome of interest– is measured in random sample surveys for 28 countries. Twenty-seven of these are from the 2010 (N = 47,894) and 2012 (N = 46,734) rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), while the United States' data comes from the 2012 wave of the General Social Survey (GSS; N = 4,813).[4] These two datasets are not strictly equivalent, however, so the United States is included only in voting models (as noted below).

Dependent variables

The outcomes of interest are threefold: voting; involvement in electoral politics; and nonelectoral political involvement. All of these are based on self-reported activities in the ESS and GSS surveys. Voting refers to the most

4. ESS: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data
GSS: http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/

recent parliamentary or Congressional election. Electoral and nonelectoral involvement are constructed as sums of activities over the past 12 months, where each of the activities is dichotomous (yes/no). For electoral involvement, the components are: contacting a politician, working in a political party or action group, and wearing or displaying a campaign badge. For nonelectoral involvement, they are: signing a petition, taking part in a demonstration, and boycotting certain products.

Independent variables

Immigrant 'generation' is the main independent variable of interest, with children of immigrants as the focus of this study. The first generation includes all foreign-born individuals who listed their arrival age as 16 or older.[5] The second generation includes individuals who were born in their country of residents and who have at least one foreign-born parent, and the native generation is defined as all others (i.e. those born in their country of residence to two native-born parents.)

The models also include individual level socioeconomic and demographic characteristics: immigrant generation (based on country of birth and parents' country of birth), as well as education level, employment status, age, and gender. I also include an indicator for participation in voluntary organizations

5. The standard definition of the 1.5 generation has an age cutoff at 12 or 13, which is justified by the amount of schooling one would have attended in the destination country and by the biological propensity for language acquisition (Rumbaut 2004). Since the GSS asks if individuals lived in the United States at age 16, it is only possible to identify individuals who arrived before or after that age; hence this slight variation from the usual definition.

will also be included because it is expected that this is positively correlated with political activity, based on previous findings. Older people and those with higher education and income are expected to have higher rates of formal political participation based on previous findings, while younger people and residents of larger cities are expected to participate more often in informal political activities.

I exclude non-citizens because acquisition of citizenship – a central issue in terms of political incorporation for immigrants– is nevertheless not the subject of the present inquiry. The limited sample sizes of the ESS and GSS surveys make it impossible to adequately measure the political participation of non-citizen members of the second generation.

I operationalize the political climate in three alternate ways. Rather than competing hypotheses, I conceive of this strategy as a check on the external validity of the measures. These three ways that political climate is measured are:

1. Migrant Integration Policy Index
2. Multicultural Policy Index
3. Parliamentary far-right vote share

Researchers have constructed the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and Migrant Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) indices using various legal and policy indicators related to migrant and minority rights.[6] MIPEX

6. The correlation between the MCP and MIPEX indices is 0.71, $p \leq 0.001$.

is constructed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group. It consists of 148 policy measures on migrant rights ranging from the right of spouse-visa holders to work, to the presence of various barriers to naturalization (see Appendix and Niessen and Huddleston 2009; see also Ruedin 2011 on the reliability of MIPEX). The MCP Index has been constructed by Banting and Kymlicka of Queen's University, Ontario (Banting and Kymlicka n.d.; Tolley 2011). It too includes information about the ease of naturalization (whether the country allows dual citizenship), as well as policies that would more directly affect the second generation like bilingual education policies and funding for ethnic group organizations. I also use the Democracy Barometer as a measure of general democracy quality in some models (Bhlmann et al. 2012).

Both indices are expected to be positively associated with second generation political activity, because they indicate a more accommodating policy environment towards immigrants. The share of far-right votes received in recent parliamentary elections, on the other hand, could have a dampening effect on second generation members' involvement in politics because of the alienation resulting from public hostility towards migration. Thus, the association between second generation political involvement and the far-right vote share is expected to be negative.

The categorization of parties as 'far right populist' is complex and contentious, and I have relied on several authors to categorize parties that participated in the elections prior to each ESS wave (2007-2011; see Table 4.)

I have chosen to use the share of votes obtained by far-right parties rather than the share of seats in parliament because the system of assigning parliamentary seats varies among countries.[7] Also, some countries have minimum vote share thresholds for parliamentary representation and this would affect the party's representation in ways that would distort the degree of support among the electorate. Election results come primarily from the European Elections Database (EED)[8], with two exceptions: results for Israel's 2009 Knesset elections and the American Congressional elections of 2010 come from those countries' government websites ().

To categorize parties as 'far right populist,' I rely upon lists compiled by Art (2011) and van Spanje (2011). Each list partially overlaps with the geographic range and time frame of this study, so some parties have also been added. Far right parties are often small and therefore vulnerable to extinction, and in some cases have merged to form coalitions, changed names, or splintered. For the Czech Republic I have referred to Mares (2012), and for several additional countries I have referred to Hellwig *et al.*'s (2011) expert party ideology database and the European Elections Database categorization of political parties. In the United States, where the Democratic and Republican parties dominate politics, I have operationalized far-right populist vote share as votes for candidates who are associated with the Tea Party based on the movement's populist ideology and anti-immigrant views (Skocpol and

7. For example, district winner-take-all contests would produce different outcomes than strictly party-proportional ways of awarding parliamentary seats.

8. EED: http://eed.nsd.uib.no

Williamson 2012; Parker and Barreto 2014). Although these parties overall represent a wide range of views, they have in common either explicitly nationalist or anti-immigrant ideology. Therefore they can be thought of as a proxy for the degree of threat that immigrants and their children might feel in response to their presence in elections and/or government.

Methods

To predict political participation, all models will include random country effects and a number of control variables. Both hypotheses have political actions as their outcomes of interest. The models are of the form:

(1.1) $y_i = j_i + x_i$, for individuals $i = 1, ..., n$

(1.2) $j = a + bu_j + \eta_j$, for countries $j = 1, ..., J$

Here, x_i and u_j represent predictors at the individual and country levels, respectively, and ϵ_i, and η_j are independent error terms at each of the two levels. ϵ_i, is the within-individual variation, including measurement error, and η_j represents variation between countries. In the analyses, the outcome y_i will represent the following dichotomous outcomes: voting, formal political participation, and informal political participation (details below).

β represents a matrix of coefficients for individual-level variables, including controls for socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. It also includes the immigration 'generation' of the individual as dummy variables, where the reference group is native-origin individuals. In the analysis of country-level political climates, b in equation (1.2) is a coefficient for the

measure of political climate.

Results

Second generation political activity

Currently, children of immigrants vote at lower rates than natives in 23 of 28 countries included in this study (Figure 1).[9] This could be due to differences in the composition of these two groups, or, if this is not the case, it suggests that political parties have not been particularly effective in attracting the votes of second generation members. I use logistic regression to account for differences in age distribution and socioeconomic status between groups of different ancestry (i.e. native- versus foreign-born parents). The results shown in Table 2, models a and b, indicate that first and second generation citizens are less likely to vote: the associated odds ratios are 0.54 and 0.81, respectively (Model 2b). On average, this translates into a probability of voting for employed females with an upper secondary education of 0.85 if she has native-born parents, 0.81 if she has foreign-born parents, and 0.71 if she is herself foreign-born.

Despite the widespread belief that particular origin groups or religious groups are less willing or able to assimilate than others, these patterns of voting behavior remain significant and similar in magnitude even when controlling for religious denomination or ethnic ancestry (results not shown).

9. Exceptions are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland and Ukraine.

Muslims, in particular, are not significantly different in voting behavior than Protestants or Catholics. Furthermore, migrants and second generation with non-EU origins are equally likely to vote in parliamentary elections, relative to EU-migrants and descendents (model 2b).

Employment status and socioeconomic background, measured by educational attainment, show the expected association with voting.[10] That is, employed people are more likely than those who are unemployed or doing other activities (i.e. housework, studies, retirement) to vote. Although income data is available from the GSS and ESS it has been excluded from all models for several reasons. The data is missing for about a quarter of the sample. Also, the ESS question asks what quintile of income the respondent is in but patterns of reporting are skewed in markedly different ways from country to country (the expected distribution is uniform across quintiles, by definition). When the models include income (using the 75% sample), the model results (not shown) do not differ substantively from those reported here.

In terms of other types of political participation, the picture is rosier. While immigrants themselves remain significantly less likely to participate in electoral or non-electoral political activities relative to natives (OR = 0.74 for electoral activity, 0.76 for non-electoral; see models 2d and 2f), their children

10. Education is measured using a modified version of the Edu framework. Level 1 is primary school only (up to 8 years); level 2 is less than high school; level 3 is upper secondary/high school or junior college; level 4 is some education beyond upper secondary school; level 4 is bachelor's degree, and level 5 is a graduate degree.

are significantly *more* likely than children of native-born parents to participate. For electoral politics, the odds ratio for the second generation is 1.13, and for non-electoral politics it is 1.26. However, those of non-EU origins are less likely to participate in other types of political activity. When non-EU ancestry is interacted with migrant generation (not shown), the models show that both first and second generation immigrants with origins outside the EU are less likely to participate in formal or informal politics than EU-origin individuals of the first or second generation, but that non-EU migrants are *more* likely than EU-origin migrants to vote.

To summarize: immigrants are less likely to vote or engage in other types of political involvement than are native-born individuals (including the native-born second generation). Members of the second generation are somewhat less likely to vote (regardless of EU/non-EU origin) than are those with native-born parents, controlling for age, employment status, and educational attainment. Finally, second generation members whose parents come from EU countries are most likely to participate in formal or informal politics– even more than children of native-born parents. Those who have parents of non-EU origin are just as likely to participate in non-electoral politics as children of native-born parents, but are somewhat less likely to participate in electoral politics.

Policy and political participation

Next, we turn to the association between political climate and the second generation's political involvement. As described above, the political climate towards migration is measured in three ways. The first two are indices of legislation on migrant rights (MIPEX) and on multicultural rights (MCP). The third is the share of votes that went to far-right populist parties in the most recent parliamentary or Congressional election (see Table 6 for a list of these parties).

We have already seen that members of the second generation vote less than people with native-born parents, but participate in other political activities as much as natives (for those with non-EU parental origins) or more (if their parents' origins are in the EU). The results of models including measures of political climate show that countries where migrant integration rights are broad have higher rates of voting across migrant status; however, the association is strongest for people with native origins (Table 3, model b). The effect for those with foreign-born parents and for those born abroad is still positive, but somewhat less so. Per standard deviation increase in a country's MIPEX score, the odds ratio for a child of immigrants to vote is 1.35; for an immigrant it is 1.30, and for a child of native parents, 1.51. Again, there are no differences between EU- and non-EU origins in terms of voting participation. MIPEX is thus associated with higher rates of voting overall.

Could this result be spurious, due to the effect of the quality of democracy

in general rather than to migrant rights legislation in particular? I test this by including a measure of democracy quality in model 3d. The results show that the quality of democracy in general does not explain all of the effect of MIPEX on voting rates, and is not itself significant.

I have also tested the association of voting probability with the far-right party vote share and with the MCP. The results for the far-right vote share are not significant, and not presented in tables here. Nor is the MCP index significantly associated with voting rates, or with other electoral politics (models 3e and 4e). However, it is associated with informal (non-electoral) political involvement, as shown in model 5e.

The positive, significant association between the Migrant Integration Index and second generation political involvement is also found for electoral and non-electoral activities (models 4c and 5c). However, this association declines to insignificance when the democracy quality measure is included for electoral political involvement. In other words, as far as getting involved in party politics goes, Mipex does no better a predictor than a general democracy quality index.

For non-electoral political involvement, the models in Table 5 show that an increase in the MIPEX score is associated with an odds ratio of 1.65 for natives, and 1.52 for the second generation and 1.42 for immigrants (model 5c). Members of the second generation with EU parental origins have higher rates of participation in these forms of political expression than other groups, and those with non-EU parental origins have roughly the same odds of par-

ticipation as those with native parents. MIPEX outperforms the democracy quality index here (model 5d). The MCP index is not associated with a significant difference in natives' and second generation members' participation, though it is associated with *lower* odds of participation for immigrants themselves (model 5e). I discuss possible explanations for this in the following section.

Discussion

The evidence presented here shows that members of the second generation participate in politically oriented activities, both formal actions and informal forms of activism, as much as or more than their peers of native origins. The exception, of course, is voting; although they have greater probabilities of voting than foreign-born citizens, they still lag behind children of natives when socioeconomic and other compositional differences are accounted for.

Do countries with pro-migrant rights regimes display different patterns of political participation for the second generation than those with more restrictive legislation? Here, the association between legislation and is in the expected direction: the more pro-migrant rights the country, the greater the involvement of the second generation in politics. A caveat is necessary, however: while MIPEX is associated with greater participation, the association is stronger for people of native origins than for the second generation or immigrants themselves. In other words, the *gap* in participation actually widens as the migrant rights index increases, even though absolute participation in-

creases for all groups. This is a cause for concern, as it suggests that the policies to give rights to migrants are not as effective as they could be in promoting the political integration of immigrants and their descendents.

MIPEX is significantly associated with second generation political involvement, while the share of far-right votes and the MCP index are not. There are a few possible explainations for this. One is simply that MIPEX is a more nuanced instrument of policy climate than the other indicators; after all, it takes account of 148 policies while MCP classifies by only eight. The far right vote share is notably volatile; for example, the True Finns party received 4.1 % of the parliamentary vote in 2007 and 19.0 % just four years later. While other countries have seen more stable voting patterns during that period, it is also unlikely that each of the parties here has the same effect on children of immigrants (i.e. chilling vs promoting political involvement), even if they share some aspects of their ideology. Indeed, some countries might see reactive mobilization against xenophobic parties while others experience fear and decreased political initiative among children of immigrants. If this were the case, the effects could cancel one another out and lead to the nonsignificance found here.

A second issue worthy of policymakers' attention is the EU/non-EU gap in political participation among immigrants and children of immigrants, with the exception of voting behaviors. This finding is particularly surprising for informal political involvement because of the relatively low barriers to entry in this type of activity. Children of non-EU migrants, too, seem more likely to

be at risk of discrimination and therefore to have more motivating grievances that could lead to political activism, especially in non-electoral forms. On the other hand, the fact that MIPEX is associated with a smaller increase in political involvement for the second generation than with natives could reflect the fact that it indirectly measures hostility towards migrants, which could in turn be a cause for second generation mobilization. In other words, as rights for immigrant minorities are extended, the second generation might see less reason to protest.

Conclusion

As previously noted, political integration is an understudied field among sociologists who study migration. The participation of children of immigrants, who are most often citizens of their birth countries, there appear to be barriers to voting, although not to other forms of political expression. Members of the second generation are more likely to demonstrate, boycott products, and wear political badges than are children of native-born individuals, and are no less likely to work for a political party or to contact a politician. For the most part, there is evidence that integration for children of immigrants has been successful in various ways. Nevertheless, voting is the primary tool for citizens to turn their policy preferences into legislation, so the remaining gap is troubling.

The far-right parties now present in much of Europe are not particularly likely to gain much power themselves, because they are often one-issue parties

(Mudde 2013). Still, their influence may be more important in terms of the effect they have on mainstream politics rather than because of their own share legislative bodies or electoral results (Bale 2003). Given the association between expanded second generation political involvement and the legislative environment with respect to migrant integration, this development should not be dismissed out of hand.

References

Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 1997. "Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration." *International Migration Review* 31 (4): 826–874.

———. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration.* Harvard University Press.

Alba, Richard D., and Mary C. Waters. 2011. *The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective.* NYU Press.

Al-Ali, Nadje, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser. 2001. "Refugees and transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (4): 615–634.

Art, David. 2011. *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe.* 00089. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bale, Tim. 2003. "Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in Europe's bipolarising party systems." *West European Politics* 26 (3): 67–90.

Bale, Tim, et al. 2010. "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe." *Political Studies* 58 (3): 410–426.

Banting, Keith G., and Will Kymlicka. n.d. *Multiculturalism Policy Index.* Technical report. Ontario, Canada: Queen's University.

Bueker, Catherine Simpson. 2005. "Political Incorporation Among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects." *International Migration Review* 39 (1): 103–140.

Bhlmann, Marc, et al. 2012. "The Democracy Barometer: A New Instrument to Measure the Quality of Democracy and its Potential for Comparative Research." *European Political Science* 11 (4): 519–536.

Crul, Maurice, and Jens Schneider. 2010. "Comparative integration context theory: participation and belonging in new diverse European cities." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (7): 1249–1268.

DeWind, Josh, and Philip Kasinitz. 1997. "Everything old is new again? Processes and theories of immigrant incorporation." *The International Migration Review* 31 (4): 1096–1111.

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2005. "To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 642–659.

Gallego, Aina. 2007. "Unequal Political Participation in Europe." *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (4): 10–25.

Garza, Rodolfo O. de la. 2004. "Latino Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1): 91–123.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Pontus Odmalm. 2008. "Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15 (3): 367–381.

Hellwig, Tim. 2011. *Survey of Experts on Political Parties and Globalization - Tim Hellwig Dataverse - Harvard Dataverse Network.*

Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. "The True Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Policy,* no. 135:62.

Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2009. "Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined." *The Journal of Politics* 71 (03): 782–799.

Just, Aida, Maria Elena Sandovici, and Ola Listhaug. 2014. "Islam, religiosity, and immigrant political action in Western Europe." *Social Science Research* 43:127–144.

Massey, Douglas S., and Magaly Sanchez. 2010. *Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times.* Russell Sage Foundation.

Mudde, Cas. 2013. "Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?" *European Journal of Political Research* 52 (1): 1–19.

Niessen, Jan, and Thomas Huddleston. 2009. "Construction of the Migrant Integration Policy Index." In *Legal Frameworks for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals.* Brill.

Ohrvall, Richard. 2008. "Demokrati." In *Integration - En beskrivning av lget i Sverige [Integration - a description of the situation in Sweden].* Integration 1. Stockholm, Sweden: SCB, Statistics Sweden.

Parker, Christopher S., and Matt A. Barreto. 2014. *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America.* Princeton University Press.

Portes, Alejandro, and Min Zhou. 1993. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530:74–96.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America.* Macmillan Pub. Co.

Ruedin, Didier. 2011. *The Reliability of MIPEX Indicators as Scales.* SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Rumbaut, Rubn G. 2004. "Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States1." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1160–1205.

Rumbaut, Rubn G., and Alejandro Portes. 2001. *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America.* University of California Press.

Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. 2012. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism.* Oxford University Press.

Spanje, Joost van. 2011. "The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Immigration and Far Right Parties." *Government and Opposition* 46 (3): 293–320.

Togeby, Lise. 2004. "It depends how organisational participation affects political participation and social trust among secondgeneration immigrants in Denmark." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30 (3): 509–528.

Tolley, Erin. 2011. "Multiculturalism policy index: immigrant minority policies."

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Harvard University Press.

Appendix

Indices of integration

1. Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) includes 148 policy indicators in seven policy areas:

- Labor market access
- Family reunion
- Long-term residence
- Political participation
- Access to nationality
- Anti-discrimination
- Education

Source: http://www.mipex.eu/about
2. Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP)

- Constitutional/legislative/parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism
- Adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum
- Inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing
- Exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc
- Allowing dual citizenship
- Funding for ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities
- Funding for bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction
- Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups

Table 1: Country data availability for the European Social Survey in 2010 and 2012; standardized scores for the MIPEX and MCP (higher scores indicate pro-migrant legislation); standardized score on the Democracy Barometer (see text); vote share for far-right populist parties in the most recent parliamentary election prior to 2012.

	Country	2010	2012	MIPEX	MCP	Dem.	Right %
1	Belgium	✓	✓	1.1	1.1	1.1	7.8
2	Bulgaria	✓	✓	-0.8		-1.2	9.4
3	Croatia	✓				-1.4	5.9
4	Cyprus	✓	✓		-1.2	-0.4	1.1
5	Czech Republic	✓	✓		-0.4	-0.5	1.2
6	Denmark	✓	✓	0.1	-1.5	2.1	12.3
7	Estonia	✓	✓	-0.4		-0.4	0.5
8	Finland	✓	✓	1.3	1.0	1.6	19.0
9	France	✓	✓	-0.1	-0.6	-1.0	4.3
10	Germany	✓	✓	0.4	-0.4	0.6	1.6
11	Greece	✓		-0.2	-0.4	-1.3	0.3
12	Hungary	✓	✓		-0.5	-0.3	16.7
13	Iceland		✓			0.6	0.0
14	Ireland	✓	✓	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	0.0
15	Israel †	✓	✓			-0.8	6.2
16	Italy		✓	0.6	-1.1	-0.7	10.7
17	Lithuania	✓	✓	-0.9		-0.3	0.0
18	Netherlands	✓	✓	1.2	-0.6	1.2	15.5
19	Norway	✓	✓	1.0	0.0	1.3	22.9
20	Poland	✓	✓	-0.7		-0.6	1.3
21	Portugal	✓	✓	2.0	0.1	-0.3	0.0
22	Slovakia	✓	✓	-1.1		-1.5	5.1
23	Slovenia	✓	✓	-0.2		0.3	1.8
24	Spain	✓	✓	0.8	0.0	-0.7	0.0
25	Sweden	✓	✓	2.3	1.5	1.4	5.7
26	Switzerland	✓	✓	-0.6	-1.1	1.3	26.6
27	United Kingdom	✓	✓	0.4	0.8	-0.1	5.0
28	United States ‡		✓	0.7	-0.2	0.0	11.8

† United States and Israel have alternative election data sources (see text).
‡ United States data comes from the GSS rather than the ESS.

Table 2: Results of logistic regression on voting, electoral, and non-electoral political participation for the immigrant, second, and native (reference) generations. Additional controls: age, gender, survey year.

	— Voting —		— Electoral —		— Non-Electoral —	
	a	b	c	d	e	f
(Ref: Native)						
Second gen.	-0.20***	-0.21***	0.03	0.12**	0.17***	0.23***
	(0.028)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Immigrant	-0.30***	-0.62***	-0.41***	-0.30***	-0.43***	-0.28***
	(0.045)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Non-EU		0.03		-0.22***		-0.23***
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)
(Ref: empl.)						
Unempl.		-0.49***		-0.14***		-0.11**
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Other act.		-0.09***		0.06*		0.10***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Educ. 1		-0.73***		-0.62***		-0.84***
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Educ. 2		-0.56***		-0.35***		-0.48***
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Educ. 4		0.61***		0.47***		0.56***
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Educ. 5		0.78***		0.65***		0.74***
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
(Intercept)	1.34***	-1.49***	-1.61***	-2.60***	-1.01***	-1.64***
	(0.109)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.17)
N	85164	83752	90178	88675	89804	88319
RE (σ) ctry	0.552	0.589	0.564	0.554	0.772	0.811
AIC	83315.41	75077.69	76895.92	73315.01	94419.68	88328.26

$*p \leq 0.05** p \leq 0.01***p \leq 0.001$

Table 3: Results of logistic regression on voting. Additional controls: age, gender, survey year, education, employment status.

	a	b	c	d	e
(Ref: Native)					
Second	-0.20***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.26***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Immigrant	-0.31***	-0.71***	-0.68***	-0.69***	-0.82***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Mipex		0.40***	0.41***	0.30*	
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	
Non-EU		0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Mipex:Immigrant			-0.15*	-0.15*	
			(0.06)	(0.06)	
Mipex:Second			-0.10**	-0.10**	
			(0.04)	(0.04)	
Dem. Qual.				0.16	
				(0.12)	
MCP					0.10
					(0.17)
MCP:Immigrant					0.10
					(0.08)
MCP:Second					0.05
					(0.06)
(Intercept)	1.33***	-1.31***	-1.31***	-1.35***	-1.14***
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)
N	89532	82138	82138	82138	52410
RE (σ) ctry	0.542	0.475	0.479	0.479	0.52
AIC	87859.59	73461.35	73452.86	73457.25	41230.81

$*p \leq 0.05$** $p \leq 0.01$***$p \leq 0.001$

Table 4: Results of logistic regression on involvement in electoral politics. Additional controls: age, gender, survey year, education, employment status.

	a	b	c	d	e
(Ref: Native)					
Second	0.03	0.15***	0.17***	0.17***	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Immigrant	-0.41***	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.21**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Mipex		0.31**	0.32**	0.18	
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	
Non-EU		-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.14*
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Mipex:Immigrant			0.03	0.03	
			(0.07)	(0.07)	
Mipex:Second			-0.06	-0.06	
			(0.04)	(0.04)	
Dem. Qual				0.23*	
				(0.11)	
MCP					0.16
					(0.13)
MCP:Immigrant					-0.08
					(0.08)
MCP:Second					0.03
					(0.04)
(Intercept)	-1.61***	-2.60***	-2.60***	-2.61***	-2.16***
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
N	90178	82575	82575	82575	51340
RE (σ) ctry	0.564	0.478	0.478	0.435	0.422
AIC	76895.92	69105.46	69106.60	69103.91	47860.18

$*p \leq 0.05** p \leq 0.01***p \leq 0.001$

Table 5: Results of logistic regression on involvement in non-electoral politics. Additional controls: age, gender, survey year, education, employment status.

	a	b	c	d	e
(Ref: Native)					
Second	0.17***	0.19***	0.21***	0.21***	0.13**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Immigrant	-0.42***	-0.27***	-0.21**	-0.21**	-0.32***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Mipex		0.49**	0.50**	0.36*	
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	
Non-EU		-0.25***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.25***
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Mipex:Immigrant			-0.15*	-0.15*	
			(0.06)	(0.06)	
Mipex:Second			-0.08*	-0.08*	
			(0.03)	(0.03)	
Dem. Qual.				0.25	
				(0.16)	
MCP					0.09
					(0.18)
MCP:Immigrant					-0.15*
					(0.07)
MCP:Second					-0.07
					(0.04)
(Intercept)	-1.01***	-1.66***	-1.66***	-1.61***	-1.25***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
N	89804	82272	82272	82272	51177
RE (σ) ctry	0.772	0.711	0.71	0.678	0.567
AIC	94419.68	82230.11	82223.72	82252.69	57880.85

$*p \leq 0.05$** $p \leq 0.01$***$p \leq 0.001$

Table 6: Parliamentary vote shares for far right parties in 23 countries, 2007-11. Consecutive elections are used if elections occurred between survey waves.

Country	Party name	Abbr.	Year	Vote %
Belgium	Flemish Interest	VB	2010	7.8
Bulgaria	Attack	Ataka	2009	9.4
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights	HSP	2007	3.5
”	”	”	2011	3.1
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights dr.A.S.	HSPS	2011	2.8
Cyprus	National Popular Front	ELAM	2011	1.1
”	”	”	2011	1.1
Czech Rep.	Workers' Party of Social Justice	DSSS	2010	1.1
Denmark	Danish Peoples Party	DF	2007	13.9
”	”	”	2011	12.3
Estonia	Estonian Independence Party	EIP	2007	0.2
”	”	”	2011	0.5
Finland	Finns Party/True Finns	PS	2007	4.1
”	”	”	2011	19.0
France	National Front	FN	2007	4.3
Germany	German Peoples Union	DVU	2009	0.1
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD	2009	1.5
Greece	Golden Dawn	XA	2009	0.3
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	2009	5.6
Hungary	Jobbik	Jobbik	2010	16.7
Israel	National Union	NU	2009	3.3
Israel	Jewish Home	NRP	2009	2.9
Italy	The Right (LaDestra)	LD	2008	2.4
Italy	Northern League	LN	2008	8.3
Netherlands	Freedom Party	PVV	2010	15.5
Norway	Progress Party	FrP	2009	22.9
Poland	League of Polish Families	LPR	2007	1.3
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNSk	2010	5.1
Slovenia	Slovene National Party	SNSn	2008	5.4
”	”	”	2011	1.8
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	2010	5.7
Switzerland	Swiss Peoples Party	SVP	2007	28.9
”	”	”	2011	26.6
UK	British National Party	BNP	2010	1.9
UK	UK Independence Party	UKIP	2010	3.1
USA	Tea Party	TP-R	2010	11.8

Sources: Art 2011: VB, DF, EIP, FN, NPD, LD, LN, FrP, SVP, BNP, UKIP. van Spanje 2011: VB, FNb, DF, FN, DVU, NPD, LD, LN, FrP, SD, FPS, SD, BNP, UKIP. Eur. Elections Database: HSP, HSPS, SNSk, SNSn. Hellwig 2011: PS, LAOS, Jobbik, NU, NRP, LPR, SNSk, SNSn. Skocpol 2012 and Parker 2014: TP-R. Mares 2012: DSSS, SPRRSC. The author: ELAM, PS, XA, LAOS, Jobbik, NU, NRP, LPR, TP-R.

Table 7: Participation in political actions over past 12 months, for 27 countries: went to a demonstration; boycotted a product; signed a petition; worked for a political party; wore a political pin/badge; contacted a politician. Models are adjusted for age, gender, and survey year. Additional controls: age, gender, survey year.

	Demo	Boycott	Petition	Work	Badge	Contact
(Ref: Native)						
Second	0.19**	0.26***	0.15***	0.15	0.17**	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Immigrant	-0.12	-0.19**	-0.40***	-0.27*	-0.36***	-0.33***
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Non-EU	0.07	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.04	-0.11	-0.32***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Unemployed	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08*	-0.15	-0.11	-0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Other activ.	0.12**	0.08**	0.08***	0.08	0.10**	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Educ. 1	-0.63***	-0.80***	-0.92***	-1.01***	-0.57***	-0.67***
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Educ. 2	-0.34***	-0.46***	-0.48***	-0.50***	-0.34***	-0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Educ. 4	0.50***	0.50***	0.49***	0.56***	0.35***	0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Educ. 5	0.63***	0.70***	0.64***	0.68***	0.54***	0.64***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
(Intercept)	-2.84***	-3.34***	-2.02***	-4.66***	-2.31***	-3.99***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.13)
N	88816	88576	88666	88836	88806	88826
RE (σ) ctry	0.744	0.883	0.817	0.416	0.757	0.436
AIC	37160.91	61987.55	75073.21	24392.05	38468.50	59831.82

$*p \leq 0.05** p \leq 0.01***p \leq 0.001$



(a) Voting



(b) Electoral political activity



(c) Non-electoral political activity

Figure 1: Proportions of native-born citizens with foreign- and native-born parents who: (a) voted in most recent parliamentary election; (b) otherwise participated in electoral politics (c) participated in informal politics (see text for details). Figures (b) and (c) refer to the previous 12 months, and exclude the U.S.