Divorce in a Globalizing Era: National and Global Influence, 1960-2012

Cheng-Tong Lir Wang
University of California, Irvine
chengtow@uci.edu

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ABSTRACT

This study uses panel data of 82 countries to examine the effects of domestic and international cultural factors on national-level patterns of divorce. World society theory has examined how internationally-articulated and institutionalized normative principles shape state policies, policy outcomes, and individual values. This study advances the world society theory in two ways. First, this research examines the effects of global culture on individual behavior, rather than state policy. Second, the case of divorce is interesting because the relevant global cultural principles—related to individualism and individual rights—do not make explicit prescriptions regarding divorce per se. Rather, international norms regarding divorce emerge from the "penumbras" of broader institutionalized principles regarding individualism that are institutionalized in global culture and discourse. Panel regression models show that, in addition to national dynamics identified by previous comparative studies, world society has a "penumbra effect" on net divorce rates. World society scripts can still be effective even when they only involve fundamental principles rather than explicit scripts or norms regarding behaviors.

INTRODUCTION

One central inquiry of globalization literature has been how supra-national cultural forces influence myriad aspects of local societies. Among the several camps exploring this inquiry, world society theory ventures into answering how internationally-articulated and institutionalized normative principles shape state policies, policy outcomes, and individual values (e.g. Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Shandra 2007; Pierotti 2013). This paper advances the theory by examining the world society effect on individual behaviors, especially when the relevant global cultural scripts are under-articulated and under-institutionalized for immediate influence. In accomplishing the objectives, I examine the case of divorce.

Divorce is an interesting social phenomenon to put world society theory to test because marriage are often considered as comprising the core of private sphere and being subjected only to pressures from the immediate vicinity—structural or cultural forces within the country. The tendency of previous comparative divorce studies to include only individual and national-level predictors (Cole and Powers 1973; Trent and South 1989; Goode 1993; Hendrix and Pearson Jr. 1995; Greenstein and Davis 2006; Kalmijn 2007; Wagner and Weiß 2006) embodies the assumption. Reconsidering this assumption, this

research establishes itself on recent demographers' attention to global ideational forces that shape individual values and behaviors, especially with regards to marital behaviors (Thornton 2001; Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn 2008; Thornton et al. 2012).

The other feature of divorce challenging enough test world society theory is that, divorce belies in the gray area of global cultural norms. Numerous studies have shown that consensual and institutionalized global norms facilitate sweeping policy reforms (ADD CITATION). In contrasts, contentious projects with little institutionalization stagnate (Boyle, Kim, Longhofer, unpublished manuscript). In between these two extremes, global cultural norms do not make explicit prescriptions regarding divorce per se. Admittedly, one can infer from the fundamental global tenet of individualism (David J. Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010 ADD MORE) that divorce, as a matter of individual autonomy, should gradually be relieved from the corporatist control and suppression. The issue of divorce, nevertheless, never occupies the top of the to-do list of any international organization or instigates any heated discussion.

Despite global quiescence on this matter, there still witnesses, there was a general reform trend toward a more equal and tolerant environment for divorce at the state level: states amend their marriage law and national women's movements push for legal reform and social de-stigmatization of divorce in various countries (Htun and Weldon 2012). As

a result, we witness growing instances of divorce across countries. The case of divorce serves an intriguing case to test whether it is the global or national forces that facilitate the changes.

This research uses panel data to examine the world society effect on the national divorce patterns of 82 countries. I find that world society has a "penumbra effect" on net divorce rates. World society scripts can still be effective even when they only inform actors with fundamental principles rather than explicit instructions on normative behaviors or institutionalization of such instructions. The application of this fundamental principle of individualism—that the entrance and departure from marriage should be based on the will of equal individuals—can exert influence on individuals' behaviors. The effect intensifies when the level of articulation of the principles and relevant international mobilization increase.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Studies have accumulated on understanding the influence of global cultural scripts institutionalized by the "world society," the global governing structure comprised of networks of states and nongovernmental organizations, regulating institutions such as international treaties and agencies, and normative world cultural principles (Boli and

Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hughes et al. 2009). The fundamental tenets of these studies contend that, since the latter half of the 20th century, the structuration of world society has shifted to the global arena the locus of legitimizing cultural scripts that articulate the appropriate behaviors of all types of actors, including states, organizations, and individuals (Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Meyer 2010). These cultural scripts diffuse through the organizational connections between global and local actors and/or through individual or organizational actors adopting corresponding projects, such as state policies, issue advocacy, or international treaties (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000).

World society scholarship has excavated more social terrains under such global influence. Many policy domains are guided by articulated global projects, including but not limiting to environmental protection (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Frank, Longhofer, and Schofer 2007; Shandra 2007), women's rights (Berkovitch 1999; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997), mass education (Schafer 1999), population control (Barrett 1995), human rights (Tsutsui 2006; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), and the criminal regulation of sex (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). Other studies focus on examining the world society effect on policy outcomes, such as reducing pollution, (Schofer and Hironaka 2005) and child labor, and expanding coverage of immunizations

and educational enrollment (Boyle and Kim 2009). To others, connections to world society also open political opportunities (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998) and introduce various resources (Bartley 2007), both conducive to extensive social movement activities demanding policy implementations and substantive changes. Jointly, these studies establish that articulated and institutionalized global cultural norms can penetrate national borders and produce concrete changes.

Recently, scholars extend the search of global influence on individuals in terms of their values. Jennifer Givens and Andrew Jorgenson (2013) associate the presence of environmental international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) with the awakening of environmentalist concerns. Pierotti (2013) also shows the global effect on changing attitudes in opposition to violence against women. These studies show that articulated world cultural norms also have a broad impact on individuals, as shown by aggregate- or individual-level data.

This research advances current world society theory in two ways. First, this research answers whether the global cultural norms influences individual *behaviors*. Demographers and social theorists have not ignored the supra-national ideational forces that shape individual behaviors. The processes of westernization and spread of new ideals of intimate relationship inquires the influence of western values on fertility transition and

expectations on relationships (Freedman 1979; Giddens 2002). Thornton (2001; 2005) further points out that "developmental idealism" idealizes features of Western European families, such as the nuclear family, individual autonomy, a higher status of women, as an integral component of "modern" society. Diffusing with development projects, these ideals shape the values of individuals, and eventually alter their familial practices (Jayakody, Thornton, and Axinn 2008; Thornton et al. 2012). This research incorporates their insights, as well as the empirical knowledge from the aforementioned comparative divorce studies to understand the world society effect on national divorce patterns.

Inspired by Pierotti (2013), Figure 1 provides the conceptual framework to understand how global ideational forces shape individual behaviors. Global ideational influence can be exerted through multiple pathways at different levels (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Global cultural scripts can affect both the structural and ideational conditions at the national level by policy reforms that reallocate social relations and resources and by the collective effort shaping national values. Structural and ideational changes can recalibrate individuals' cost/benefit calculation regarding their behaviors. These changes can also mold individuals' values and beliefs that determine individual behaviors. Furthermore, direct global-individual connections through INGO memberships exemplifies another pathway through which individual behaviors are shaped.

This research enriches the world society theory in the second way by exploring whether and how world society affects individual behavior *when relevant global cultural norms are under-articulated and under-institutionalized*. Existing literature mostly searches for world society effect where the cultural scripts are articulated and institutionalized as concrete treaties, INGO missions and action plans, and national policy templates. Consolidating this argument from the opposite direction, recent scholarly work demonstrates that world society effect can be severely limited with regards to a contentious and weakly-institutionalized script, such as the abortion policy (Boyle, Kim, Longhofer, unpublished manuscript). This study takes advantage of the issue of divorce to explore the world society influence in the grey area between the two extremes: issue areas that are only informed by fundamental principles of world culture—individualism (for the discussion of these principles, see Boli and Thomas 1997)—and do not develop extensive rationales and projects.

I adapt the legal concept of a "penumbra" to denote the world society effect in these issue areas. The concept of penumbra originally designates the constitutional rights that are not explicitly written but emanate from other fundamental rights. World society effect is analogous to the penumbra principle on divorce and other issue areas for which global cultural scripts was not explicitly articulated or institutionalized, but can only be guided

by fundamental world cultural principles. With regards to these issues, world society effect may not be immediately detected. Rather, it takes the engagement of committed actors, a relatively increased-level of articulation, or the persistence of these two processes for the effect to become observable.

Hypothesis 1: Global-local connections are not positively associated with increasing divorce.

WORLD CULTURAL PRINCIPLES, PENUMBRA EFFECT, AND DIVORCE

Unlike other issue areas examined by previous world society literature, divorce does not receive much global attention. Rather, the global articulation focuses on the overall scripting of marriage. The cultural script regarding marriage was institutionalized as early as in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 16 declared that both men and women had "equal rights to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution," and that marriage should be established only with the "free and full consent of the intending spouses." Lastly, the article confirmed that the "family [was] the natural and fundamental group unit of society and [was] entitled to protection by society and the State" (United Nations 1948).

The cultural script of marriage, based on the Declaration follows the broad trend of

"the individualization of society" (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010) and portrayed an individualistic imagination of marriage. Following the fundamental world cultural principle of individualism, marriage is no longer a mandatory stage of life course which everyone by default has to experience. Instead, one is entitled to determine whether s/he wants to get married based on his/her, rather than anybody else's, will. In addition, the article that seamlessly incorporated the description of marriage and the protection of family also gives the impression of prioritizing marriage as the backbone of family—a western imagination of the nuclear family. Under such conceptualization, the corporatist functions of marriage, including collective resource pooling, reproduction for lineage continuation, or communal bonding, should not overshadow an individual's marital decision. Lastly, the intending spouses are seen as equal actors, stripped off their gender, social status, or any other characteristics. The two human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), reiterated the script almost verbatim (United Nations 1966a, 1966b).

The codified script about marriage and family only brings up divorce when discussing the equal rights of spouses with regard to marital and familial decisions. There is no explicit codification of the very freedom to divorce. However, one could reasonably

deduct that such freedom for everyone has to be presumed to foreground the equality at the dissolution of marriage. Individual freedom to divorce was thus non-explicit yet ready to be implied—a penumbra of fundamental human rights.

Indeed, this underlying presumption seems to be a taken-for-granted notion that requires no further codification in the minds of cultural scriptwriters. In the following decade, the milestone of the international women's rights movement, the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), builds on this presumption and develops the previous script of marriage with 8 specifications of what "equal rights" should mean. These specifications entail rights and responsibilities regarding reproduction, children, personal life choices, and property. In addition to articulating the realms of equality in marriage, the treaty also states that spouses should enjoy the same rights and responsibilities both "during marriage and at its dissolution" (Article 16[c], United Nations 1979). In other words, the equality scripts are extended to the handling of divorce, should the issues be relevant. Again, divorce was not given independent attention, but was treated as part of women's rights in marriage and family. Nevertheless, the level of articulation improved compared to the previous decades.

Although divorce is never given independent and undivided attention, it does not mean that actors reject the issue of divorce as being an integral part of the human rights

project. Rather, there were constantly signs of actors at all levels taking their cue from 1) the fundamental world cultural principles of individualism, and 2) the more explicit "equality" frame, in addressing the issue of divorce. For example, monitoring documents of the international women's movement included divorce policy and statistics as one indicator of the state of women's status of a country (Morgan 1996). CEDAW state parties also mentioned divorce law reforms toward equality in their periodic reports as signs of compliance with the global cultural norms (e.g. Albania 2002, Cyprus 2004, and India 2005). Lastly, national women's movements addressed the lack of rights for women to divorce or unequal grounds for both sexes as one of their concerns (e.g. see Dontopoulos 1982 for Greek; Agnes 1994; Agnihotri and Mazumdar 1995 for India; Chew 1994 for Singapore). It is worth noticing that their attention to the issue also resonates with how the issue was processed at the international level—actors treated divorce as part of a broader, more fundamental women's rights issue—equality and freedom in marriage. Divorce was one of the issues, but it was not an isolated or prioritized issue.

All in all, reviewing the international attention to divorce reveals that global cultural script regarding divorce is not explicitly addressed in international treaties, but mainly implied by the fundamental principle of individualism. Over time, the script becomes

more articulated based on the principle of equality. However, it is still under-institutionalized in terms of devoted international treaties, organizational infrastructure, or actors. Neither is there action plan specifically designed for the issue.

What is the connection between international norms, transnational and national social movements, and the changes in local conditions of divorce? How can we discern whether the state or NGO actors actually take their cue from the global cultural scripts or spontaneously develop the divorce reform agenda? To my best knowledge, literature focusing on exploring divorce reform is rare and often silent on global-local connections.[1] Recognizing the limitation, this paper relies on comparative research design to adjudicate the contending explanations.

In putting the penumbra effect of world society to the test, this research hypothesizes that, first, because the international women's movement had a direct contribution to the increasing articulation of the global cultural script of divorce in CEDAW, *the global-local connections of the women's right organizations should be meaningful in predicting the rising divorce (Hypothesis 1a).* Second, *as the cultural script of "womanhood" becomes more articulated, subsequent international mobilization of women's activists around the*

[1] For example, among the aforementioned literature on national women's movements, only Chew(1994) discuss the international connections of the Singapore Council of the Status of Women and how the reform experience in other countries (China and India) convinced them and propelled their own effort.

world should have more salient influence in rising divorce than in the previous period (Hypothsis 2). I identified the 1985 Nairobi World Conference on Women as the watershed event that produced divergent effect of global-local connection in the two periods. The Nairobi World Conference on Women was the first major world conference on women after the establishment of CEDAW. The conference also witnessed the first large-scale mobilization and interaction among women's rights activists around the world. The interaction can diffuse the ideal of promoting a more equal divorce regulation and assisting women to escape from intolerable marriages as viable women's movement projects (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006). Although the international women's movement never consolidated an advocacy template to address divorce, the cross-national exchange of advocacy experience might help solidify the recognition of the issue and envision the embodiment of an implicit world cultural principle. I therefore expect the global cultural diffusion to be more influential and more salient in the post-1985 period.

NATIONAL-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVORCE PATTERNS

In addition to the global dynamics, this research also tests the effect of 3 national predictors.

WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Multiple scholars argue the contributing effect of women's employment on divorce from different angles. At the individual level, women's increasing participation in the labor force repays them on with greater economic independence and higher status within the family due to more economic contribution. Both changes provide women with more incentives and capability of perceiving and actualizing marriage dissolution. Engaging in paid labor also creates tension between women's domestic responsibilities and public employment. (Booth et al. 1984; Chafetz and Hagan 1996; A. Cherlin and Furstenberg 1988; Huber and Spitze 1980; Scanzoni 1972). The overall increase of independence and status may also cultivate a permissive society for divorce.

Hypothesis 3: Women's labor force participation is positively associated with increasing divorce.

STATE CAPACITY

Welfare state literature argues that a state's policies set the institutional context in which individuals carry out their family lives. Most welfare state studies do not consider the direct connection between welfare state policies and divorces. Rather, the relationship is mediated by changes of the gendered relationship of couples, such as women's

employment, and household division of labor, to name a few (Geist 2005; Cooke and Baxter 2010; Cooke et al. 2013). These factors, in turns, affect whether individuals choose to divorce. In general, welfare state studies concur that countries with higher government welfare spending (associated with the socio-democratic regime) provide an institutional buffer for the effect of women's employment. The argument, however, should be qualified as the findings largely stems from industrialized western countries.

Hypothesis 4a: The level of welfare spending mitigates the effect of women's employment on divorce (This hypothesis is not tested in current manuscript. I will update the result in the following version.)

The other line of research argues that welfare policies can amend the disadvantage of single-parent household poverty and dissatisfactory status of child wellbeing (Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). These two factors can also be important concerns of divorce. Other things being equal, a society with a better policy safety net should create an environmental more tolerant for divorces. Lastly, state capacity to deliver the welfare services fundamentally conditions whether such environment can be realized.

Hypothesis 4b: The level of welfare spending is positively associated with increasing divorce.

Hypothesis 4c: Stronger state capacity is positively associated with divorce.

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE

Aside from the religiosity level of individuals, religious doctrines regulate divorce through both official channels (e.g. Sharia Law on divorce) and unofficial channels, namely, through regulating the norms and configuring the worldview of marriage. Therborn (2004) has identified religious influence when categorizing major family systems of the world. Catholicism conceptualizes marriage as a sacred bond between spouses and explicitly sanctions divorce. Islam considers marriage as secular ties and dissolvable by men. Empirically, studies yield inconsistent results regarding the effect of individual religions (Clark 1990; Greenstein and Davis 2006; Trent and South 1989). This research attempts to examine the religious effect with a panel dataset to yield a more considerate result. I hypothesize that *Catholicism has a prohibitive effect on divorce (Hypothesis 5a)* and *Islam has a positive effect on divorce (Hypothesis 5b)*

In addition to the three national predictors, I also include two sets of control variables.

DEVELOPMENT

Previous research has repeatedly demonstrated that the divorce rate is higher in

socially and economically developed countries, although the relation may not always be linear (Trent and South 1989). Under the broad banner of socioeconomic development processes, industrialization, urbanization, economic growth, technological advancement, and mass education all contribute to more frequent divorce (Cole and Powers 1973; Goode 1993; Nimkoff 1965; Ogburn and Nimkoff 1955). These processes create alternative institutions in replacement of the economic and emotional functions of the family and instigates ideational and value changes stressing individualism, self-fulfillment, and emotional satisfaction in marriage. These changes not only destabilize marital unions, but also create a permissive environment for divorce (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lesthaeghe 1983).

DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS

Researchers call attention to an unbalanced sex-ratio that dictates the value of women as wives and bearers of children (Guttentag and Secord 1983). The relative scarcity of women in societies with a higher sex ratio renders men more reluctant, if not resistant, to divorce (Clark 1990; Greenstein and Davis 2006; Trent and South 1989). At the same time, having more children can intensify the need of double incomes and diminish the feasibility of divorce.

DATA

I collected the data on divorce rate from the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* (the *Yearbook*). The *Yearbook* was published yearly since 1948. Although the United Nations started publishing individual tables electronically on its website, I decided to use the data from the book version for data consistency. Each edition of the *Yearbook* reported demographic indicators. In 1951, the *Yearbook* started publishing the number of divorce of 71 areas, mostly European countries and their colonies. Some of the country/area data dated back to 1935. In the following editions, the *Yearbooks* constantly included longitudinal data of both the number of divorce and the crude divorce rate, with various year ranges. When the year ranges of multiple editions overlapped and reported inconsistent data, I used data reported in later years because it might take time to collect and clean the data. Because the calculation of crude divorce rate data required the number of the total population, which could be based on census data or estimates, I prefer data calculated from census data, if indicated.

Research assistants helped transcribe the data into an Excel file. Inconsistent data were noted in the file. I double-checked the accuracy of data by comparing the data in the Excel file with the *Yearbook* and adjusted the data using the aforementioned criteria.

When colonies/disputed areas gained independence, I merged the data under the names of the newly-independent countries. For those countries or areas whose territories changed during their transitions (most often because of separation or integration), I treated them as different countries.

Eighty-two countries/areas were included in this study with country-year data between 1960 and 2012, although the numbers of cases varied in each statistic model due to the availability of independent variables. I excluded a set of outliers with a population fewer than 300,000 or an exceptionally high net divorce rate over 20 percent because these countries had a disproportionate influence on the regression models. Countries in this sample were located on all six inhabited continents, although less developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southwest Asia, and Oceania were underrepresented. Economic hardship and political instability may have prevented these countries from establishing the infrastructure and effective governance required for collecting and processing such data.

In the following paragraphs, I discuss the measurement of the variables. The descriptive statistics and correlation between variables are presented in Table 1.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Most comparative studies on divorce, especially those including developing countries, used the crude divorce rate (number of legally registered divorce per 1,000 population) as dependent variable because of its maximum data availability. However, crude divorce rate does not take into consideration age structure and marriage rate of the society. To avoid the biases of the crude divorce rate, I constructed the **net divorce rates** (the number of officially registered divorce per 1000 married population) based on the following calculation: I divided the crude divorce rates data (United Nations 1951-2012) by the census estimates of the proportion of the married population.[2]

$$Net\ diroce\ rate = \frac{crude\ divorce\ rate}{proportion\ of\ married\ population} \frac{\frac{number\ of\ legally\ registered\ divorce}{total\ population}}{\frac{married\ population}{total\ population}}$$

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Based on the five sets of hypotheses, I included the following indicators. For independent variables that were not measured annually, I interpolated the data.

State Capacity. Among the several indicators commonly used to denote the state capacity, I chose the government consumption (as the percentage of GDP) as a general measure of state capacity because of its maximum data availability. The *World Development Indicators* (WDI) provided the data. I also collected another set of data, the

[2] The data can be downloaded from http://data.un.org/Default.aspx.

social security tax (as the percentage of total government revenue), as a more accurate measure of welfare state spending (CICUP 2012). Limited by the short window of data availability (1988-2012), I only use the data for supplementary analysis.

Women's Employment. The extent of female labor force participation was measured by the percentage of women above age 15 who were active in the labor force. This set of data was collected from the International Labour Organization online database.[3]

Religious Influence. I collected the data of the numbers of Catholic and Muslim population of a country from the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2011). The encyclopedia provided numbers of Catholic and Muslim population at four time points (1970, 1995, 2000, and 2010). I divided the numbers by total population (data provided by World Bank WDI 2012) to get the proportion of population of the specific religion.

Global Effect. This study engaged two indicators of global-domestic linkages: 1) the logged number of individual or organizational memberships of all recorded INGOs, and more specifically 2) the membership count of 25 randomly sampled women's international nongovernmental organizations (WINGOs). Both data derived from the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (UIO 1948-2011). Currently the data collection

[3] Both the data of female labor participation and of religious population were collected by my colleague Rachael Chatterson. I am greatly indebted and hereby express my sincere gratitude.

of the sampled WINGO memberships are only updated to 2005, I would update the latest data in later version of manuscript.

I also included a time-varying dichotomous measure of the ratification of CEDAW. I coded the years during which a country had not ratified CEDAW as 0 and 1 for the year of ratification and each of the following year. Because CEDAW was first adopted in the year 1979, all the years prior to 1979 were treated as 0. The years during which state parties reserved on relevant articles were also coded as 0.

Time Effect In order to explore the time-varying effect of global cultural norm diffusion, I established a dummy variable of post 1985 period. The years after 1986 are coded as 1 and pre-1985 period is coded as 0. I created time-interaction variables of the global effect by multiplying the dummy variable and global-effect predictors.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Development. I used two indicators to capture important dimensions of the socioeconomic development of a country. I used the natural log of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as indicator for economic development and gross secondary education enrollment rate to indicate the level of educational attainment. The gross secondary education enrollment rate referred to the number of students enrolled in

secondary education, regardless of their age, divided by secondary school-aged population. Because the measurement did not exclude those students beyond the eligible age for secondary education, the number of rates could exceed 100%. Both data sets came from the *World Development Indicators* (WDI, World Bank 2012).

Demographic Dynamics. I included two indicators of demographic dynamics. The data of population sex ratio was measured by the number of males per 100 females (UN World Population Prospects 2012). The data of youth dependency was measured as the ratio between the population under 15 and the population between 15 and 64 (WDI, World Bank 2012).

Divorce Law. Because the net divorce rate data used the numbers of divorces officially registered in the government system, the numbers were preconditioned by national divorce laws. Those countries with a stringent or unequal divorce law (e.g., only allowing men to initiate divorce, or only assigning child custody to men) were likely to have fewer divorces in the government records. To control for the limiting effect of divorce law, I use the family law dataset developed by Htun and Weldon (2012). The datasets included indicators of the family laws of 75 countries at 4 time points (1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005). Among the 13 indicators, three dichotomous indicators concerned the equality of divorce laws: whether divorce can be initiated by both men and women,

whether women can be granted child custody as men, and whether the assignment of property upon divorce favored men. I combined the three indicators to an ordinal index. The larger value of the index signaled higher level of equality. Because the index severely downsized the data, I only used the data in supplementary analysis.

METHOD

I investigated the effect of both global and national effects on divorce patterns with panel regression technology. The unit of analysis was country-year. Panel regression was an appropriate method for examining dynamic historical processes and comparing multiple cases, such as the change of divorce patterns over time among different countries. I chose to begin the analysis from the year 1960 in order to balance the limit of data availability with the need for the widest time span to allow the aggregates of individual behaviors to shift. The year 1960 was also an acceptable starting point because the related global norms were then either newly established (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948) or in the making.

Based on the results of the Hausman's Chi-square test, the coefficients from random and fixed effect models were not significantly different. Therefore, I used random effect models for all models presented in this paper to fully take advantage of the method's

concomitant consideration of within- and between-group variation. I explored the covariation of all variable to detect multicollinearity. As a result, I did not discover an exceptionally high level of correlation between any two variables. I conducted sensitivity tests to check for potential problems of heteroskedacity or non-normality. The signs and significance levels across the results of different tests are generally stable, assuring the robustness of the models.

FINDINGS

I first summarize the cross-regional and longitudinal patterns of divorce. The descriptive statistics of each country's net divorce rate are presented in Table 2. While the mean values of national net divorce rates vary within each region, the net divorce rates of Eastern European and Northern European countries are the highest among all regions, followed by those of the two Northern American countries and two Oceanian countries. The median numbers of the two regions with the highest national average net divorce rates (Moldova 6.805, Iceland 5.114) are 1 to 4 points higher than those of other regions. On the other end, Southern America and Southern Europe are the two regions with the lowest national average net divorce rates.

Meanwhile, the regional ranking of total INGO memberships differs slightly from

the divorce patterns. While Western European countries do not have particularly high net divorce rates, the region, on average, hosts the highest national counts of total INGO memberships. Northern America and Northern Europe rival their means of total INGO memberships. In comparison, Central and Western Asian countries have the lowest average national counts of INGO memberships.

--Table 2 around here--

Figure 2 presents the longitudinal trend of divorce and global-local connections. The annual average of the sampled countries' net divorce rates increases from 1.305 to 5.133 divorces per thousand married population. The average net divorce rate gradually rises from the outset of the research time period and plateaus around the 1980s. After the stagnant period, the line starts to ascend in the late 1980s once again. In general, the longitudinal trends of individual countries follow the overall trend of gradual increase, with the exception of some irregularity. Both the annual mean of total INGO membership counts and the sampled WINGO membership level do not start to rise until the late 1970s. The trend of average INGO membership counts experiences two waves of growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s. After a short period of stagnation, the number rises steadily until today. The average linkages to sampled WINGO increases sharply for a decade from

the late 1970s, contracts for a couple of years, and then mounts again.

The relative timing of the ascendance of the global-local connections and net divorce rate shows two divergent patterns before and after the mid-1980s. The first wave of rising net divorce rate predates the increase of both numbers of global-local connections. However, this pattern reverses around the mid-1980s. After the stagnation of net divorce rates in 1980s, both the trends of average INGO and WINGO linkage counts start to lead the trend of net divorce rate. The general growing trend of average INGO membership counts precedes the increase of net divorce rate since mid-1985. The longitudinal trend of the net divorce rate especially follows the trends of growing WINGO linkages closely through almost every ebb and flow until the early 2000s. The preliminary review of the timing of the three trends suggest different relations between the global-local connections and divorce before and after 1985.

--Figure 2 around here

In Table 3, I present the basic panel regression models testing the effect of national and global cultural factors on national divorce pattern. Model 1 presents the aggregate model with all control variables and national-level predictors. Model 2, 4, and 6, in turns, examine three indicators denoting channels of global diffusion, including connections to

all INGOs, sampled WINGOs, and state ratification of CEDAW. The results demonstrate a clear global influence in addition to national dynamics identified by previous literature.

Models in Table 3 show considerably consistent patterns of national-level predictors' effects. Countries with a higher level of government spending and a larger proportion of female labor force participation have higher level of divorce, as the hypotheses expected. According to the results from model 1, every one-point increase of government spending in percentage of GDP increases the net divorce rate by 3.707 divorces per thousand married population. A one-point increase of female labor force participation yields .038 count of divorce per thousand married population, a minute but significant effect. In terms of religious influence, with every one-unit increase of the Catholic proportion of the population, the number of divorce decreases by 0.026 per thousand married population,.

Among the control variables, net divorce rate is positively associated with increasing educational attainment and economic development level. While youth dependency has a significant negative effect in models testing single variables, including government consumption and religious influence, the effect falls shy of significance in aggregate models and in the model that specifically tests the effect of female labor force

participation.[4] Lastly, I also find results that disagreed with the hypotheses. Contrary to the findings of previous cross-sectional studies, I do not find the effect of an unbalanced sex ratio. While undersupply of women (high value of sex ratio) is associated with a lower divorce rate, the negative association is not significant in any of the models specified in Table 3 and 4.

In addition to factors at the national levels, I also find evidence on the influence of the diffusion of global cultural models. Both the measures of general global-local connections and of the connections to specific world cultural delegates have significant positive effect on net divorce rate. Net of other national dynamics, one-point increase in the total INGO membership count lifts the net divorce rate by 0.179, and one-point increase in the saturation percentage of sampled WINGO memberships adds 0.063 more divorce per thousand married population. On the other hand, CEDAW ratification does not have a significant effect on national divorce pattern. The result confirms once again the findings of previous research that state ratifications of international treaties often are window dressing, rather than powerful instrument of change.

Models in Table 4 further examine the aforementioned pattern with the additional control of the legal limitation on reporting divorces. Table 4 presents models of a smaller

[4] Results of models that test single variables and different sets of national predictors are available upon request.

sample of countries with available data on the equality level of their divorce law. The identical numeric ordering denotes the same model as that in Table 3, but with the divorce law control variable added. The results show that, unsurprisingly, the equality level of the law indeed has a positive effect on the number of legally registered divorces. Secondly, the effects of both the national and global factors identified in Table 3 withhold even when controlling the equality level of divorce law. Greater government spending, female labor force participation, and Catholic population proportion remain having a significant positive effect on the net divorce rate. Global diffusion of world individualist culture through INGO memberships and WINGO memberships has even larger positive effect on net divorce rate. In order to exclude the potential bias of sample selection in producing similar results, I used the same set of samples to test the models without the divorce law control and received consistent results. While confirming the encouraging effect of tolerant divorce law, this examination also reassures that the indicator does not prevent or bias the identification of non-legal mechanisms at work.

PERIOD EFFECT

While models 2 and 4 confirm that general global-local linkages through all sorts of INGOs and issue-specific organizational linkages with WINGOs produces a positive

effect on national net divorce rates, the analysis with time-interaction variables helps clarify when and how the influence takes place. Model 3, 5, and 7 in Table 3 and 4 presents the same aggregate models as model 2, 4, and 6 with additional time-interaction effect. When the research time period is disaggregated into two periods by the year of 1985, Model 3A shows that during the pre-1985 period, the overall INGO membership counts actually have a negative effect of -0.111 on net divorce rate with every unit of increase. The effect flips to a positive 0.215 during the post-1985 period. Model 5A shows that the effect of sampled WINGO membership counts on net divorce rate is significant in both periods, and it is slightly bigger in the post-1985 period (0.068) than the pre-1985 period (0.056). However, the time-interaction effect is not significant in this model. Model 3B and 5B in Table 4 show consistent pattern. The examination provides moderate support for the time-varying effect of global cultural norm diffusion.

CLOSE EXAMINATION OF WELFARE STATE SPENDING

Table 5 examines an additional measure of welfare state support. Data of the percentage of social security tax to total government revenue, while less widely or frequently available, reflects more directly a country's scale of social spending. Results in Table 5 confirm once again the positive effect of welfare spending even when controlling

for a state's capacity to deliver the related services. In model 1C that includes only national-level predictors, each one-point increase of the social transfer indicator yields 0.032 more divorces per thousand married population.

The effect of global cultural diffusion remains significant in models including the social transfer indicator: the effect of general INGO membership (0.246) is larger than the effect of sampled WINGO (0.022). When controlling the social transfer indicator, the positive effect of CEDAW ratification (0.246) becomes significant. The patterns of time-interaction effect are also consistent with what I previously identified in Table 3. National INGO membership counts has a negative, albeit insignificant effect prior to 1985, but the effect becomes positive after 1985 (0.336). After disaggregating the time range, the positive CEDAW ratification effect loses significant. It is possible that the difference of CEDAW ratification effect in non-interactive model is due to the influence of decreasing sample size because models based on the same sample yield consistent result when excluding the social transfer variable.

The same issue can also account for the changes in the directionality of the effect of youth dependency. When taking into consideration the availability of social transfer, having to support more children unexpectedly prompts the decision of divorce. In addition to the explanation of the changing sample size, it is indeed possible that in a

society with comprehensive support of single-headed households, having more children may actually accentuate the need to leave a deleterious marriage in search of a healthier environment for childraising.

DISCUSSION

The statistical evidence presented above supports the major arguments of this paper. In addition to national dynamics, ideational or cultural principles at the global level diffuse into a national context through organizational connections between the global and local actors and shape an individual's decision of divorce. The effect of INGO and WINGO membership is consistently significant in the basic models and additional models with smaller sample size and more variables. The result is also robust to the test of endogeneity.

The disaggregated analysis on the global cultural effect in different time periods further suggests how global cultural norms exert influence when the cultural norms regarding an issue are under-articulated and under-institutionalized. Global cultural diffusion through the channels of organizational membership has a weak effect on the divorce pattern in the pre-1985 period. The effect strengthens during the post-1985 watershed. The connections to both INGOs and WINGOs produce larger encouraging

effect after 1985. The result provides support for the hypothesis that when the global cultural norms are under-articulated or under-institutionalized, the penumbra effect may diffuse through improved articulation and international mobilization and networking of actors whose missions contain social projects related to the issue. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility of sample selection bias that clouds the validity of the results of the pre-1985 period. However, the longitudinal trends of the global-local connections and divorce demonstrate that the net divorce rate experiences a plateaued period when the increase of total INGO memberships and WINGO memberships first accelerates. The relative stagnation may have caused the negative effect.

Lastly, although the international women's movement is related to the rise of divorce, it does not necessarily follow that all the institutionalization milestones have direct effect on the trend as well. In this study, CEDAW ratification fails to demonstrate a consistent significant effect across models. For one thing, states ratify CEDAW for various reasons. Ratification as a manifestation of true commitment can be a reason, yet previous research soundly points out the paradox that more than often, it is just an act of window dressing *sans* genuine commitment. Treaty ratification as window dressing may even divert monitoring attention and worsen the scale of human rights violations (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). The limited country-year data points (CEDAW was first ratified in 1979)

may also account for the unexpected negative effect of CEDAW ratification in the pre-1985 period.

In addition to the global diffusion of cultural principles, this research also examines several national dynamics identified by previous comparative studies. Because previous comparative studies do not include a time-series design, it is valuable to discuss the results of national-level factors.

Demographic Dynamics. Although cross-sectional research generally argues that demographic composition constitutes some basic concerns of divorce decision-making and generally finds a statistically significant effect of unbalance sex ratio, this research finds that the effect of sex ratios tends to fall shy of significance. This factor is only influential when the level of social transfer is included, which can be a result of decreasing sample size. It is interesting to notice that the insignificant discouraging effect of heavy childraising duty shifts to a positive effect when controlling for policy arrangements, including divorce law and welfare policies. While the introduction of a more equal divorce law and welfare policies already has a predicted positive effect, the result preliminarily suggests that, while the burden of children for single parents can be a great discouragement for divorce, with institutional buffers, having more children may

actually become a motivation to leave dysfunctional marriage.

State Capacity and Welfare. Rarely does the demographic literature on comparative divorce study takes into consideration the state capacity. The analysis finds a significant positive effect for both the broad indicator for state capacity and the more specific indicator of social security tax. The confirming results suggest that having welfare support can allow more divorces indirectly by creating a less hostile environment against single parents. While most of the welfare state literature is not directly interested in the effect of welfare state policy on divorce *per se*, but rather the consequences of divorce, it is possible that social transfer can mitigate the negative consequences of single parenthood and alter the decision making process of divorce. The overarching significant effect of government consumption also suggests that, fundamentally, state capacity to implement policy and delivery services is crucial to introduce real changes.

Women's Employment. The findings confirm the overarching effect of women's labor force participation on divorce. The indicator is consistently significant across all models. Panel data not only reaffirms the conclusion of cross-national research but further provides proof of within-state longitudinal dynamics. This dynamic seems to transcend

countries. Engagement in employment brings women independence and/or conflict between the double shifts. Both influences are likely to trigger increasing incidences of divorce. Unfortunately, the data does not allow me to adjudicate the competing arguments regarding the actual mechanisms between female employment and divorce.

Religious Effect. My result finds that both religions exert discouraging effect on the decision of divorce, although the effect of Catholicism is stronger and more salient. In the basic models of Table 3, the proportion of Muslim population even produces positive (although insignificant) effect on divorce. It is worth noticing that in this research I conceptualize religious influence on the aggregate level, rather than at the individual level.. Religion shapes the behaviors of its believers and its force is reflected in the aggregates of individual behaviors. However, religion can produce other powerful macro-level effects, such as shaping the overall social attitude or the law. Further examination using dummy variable for stat religion would be a productive way to clarify other macro-level effects of religion.

CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of increasing academic recognition of the global influence on

local affairs, this research extends the world society theory in two aspects. First, this research examines the world society effect on individual behaviors. Recent studies explore beyond government compliance with global normative pressure and demonstrate that global cultural scripts can produce substantive changes in various areas in individuals' lives (Boyle and Kim 2009; Pierotti 2013). This research joins the quest and tests, in the case of divorce, whether the global cultural scripts blueprinting individuals' lives actually shape individuals' behaviors. My findings suggest that, on top of national dynamics identified by previous literature, connections to the world society have substantial effect on the likelihood of individuals to adhere to the global cultural scripts—other things being equal, societies that are more associated with the world society demonstrate tendency towards more divorces. In the case of divorce, following the blueprint that the dissolution of marriage should be determined by equal individuals rather than subjected to the will of corporatist groups, more and more unhappy marriages may or can end up with divorce.

Second, this research contributes to the understanding the grey zone of world society effect—the issue areas where global cultural scripts are relatively under-articulated and under-institutionalized. Most world society studies examine cases in which the global cultural scripts are highly articulated and institutionalized based on a formal consensus

and yield a substantial impact. A recent study proves the impact non-existent when there is low consensus on the script (Boyle, Kim, Longhofer, unpublished manuscript). This research demonstrates that even when the cultural scripts is relatively under-institutionalized, world society effect can still take place under the conditions of improving the level of articulation and relevant international mobilization and networking. This research demonstrates the nuanced effect of global-local connections on the condition of varied articulation and institutionalization of individual world cultural models.

This project converses with the intellectual dialogue regarding the broad trend of individualization. This worldwide trend manifests itself in myriad aspects of social life, including the realm of marriage and the family (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). With their interpretation focusing on slightly different dimensions, families scholars have largely concurred that the meaning of divorce relates to the individuation of marriage (Giddens 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Cherlin 2009). While most theorists view the change as a natural evolvement of modernization processes, this research joins the recent argument that emphasizes that intentional social planning stems from the global level and diffuses internationally so as to shape local social lives. The findings support the argument with

empirical evidence.

Granted, the claim of a world society effect on individual behaviors requires some qualification. Because this research uses aggregate statistics rather than individual-level data, the finding cannot directly be used to infer the propensity of individuals' decision. However, current individual-level data suffers from data paucity and incommensurability. Harmonization of national survey data is still ongoing.[5] In comparison, the aggregate statistics encompass a broad range of societies and time periods, and can afford an inquiry of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal patterns. I therefore took advantage of the imperfect yet best available data. Review of current findings with individual-level data when they are available would be valuable in excluding the risk of an ecological fallacy.

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[5] For some of the effort, see www.idhsdata.org

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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables

		A)	B)	C)	D)	E)	F)	G)	H)	I)	J)	K)	L)	M)	N)	Mean	S.D.
A)	Net Divorce rate	1.00														3.66	2.82
B)	Divorce Law Equality Index	0.22	1.00													2.66	0.80
C)	Population Sex Ratio	-0.15	-0.51	1.00												99.06	7.95
D)	Youth Dependency	-0.31	-0.55	0.36	1.00											49.84	22.76
E)	Economic Development	0.18	0.49	-0.33	-0.70	1.00										8.82	1.33
F)	Education Attainment	0.37	0.34	-0.21	-0.79	0.66	1.00									72.24	28.75
G)	Government Consumption	0.10	-0.31	-0.03	0.10	-0.39	0.08	1.00								0.20	0.09
H)	Social Transfer	0.19	0.38	-0.39	-0.55	0.44	0.39	-0.09	1.00							15.43	14.38
I)	Female Employment	0.31	0.52	-0.41	-0.76	0.48	0.70	0.03	0.36	1.00						29.60	13.48
J)	Catholic Population	-0.10	0.33	-0.18	0.08	0.05	-0.22	-0.17	0.33	-0.26	1.00					36.76	37.94
K)	Muslim Population	-0.14	-0.75	0.46	0.44	-0.44	-0.19	0.26	-0.32	-0.39	-0.44	1.00				17.57	34.36
L)	INGO Linkages	0.17	0.33	-0.18	-0.55	0.74	0.52	-0.17	0.48	0.31	0.14	-0.26	1.00			6.27	1.37
M)	WINGO Linkage Saturation	0.20	0.22	-0.28	-0.53	0.61	0.60	-0.19	0.39	0.43	-0.01	-0.29	0.78	1.00		18.12	16.64
N)	CEDAW Ratification	0.24	0.26	-0.22	-0.43	0.08	0.51	0.11	0.16	0.45	0.03	-0.15	0.40	0.38	1.00	0.52	0.50

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of National Net Divorce Rate

Country	Mean	Range	Country	Mean	Range	Country	Mean	Range
Africa			Israel	4.065	3.331-4.689	Slovak Rep.	4.364	3.263-5.309
Egypt	4.483	2.209-6.701	Jordon	3.933	2.426-5.693	Ukraine	8.022	7.383-8.716
Ethiopia	8.111	8.111-8.111	Kazakhstan	17.470	14.375-19.795	**Western Europe**		
Tunisia	3.033	2.215-4.651	Kuwait	4.678	4.678-4.678	Austria	3.841	2.467-5.868
Mauritius	1.965	1.572-2.836	Kyrgyzstan	3.548	2.816-4.685	Belgium	3.766	0.974-7.877
South Africa	2.692	2.692-2.692	Turkey	1.795	0.769-3.316	France	3.571	1.384-6.183
Northern America			Tajikistan	1.732	0.987-3.853	Germany	4.807	3.431-5.777
Canada	4.422	0.820-6.424	**Southern/Eastern Asia**			Ireland	1.909	1.668-2.164
United States	9.524	6.439-11.529	China	5.698	0.949-19.711	Luxembourg	1.897	0.146-5.083
Central America and Caribbean			Hong Kong	4.033	3.969-4.098	Netherlands	3.523	1.057-5.241
Costa Rica	3.451	0.190-8.181	Indonesia	3.003	1.967-4.075	Switzerland	4.671	3.091-6.297
Dominican Rep.	8.167	1.738-15.228	Iran	1.832	1.075-2.925	United Kingdom	6.496	5.842-7.070
El Salvador	2.765	2.077-3.592	Japan	2.805	1.700-4.475	**Southern Europe**		
Guatemala	0.920	0.626-1.205	Korea, Rep.	2.760	0.590-7.457	Albania	1.733	1.025-2.631
Honduras	1.448	0.798-2.355	Macao	2.427	1.707-3.317	Croatia	1.827	1.573-2.168
Jamaica	3.789	3.789-3.789	Mongolia	2.062	1.522-2.834	Greece	1.193	0.696-2.026
Mexico	1.630	0.813-2.742	Nepal	1.993	1.993-1.993	Italy	0.977	0.340-1.821
Panama	3.443	2.345-4.427	Sri Lanka	0.453	0.396-0.501	Macedonia	0.988	0.607-1.376
Trinidad and Tobago	3.577	2.904-4.625	Syria	1.982	1.502-2.400	Montenegro	2.106	1.783-2.629
Southern America			Thailand	1.046	0.424-2.031	Portugal	2.144	0.065-6.974
Brazil	1.266	0.663-2.006	**Eastern Europe**			Slovenia	2.619	1.793-3.240
Chile	0.909	0.337-1.230	Belarus	8.306	6.503-10.063	Spain	1.490	1.228-1.979
Ecuador	1.056	0.676-2.229	Bulgaria	2.580	1.623-3.554	**Northern Europe**		
Paraguay	3.947	3.377-4.825	Estonia	8.194	6.982-8.782	Denmark	6.242	3.950-7.319
Peru	0.493	0.328-0.710	Hungary	5.482	4.206-15.448	Finland	5.064	1.997-7.045
Uruguay	3.751	2.160-8.245	Latvia	7.184	5.196-12.265	Iceland	5.117	4.876-5.327
Venezuela	3.603	1.531-5.918	Lithuania	7.636	7.636-7.636	Norway	3.989	1.408-6.294
Central/Western Asia			Moldova	6.805	5.159-9.830	Sweden	5.436	2.329-7.396
Armenia	2.130	1.117-7.048	Poland	2.265	1.496-3.666	**Oceania**		
Azerbaijan	1.812	1.472-2.320	Romania	3.340	2.507-6.903	Australia	4.831	1.360-9.735
Cyprus	2.214	0.415-4.642	Russia Fed.	10.156	7.762-13.932	New Zealand	6.291	3.708-8.627

Table 3 Panel Regression Models of All Countries with All Years

	Model 1A	Model 2A	Model 3A	Model 4A	Model 5A	Model 6A	Model 7A
Control							
Population sex ratio	-0.023	-0.022	-0.016	-0.027	-0.025	-0.022	-0.019
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Youth dependency	-0.001	0.004	-0.003	0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Economic	0.646***	0.605***	0.542***	0.401*	0.388*	0.637***	0.607***
Development	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Education	0.017***	0.016***	0.015***	0.014***	0.015***	0.016***	0.017***
Attainment	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
State Capacity							
Government spending	3.707***	3.956***	4.069***	3.897***	3.881***	3.682***	3.734***
	(0.546)	(0.548)	(0.546)	(0.572)	(0.573)	(0.546)	(0.546)
Women's Employment	0.038***	0.035***	0.035***	0.036***	0.038***	0.034***	0.035***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Religion							
Catholic Population	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.026***	-0.024**	-0.023**	-0.027***	-0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Muslim Population	0.008	0.005	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.007	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Global Influence							
Post- 1985 period			-2.174***		-0.148		-0.331*
			(0.562)		(0.145)		(0.163)
INGO Linkages		0.179**	-0.111				
		(0.062)	(0.098)				
INGO Linkage X			0.326***				
Post-1985 period			(0.084)				
WINGO Linkages				0.063***	0.056+		
				(0.016)	(0.032)		
WINGO Linkages X					0.012		
Post-1985 period					(0.024)		
CEDAW						0.141	0.018
ratification						(0.087)	(0.119)
CEDAW ratificationX							0.428*
Post-1985 period							(0.186)
_cons	-1.997	-2.907	-0.700	0.351	0.363	-1.875	-2.007
	(2.735)	(2.759)	(2.823)	(2.973)	(2.983)	(2.740)	(2.747)
Wald Chi-square	473.81***	488.15***	507.54***	416.63***	417.69***	477.12***	483.87***
N of observations	1,723	1,718	1,718	1,581	1,581	1,723	1,723
N of Countries	81	80	80	78	78	81	81

Table 4 Panel Regression Models of All Countries/All Years, with Divorce Law Control

	Model 1B	Model 2B	Model 3B	Model 4B	Model 5B	Model 6B	Model 7B
Control							
Divorce law equality index	0.402***	0.425***	0.372**	0.543***	0.533***	0.394***	0.317**
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.122)
Population sex ratio	-0.004	-0.007	-0.011	-0.006	-0.005	-0.001	0.007
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Youth dependency	0.009	0.014*	0.002	0.014+	0.011	0.010	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Economic Development	0.793***	0.656***	0.595**	0.444+	0.443+	0.768***	0.767***
	(0.194)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.194)	(0.196)
Education Attainment	0.023***	0.021***	0.019***	0.019***	0.020***	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
State Capacity							
Government spending	5.728***	5.588***	5.292***	5.786***	5.717***	5.720***	5.831***
	(0.767)	(0.767)	(0.767)	(0.792)	(0.797)	(0.766)	(0.766)
Women's Employment	0.021*	0.018*	0.016+	0.021*	0.022*	0.015+	0.016+
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Religion							
Catholic Population	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.052***	-0.052***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Muslim Population	-0.013	-0.015	-0.020+	-0.022+	-0.023+	-0.017	-0.020+
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Global Influence							
Post-1985 period			-3.344***		-0.205		-0.485*
			(0.792)		(0.191)		(0.205)
INGO Linkages		0.249**	-0.153				
		(0.096)	(0.138)				
INGO Linkage X Post-1985 period			0.487***				
			(0.114)				
WINGO Linkage				0.071***	0.058		
				(0.018)	(0.036)		
WINGO Linkages X Post-1985 period					0.020		
					(0.029)		
CEDAW ratification						0.220*	0.064
						(0.104)	(0.136)
CEDAW ratification X Post-1985 period							0.621**
							(0.230)
_cons	-5.559	-5.738	-1.151	-2.980	-2.704	-5.416	-5.807
	(3.829)	(3.812)	(3.973)	(4.118)	(4.155)	(3.832)	(3.840)
Wald Chi-square	407.89***	414.86***	440.03***	378.54***	380.33***	414.11***	424.56***
N of observations	1,284	1,283	1,283	1,176	1,176	1,284	1,284
N of Countries	52	52	52	51	51	52	52

Table 5 Panel Regression Models with All Countries, Social Transfer Measure Added

	Model 1C	Model 2C	Model 3C	Model 4C	Model 5C	Model 6C	Model 7C
Control							
Population sex ratio	-0.101*	-0.111**	-0.105*	-0.114**	-0.111**	-0.114**	-0.114**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Youth dependency	0.022**	0.029***	0.021*	0.023**	0.022**	0.027***	0.028***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Economic Development	0.292	0.231	0.156	0.134	0.136	0.300+	0.294
	(0.180)	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.180)	(0.182)
Education Attainment	0.020***	0.018***	0.016***	0.016***	0.016***	0.018***	0.018***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
State Capacity							
Government spending	2.395***	2.437***	2.535***	2.682***	2.669***	2.403***	2.513***
	(0.718)	(0.717)	(0.717)	(0.721)	(0.726)	(0.716)	(0.721)
Social transfer	0.032***	0.031***	0.031***	0.028***	0.028***	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Women's Employment	0.038***	0.033**	0.027**	0.029**	0.028**	0.030**	0.029**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Religion							
Catholic Population	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.030***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Muslim Population	-0.003	-0.005	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Global Influence							
Post-1985 period			-2.233***		-0.063		-0.110
			(0.657)		(0.168)		(0.172)
INGO Linkages		0.246*	-0.010				
		(0.108)	(0.127)				
INGO Linkage X Post-1985 period			0.346***				
			(0.096)				
WINGO Linkage				0.022***	0.075*		
				(0.005)	(0.038)		
WINGO Linkages X Post-1985 period					0.013		
					(0.027)		
CEDAW ratification						0.246*	0.130
						(0.100)	(0.126)
CEDAW ratification X Post-1985 period							0.270
							(0.197)
_cons	7.327+	7.309+	9.695*	10.103*	9.938*	8.681*	8.766*
	(4.120)	(4.120)	(4.162)	(4.175)	(4.192)	(4.157)	(4.168)
Wald Chi-Square	202.67***	209.01***	225.19***	226.05***	225.93***	209.41***	211.63***
N of observations	1,195	1,194	1,194	1,186	1,186	1,195	1,195
N of Countries	71	71	71	71	71	71	71



Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of World Society Influence on Individual Behaviors



Figure.2 Mean of Net Divorce Rate (%), Total INGO memberships, and Sampled WINGO memberships