GENDERED MIGRATION STRATEGIES AND UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATIONS:
SENEGALESE MIGRATION TO EUROPE

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Abstract

In the last few decades, unauthorized migration has become more heterogeneous in terms of gender, age and how people enter (Donato and Armenta 2011, Passel and Cohn 2011). Nevertheless, scholarship - especially quantitative studies - has lagged in analyzing this diversity and its determinants. During the same period, scholars have consistently shown how household and societal norms are deeply gendered and how gender is essential in understanding migration behavior. Using the recent longitudinal MAFE-Senegal (2008) data, this paper seeks to understand what drives women to embark on unauthorized migration and authorized migrations projects, how these may be related to gendered household norms, and how these differ from the determinants of male migrations.

Theoretical Framework

Gendered household and societal norms

Despite Senegal's rich diversity of ethnicities and groups, the traditional family culture is generally characterized by its patrilineal, extended family structure nature (Bass and Sow 2004). Contemporary Senegal has a so-called triple heritage (indigenous, Arabic Islamic, European Christian), although the Arabic Islamic influence is particularly dominant (Bass and Sow 2004). Originally rooted in indigenous culture, polgyny is now a fairly common practice in Senegal and is recognized and protected by Senegalese family law. Male-dominated generational hierarchies are important in both families (Bass and Sow 2004) and villages (Gabrielli 2010). For example, marriage tends to be a family-level decision, and marriages have frequently occurred between maternal or paternal cousins (Bass and Sow 2004). Traditional family structures involve the co-residence of several brothers, their wives and children (Gabrielli 2010), so married women tend to live with their husband's origin family.

At the same time, both migration (Barou 2001) and urbanization (Gabrielli 2010) have disrupted traditional family structures. Migration may lead to a 'nuclearization' of family resources if remittances are sent directly to a stay-behind wife (Barou 2001), although it is far more likely that stay-behind women lose autonomy and fall under the tutelage (and orders) of their husband's family hierarchy (Barou 2001). The latter is related to other literature about gendered household roles, expectations of old age support in other contexts (e.g. Quisumbing and McNiven 2005, Smith and Thomas 1998).

Migration strategies as embodied gender dynamics

Although it is commonly believed that women are unlikely to participate in irregular forms of migration due to strong gendered family and societal norms, nearly all studies of unauthorized and irregular migration exclude women from their analysis (see Curran et al 2006 for an evaluation of literature regarding migration and gender). The rare quantitative study of female unauthorized migration find that unauthorized border crossings are gendered: women are more likely to cross with a *coyote* and men are more likely to cross alone (Donato et al 2008).

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Female likelihood of successful unauthorized migration is also different: immediately following the IRCA 1986, women were more likely to be apprehended (Donato et al 2008). At the same time, scholars have found that migration behavior is influenced by the gender of the potential migrant (Kanaiupuni 2001, Liu 2013, Toma and Vause 2010) and the gender composition of their migrant network (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003). At the same time, qualitative studies demonstrate that the experiences of Senegalese migrants in Europe are deeply gendered (e.g. Evers Rosander 2002, Ródenas Cerezo 2014, Sinatti 2014).

Given the multitude of studies finding that gender is key for understanding migration is highly gendered (for reviews or meta-studies, consider Curran et al 2006, Donato et al 2006, Morokvasic 1984, Pedraza 1991, Pessar and Mahler 2003), the exclusion of women from studies of unauthorized migrations is a tremendous weakness of the current migration literature. Specifically, this paper aims to explore what drives female authorized and unauthorized migrations, and how this compares with the drivers of male migrations of different legal statuses in a context where men and women appear to have similar levels of migration aspirations (Kjeov 2013).

Context – *Unauthorized and authorized Senegalese migration to Europe*
Unauthorized and authorized Senegalese migrations to Europe have very different costs and risks. On one hand, unauthorized migrations involve the greatest risks of death, but also of failure as would-be migrants are apprehended or stranded *en-route*. Although exact mortality figures are difficult to ascertain, the numbers are significant. For example, between 2003 and 2004, media sources reported at least 378 migrant deaths off the coasts of Spain (Carling 2007: 318).[2] Also, Moroccan officials reported intercepting 18,236 sub-Saharan migrants leaving for Spain in 2003 (Simon 2006: 30). At the same time, others - like those in indefinite transit in Morocco (Collyer 2006) and would-be migrants stuck in Senegal (Poeze 2010) – see their migration projects stall or fail. On the other hand, authorized forms of migration are very costly, usually involve a pooling of family resources, and can be considered household migration strategies (Liu 2014). Nearly all visas require proof of official employment at origin or scholarship and proof of sufficient financial resources: these requirements are out-of-reach of nearly all individuals, where only 6.2% of the workforce is in the formal sector (Liu 2014). Many families opt for purchasing a visa through migration brokers, but this can also be out-of reach: Poeze (2010) found, on the streets of Dakar, that 5000€ could secure a visa to Portugal, but her interview respondents earned just 80€ average per month.

Most studies about unauthorized Senegalese migrations to Europe work with in-depth qualitative methods. Unsuccessful boat migrants have been interviewed to understand the decision-making and how families and other ties affect migration aspirations and plans (Poeze 2010). Young Senegalese men have been interviewed about their views of pirogue migration: their ideas of risk-taking and the symbolic nature of migration aspirations (Hernández-Carretero 2008). However all these studies have focused exclusively on men.

At the same time, some qualitative studies of Senegalese migrants have focused on women at destination, but have paid less attention to migration strategies or legal status upon arrival. In her study of female Senegalese traders in Tenerife, Evers Rosander (2003) finds that migration experience transforms gender and ethnicity-based norms and hierarchies. Like Evers Rosander, Babou (2014), in a study of female Senegalese hair braiders in the U.S., finds that this work and its income changes (decreases) the power of traditional caste and ethnic hierarchies on many women. In her study of Senegalese women living transnationally between Valencia and

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[2] This is certainly a minimum estimate of deaths since it only counts media-reported accidents with at least 10 fatalities (Carling 2007: 318).

Senegal, Ródenas Cerezo (2014) finds that gendered norms, relationships with spouse and use of female solidarity networks and closely and complexly intertwined.

Two major quantitative studies about unauthorized migration between Senegal and Europe exist. Both utilize the MAFE-Senegal data used in this project. In his analysis of different pathways into and out of irregularity, Vickstrom (2013) finds that migrant networks are related to these different pathways; that gendered labor market access is tightly related to legal status; and that transnational activities of migrants are also closely related. A previous study of male authorized and unauthorized Senegalese migrations to Europe (Liu 2014) finds evidence that, for men, authorized migrations appear better characterized as household or family-driven, while unauthorized migration are better characterized as individual-driven. It also argues that visa overstay reflects a household strategy with strong migrant network requirements. The exclusion of women is a major weakness of the second paper, and it is unknown whether female Senegalese unauthorized and authorized migrations are characterized differently from male migrations and how.

Hypotheses (Preliminary)
1. Given its particular risks and the high levels of social control on females, we expect there will not be evidence that female unauthorized migrations are household migration strategies.
2. Given higher barriers to unauthorized female migration, migrant networks will be more important for unauthorized migration undertaken by females.
3. Given the important of legal family reunification for female migration to Europe, we expect that having a migrant spouse will be especially important in explaining female authorized migration.
4. Given the lower risk level of visa overstay and the particularly lucrative female labor market niches at destination (trading, hair-braiding), we expect that visa overstay may represent a household migration strategy – and that it will make great use of migrant network resources.

Data and Methods
This study employs longitudinal data from the MAFE-Senegal (Migration between Africa and Europe) Project (2008) from interviews with approximately 1100 Dakar region residents and 600 Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain.[3] Respondents provided biographical life histories about their housing, migrations, unions, children, and work. They also reported about their migrant networks, legal status (residence and work permits), remittances and properties. Retrospective data has limitations, particularly potential recall bias (Smith and Thomas 2003); however, focusing on first migration to Europe – an extremely prominent life event – helps protect the analysis from this bias. Migrants are likely to remember poorly their legal status at time of entry and the following year since these are deeply intertwined with their first experience abroad.

This analysis focuses mainly on legal status at first-time entry into Europe. *Legal status* is captured only in the year of first migration to France, Italy or Spain: the dependent variable takes the value of 1 ('authorized first-time entry') when the individual reports having either a residence or work permit, and 2 ('unauthorized first-time entry') if not.[4] The analysis is

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[3] We do not expect the sampling strategy of urban Dakar to upward bias our results. Indeed, we might even expect the opposite. For the Mexican case, Fussell and Massey (1994) find that community-level social capital is less influential in urban areas than in rural areas.

[4] First migration to Europe was chosen rather than the first international migration since the costs and barriers to migration are quite different across the Africa-Europe border, in comparison to borders between African countries, or those between Africa and North America for example.

restricted to first-time migration, since it has higher costs (Deléchat 2001) and apparently different mechanisms than subsequent migrations (*e.g.* Donato *et al* 2008, Parrado and Cerrutti 2001). Moves from Senegal to other destinations (including those in Europe but not France, Italy or Spain) were censored at the year of migration. Second, *legal status at stay* is captured analyzing the first two years in Europe. The interest here is to distinguish visa overstay as a potential migration strategy. If an individual remains in Europe, they may move from authorized entry to unauthorized legal status (e.g. overstay of a tourist/student visa or temporary permit, losing work contract and permit, etc.). As a result, the dependent variable is an indicator that, in the year when Ego first moves to Europe, takes the value of 1 ('authorized initial stay') if the individual reports having a residence or work permit in the year of migration and the year after; 2 ('visa overstay') if the individual reports legal entry, but *no* authorization the year after; 3 ('unauthorized initial stay') if the individual reports *not* having a residence or work permit in the year of migration and the year after.

My analysis uses the year-by-year migration histories of the migrant network, as reported by the respondent for individuals who had lived at least one year outside Senegal, and includes two groups: all migrants in their close family (parents, siblings, spouses and children); and extended kin and friend migrants who the respondent reported being able to count on (or could have counted on) to receive or help them migrate out of Senegal. Information about countries lived, type of link, gender, year of meeting (friendships), year of death (if applicable) are also included. I restrict the migrant network indicators to parents, siblings, uncles/aunts, nieces/nephews, cousins, and friends.[5] Migrant spouse is considered a proxy for (legal) family reunification. Most developed countries (including the whole EU) have special provisions to facilitate the reunification of close family. For the sake of precision, I restrict all migrant network indicators to the years lived in Europe. All migrant network indicators are lagged one year to avoid simultaneous migration among respondent and network members.

Migrant network indicators distinguish among different tie strengths. Following traditional nuclear family structures and common practice in the literature, I define strong ties as parents and siblings and weak ties are extended family and friends. Reflecting the traditional patriarchal extended family structure in Senegal and its importance for migration to Europe (Liu 2013), weak ties are also distinguished into categories: strong (uncle/nephew), middle (cousin) and weak (friends).

Household migration networks and (non-household) migrant networks are captured in several ways. All measures are time-varying and are estimated utilizing the migrant networks information, the household membership roster or both. The respondent reported their ties (*e.g.* mother, brother, other relative) to all individuals living in the household at the beginning of each housing spell. The first household migration network is time-varying and follows Liu (2013): whenever a household included *any* sister, *all* sisters in the migrant networks were then considered household *during the entire housing spell*. This was repeated for migrant brothers, mother, father and friends. In addition, when the household included "other relative", all cousins, aunts/uncles, and nieces/nephews were categorized as household during the entire housing spell.

This network study has a rare opportunity to control for a multitude of time-varying control variables. These include age, ln(age), marital status; being polygynous; number of children; occupational status (working, unemployed, studying, retired or inactive); land ownership,

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[5] Friendship networks are potential sources of endogeneity in the study of network and migration behavior (individuals may form friendships in order to aid their own migration project), and so their analysis ought to be highly restricted (Liu 2013). I include only friendships which: 1. began when neither individual had migration experience; 2. lasted at least three years before either migrated out of Senegal; and 3. have passed the three-year threshold.

housing ownership, and business ownership. Remaining covariates are time invariant. Origin indicators include: urban origin, whether the respondent's father was deceased or unknown; father's education (no formal schooling, primary schooling, secondary and above); individual religious affiliation (Muslim brotherhoods of Khadre, Layène, Mouride, Tidiane; "other Muslim"; Catholic and other Christian); whether firstborn; number of siblings; respondent's highest level of education (less than primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary or higher). Finally, to control for origin and destination contextual effects, period effects (before 1990, 1990-1999, 2000-2008)[6] and two time-varying contextual factors are included: urban population growth in Senegal (%) and GDP per growth per capita in Senegal (%). This latter data was provided by the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

With my focus on adult migration, I restricted the sample to males born in Senegal who had never lived outside Senegal until at least age 17, with first possible migration to Europe at age 18. The sample restriction to males is justified by the low incidence of female unauthorized migration to Europe. All individuals in the sample had Senegalese citizenship in the year of their birth. The retrospective housing module allows me to identify the individual's entire housing and migration trajectory from birth. My empirical strategy is based on hazard analysis, which measures the risk of experiencing migration in a given year. I am interested in first-migration since the requirements of first migration are especially high, and studies have found that subsequent migration has distinct social capital costs (Massey and Espinosa 1997, Parrado and Cerrutti 2003).

To explore the dynamics of first migration between Senegal and Europe, I utilize discrete-time event history (or survival) analysis. Specifically, I use a competing risks (multinomial logit regression) model to predict legal status at migration (at entry and at stay).

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[6] The period effects are related to pertinent changes in immigration policies. Entry visas for Senegalese nationals were made compulsory by 1990 in France, Italy and Spain. Nearly all the legalizations and regularization campaigns took place before 2000.

Results (Preliminary)

Table 1 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status at entry: Migrant networks and household migration networks FEMALES				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Authorized Entry	Unauthorized entry	Authorized Entry	Unauthorized entry
	B	B	B	B
Migrant Network				
Having a nonhousehold migrant network			1.16	5.84**
Having a household migrant network (different from spouse)	2.56***	0.26	2.62***	0.33
Control for Migration Spouse	2.66**	0.00	2.62*	0.00

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education,* marital status, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
[†] *p* < .10; *p* < .05; **p* < .01; ***p* < .001

Table 2 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status at entry: Migrant networks and household migration networks MALES (Table from Liu 2014)								
	Model 1				Model 2			
	Authorized Entry		Unauthorized entry		Authorized Entry		Unauthorized entry	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Migrant Network								
Having a nonhousehold migrant network					1.96***	0.31	1.13	0.33
Having a household migrant network (different from spouse)	1.93***	0.32	1.42	0.42	1.95***	0.32	1.44	0.42
Control for Migration Spouse	0.19[†]	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.17[†]	0.17	0.00	0.00

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education,* marital status, polygynous, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
[†] *p* < .10; *p* < .05; **p* < .01; ***p* < .001

Table 3 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status at entry: Migrant networks and tie strength FEMALES

	Model 1 Authorized Entry	Unauthorized Entry	Model 2 Authorized Entry	Unauthorized Entry
	B	B	B	B
Having a Nonhousehold Migrant Network				
Strong tie	0.91	1.33	0.91	1.81
Weak tie	1.17	8.33***		
Weak tie: stronger			1.22	1.71
Weak tie: medium			1.35	4.28†
Weak tie: weaker			0.98	9.38***
Having a Household Migrant Network	2.55***	0.31	2.57***	0.24†
Having a Migrant Spouse	2.71*	0.36		0.38
N (person-years)	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education*, marital status, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
$^{\dagger}p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 4 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status at entry: Migrant networks and tie strength MALES (Table from Liu 2014)

	Model 1 Authorized Entry		Unauthorized Entry		Model 2 Authorized Entry		Unauthorized Entry	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Having a Nonhousehold Migrant Network								
Strong tie	1.01	0.23	0.55	0.27	1.03	0.24	0.57	0.28
Weak tie	2.28***	0.37	1.48	0.47				
Weak tie: stronger					1.02	0.34	1.02	0.76
Weak tie: medium					1.65†	0.42	0.69	0.43
Weak tie: weaker					3.21***	0.63	2.41*	0.88
Having a Household Migrant Network	1.99***	0.33	1.47	0.44	2.05***	0.34	1.43	0.43
N (person-years)	13,366		13,366		13,366		13,366	

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education*, marital status, polygynous, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
$^{\dagger}p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 5 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status of initial stay: Strength of Tie FEMALES

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay
Having a Nonhousehold Migrant Network	1.06	1.68	8.43***						
Strong tie				0.98	0.66	2.14	0.98	0.69	2.71
Weak tie				0.91	2.64*	8.86***			
Weak tie: stronger							0.82	2.78†	2.38
Weak tie: medium							1.13	2.72†	2.91
Weak tie: weaker							0.63***	2.76†	11***
Having a Household Migrant Network	2.73***	2.04†	0.40	2.69***	1.78	0.37	2.70***	1.84	0.29
Having a Migrant Spouse	3.35***	0.91	0.00	3.37***	1.01	0.00	3.36***	0.99	0.00
N (person-years)	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455	13,455

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education*, marital status, migrant spouse, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
† $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 6 Logistic estimation of the relative risk of being a first-time migrant in a year, by legal status of initial stay: Strength of Tie MALES (Table from Liu 2014)

	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay	Auth. Stay	Overstay	Unauth. Stay
Having a Nonhousehold Migrant Network	1.93*** (0.35)	1.95* (0.62)	1.18 (0.38)						
Strong tie				0.99 (0.27)	1.01 (0.47)	0.40 (0.25)	1.01 (0.27)	1.08 (0.50)	0.41 (0.26)
Weak tie				2.20*** (0.42)	2.50** (0.80)	1.73† (0.50)			
Weak tie: stronger							1.11 (0.41)	0.83 (0.64)	1.18 (0.90)
Weak tie: medium							1.84* (0.52)	0.97 (0.62)	0.85 (0.54)
Weak tie: weaker							2.96*** (0.70)	3.83*** (1.35)	2.56* (0.98)
Having a Household Migrant Network	1.86** (0.35)	2.24* (0.72)	1.43 (0.46)	1.90** (0.36)	2.31** (0.74)	1.48 (0.47)	1.96*** (0.70)	2.33* (0.76)	1.44 (0.46)
N (person-years)	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366	13,366

Notes: Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, ln(age), *urban origin, religious affiliation, father's education, father unknown/deceased at respondent's age 15, firstborn, number of siblings, own highest level of education*, marital status, polygynous, migrant spouse, number of children, occupational status, landownership, homeownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth, and % GDP per capita growth. All indicators other than those listed in italics are time-varying, year by year.
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.
† $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

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