

Gender Equality within Dual-Earner and Dual-Career Couples across Different Policy Regimes and Norm Systems in Europe

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Abstract: This study focuses the division of housework among various couple earner types in ten European countries, using data from the European Social Survey, and examines if relative resources, time availability and gender ideology moderate this association. The study combines the conventional economic and gender based approaches with an institutional framework on work-family reconciliation policies and gender norms to examine if the division of housework is institutionally embedded. The result shows that dual-career couples, female-career couples and female single-earner couples divide the housework more equal than dual-earner couples. This relates to the fact that women do less housework. The cross-national analysis show apparent differences between dual-earner and dual-career couples, yet the result reveals smaller gender difference in the division of housework in countries with more institutional support for work-family reconciliation and less traditional gender norms, suggesting that couples decisions on how to divide the housework are institutionally embedded.

Keywords: gender, division of housework, family policies, gender norms, Europe

1. Introduction

In contemporary Europe, dual-earner families are widespread as a result of women's increased labour force participation. Nevertheless, the division of housework is highly gendered; women still bear the lion's share of the housework. Although this gender gap has diminished over time, it is mainly a result of women decreasing their share rather than men increasing their share of the housework (Brittman et al. 2003; Evertsson and Neramo 2004; Hook 2010). Much of the early research in this area is based on country specific studies, failing to address the issue in a broader context. More recent studies have focused on cross-national variation in the gender division of unpaid work (e.g. Aliaga 2006; Anxo et al. 2011; Craig and Mullan 2010; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2010; Treas and Drobnič 2010), however, little attention has been directed towards making a distinction between sub-groups in the growing category of dual-earner couples (Ferree 1991). Dual-career couples differ from dual-earner couples in that both partners are at the higher occupational levels (Lucchini et al. 2007). This also suggest that dual-career couples face more challenges in juggling their private life with high demand jobs and longer working hours, which affect the time available for doing housework. However, they also benefit from having higher income, which enable them to outsource housework to a higher extent than other couples (Baxter et al. 2009).

This study focuses on the division of housework among various couple earner types across different European welfare regimes in regard to work-family policies and gender norms. Studying different couple earner types in a cross-national comparative perspective can provide important insights into how time is allocated and dealt with within couples across different institutional contexts. The questions addressed are: *Does the division of housework vary by different couple earner types? Do relative resources within the couple, time spent on paid work, gender role attitudes and family structure, moderate variations in unpaid work between different couple earner types? Can we detect diversities in the division of housework across different welfare regimes in terms of work-family reconciliation policies and gender norms?*

Initially, a review of theories and previous research on the division of housework is presented, followed by a section on work-family policies and gender norms. The last section present the results of (a) the analyses of the association between various couple earner types and men's share of the housework, and the men's and women's housework hours, and (b) a cross-country analysis of the gendered division of housework in relation to work-family policies and social gender norms. The article concludes with a summary and discussion of the results.

2. Theoretical approaches to the division of housework

Since the 1970's, the literature on the division of labour have grown extensively, and the results is consistent; women do more housework then men, but the explanations of the gendered division of housework diverge, and can be divided into two general theoretical frameworks; economic perspective and gender perspective (e.g. Geist 2005; Greenstein 2000; Sayer 2010).

2.1. Economic explanations

The specialized human capital perspective (Becker 1993) assumes that the allocation of paid and unpaid work is a rational arrangement between the partners, driven by a utility maximisation of the common good, that is the partner who earns less from paid work is assumed to do a larger share of the unpaid work, whereas the partner who earns most will specialize on the labour market to maximise the household income (see Geist 2005; Gupta 2007). A related perspective is the time-available approach. The premise is that the amount of time spend on housework is strongly affected by the time available for such task, hence the more hours spend on the labour market, the less time is available to spend on housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Coverman 1995; Fuwa 2004, Greenstein 2000; Sayer 2010). These perspectives have been challenged on many fronts. First, the approaches are gender-neutral and treats household as a single unit where the members are assumed to have similar goals and preferences, and fail to take power relations into account (e.g. Agarwal 1997; Lundberg and Pollak 1996). Second, the causality is difficult to disentangle, that is whether women do fewer hours on the labour market because they do the majority of housework, or if they do most of the housework because they spend fewer hours in paid work (Evertsson and Neramo 2007).

A third approach is the relative resources-bargaining approach, according to which the division of housework reflects the power relation within the household, and the distribution of resources between the partners (Bianchi et al. 2000; Brines 1994). The assumption is that housework is something undesired, and the more resources a person has, the more power he/she has to negotiate the housework away (Evertsson and Neramo 2004). Higher income, education, and occupational prestige, relative to the partner, are assumed to translate into more negotiating power (Bianchi et al. 2000; Evertsson and Neramo 2004). The relative resources-bargaining approach suggests that the division of housework should be more equally distributed within couples where both spouses possess similar recourses. Previous research confirms this assumption; women tend to decrease their time spent on housework as their earnings increase, but only to a certain point (Brittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Davis and Greenstein 2004; Evertsson and Neramo 2007; Greenstein 2000; Killewald and Gough 2010).

2.2. Gender explanations

The gender perspective is known under several labels (see Coltrane 2000 for an overview), such as the “doing gender” or “gender display” approaches (Berk 1985; West and Zimmermann 1987). The basic premise is that housework is a symbolic production of gender relations (Berk 1985; West and Zimmermann 1987). It is assumed that people’s behaviour is influenced by the expectations held by others (Brittman et al. 2003), and that the performance of unpaid housework is one way to ensure an expected gendered behaviour and to define gender relations within the household (Coltrane 2000; Berk 1995; Bianchi et al. 2000; West and Zimmermann 1987). This perspective have been fruitful as an alternative explanation to the gendered division of housework in households where the woman has higher income or employment status, yet still perform the lion’s share of the housework. In these couples, the

couple tends to compensate the less traditional economic relationship with more traditional division of housework (Brittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Neramo 2004; Greenstein 2000),

A related perspective is the gender ideology approach. According to Greenstein (2000), gender ideologies are how people identified themselves with regard to intra-household roles; roles traditionally linked to gender, and it is within the household and within intimate relations that these ideologies are exhibited and played out. The assumption is that the division of housework is the result of shared values within a couple, and that more egalitarian gender ideologies will lead to a more equal division of housework (Greenstein 2000). This has been corroborated by previous studies (e.g. Bianchi et al. 2000; Crompton et al. 2005; Kan 2008).

3. Cross-national differences in the division of housework

Previous research regarding the division of housework shows that the extent of this gender difference varies by institutional context (e.g. Aliaga 2006; Batalova and Cohen 2002; Davies and Greenstein 2004). Geist (2005) argues that the differences in the division of housework cannot solely be explained by difference in individual characteristics, but are also shaped by contextual factors. Several empirical studies corroborate this argument. For instance, more equal sharing of the housework is found in the Nordic countries compared with more conservative welfare regimes, such as Italy and Austria (Geist 2005), also in countries with longer parental leave policies and no gender discriminatory policy (Fuwa and Cohen 2007). In addition, men's unpaid work is higher in countries with higher female labour force participation, and that fathers do more housework in countries where fathers are entitled to use the parental leave, but less in countries with long maternity leave (Hook 2010). Parents tend to share the housework less equal than nonparents, and this difference is most pronounced in the United States and Australia, compared with France and Denmark (Craig and Mullan 2010). Fuwa (2004) has found that the equalising impact of gender ideology and time availability, are stronger for women in more egalitarian countries.

3.1 Individual level assumptions

According to the relative resource/bargaining approach we can expect that: (H1) *dual-career couples share the housework more equally*. This is due to the fact that both parties have relatively strong resources in terms of occupational status and therefore have better bargaining position, but also that they may face more time constraints caused by longer working hours, resulting in less available time for housework. In addition, higher socioeconomic status is usually accompanied with less traditional gender ideology, which in turn should promote a more equal division of housework. When women is more dependent upon their spouses, division of housework tend to be more traditional, hence we can assume that (H2) *the division of housework is more unequal in male-career and single male-earner couples*. In addition, (H3) *in female-career and single female-earner couples the division of housework is expected to be more traditional*, as such couple will counterbalance their less traditional division of

paid work with more traditional division of housework, as suggested by the doing gender approach. If the division of housework mainly is affected by time availability, gender ideology and other relative resources, apart from occupational position, we can expect that the difference between various couple earner types disappears when controlling for these factors.

4. Work-family policies and gender norms in different welfare states

States vary considering the extent to which work-family policies reinforce gendered responsibilities of unpaid and paid work (e.g. Cooke 2006; Korpi 2000; Orloff 1993). Previous studies have shown that social support from the state influence mothers' labour market participation and attachment (see Allen et al. 2012; Misra et al. 2011; Keck and Saraceno 2013). Pfau-Effinger (2012) argues that also gender norms explain cross-national differences in female labour force participation. This section discusses work-family policies and gender norms in ten European countries. The countries selected in this study represent different welfare regimes within the EU; the dual-earner support model (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), the general family support model (Germany and the Netherlands), the market-oriented model (the United Kingdom) (Korpi 2000). Spain represents the southern model (Ferrera 1996), and Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland represent the post-socialist countries (Ferrarini 2006). In this study, it is relevant to consider parental leave systems and formal childcare, especially for younger children, as indicators of policy support for work-family reconciliation and dual-earner arrangement (see Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Gornick et al. 1997; Leitner 2003). These policy measures also reflect norms regarding work and family, as gender norms and policies are highly intertwined (Fahey et al. 2003; Gregory and Milner 2009). Table 1 presents the parental leave systems¹ and Figure 1 displays norms regarding women's role in work and care, in the ten selected countries.

The Nordic countries display less traditional gender norms. Here both policies and norms encourage a more equally shared division of caring and earning responsibilities, and childcare is regarded as a social right (Plantenga and Remery 2009). The total full-rate equivalent (FRE) of paid leave² is relatively generous, and fathers in Sweden and Finland are entitled to FRE of paid paternity leave for more than a month (as do fathers in Germany) (Table 1). The Central Eastern European countries (CEE countries) display the most traditional gender norms (Figure 1). These are countries with low provision of childcare, which can be linked to long parental leave. The FRE of paid maternal/parental leave is relatively generous (Table 1). This policy combination encourages women to withdrawing from the labour market for several years after having children (Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2006). Intermediate gender norms are found in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Spain (Figure 1). These are countries with unpaid or short FTE of paid parental leave and

¹ The specific policies are those in place when the fifth round of European Social Survey was conducted in 2001/11.

² To be able to compare the leave systems across countries, with different payment rates and duration of paid leave, the full-rate equivalent (FRE) of paid leave is presented. The FRE of paid leave is the duration of paid leave if it were paid at 100 percent of previous earnings (OECD 2013a).

intermediate levels of childcare provision (Germany and the Netherlands), or expensive childcare provision (the UK and Spain), mainly on part-time basis (Table 1). This is also mirrored in the relatively high proportion of part-time working women (Anxo et al. 2007), except in Spain with an overall low employment rate for mothers of pre-schoolers (OECD 2010).


Table 1. Parental leave and childcare in ten European countries (2010-12).

	DK	FI	SW	DE	NL	UK	ES	CZ	HU	PL
Full-rate equivalent of paid leave benefit in weeks (1)										
FRE of paid maternity leave	9.6	11.7	8	14	16	12.7	16	19.3	16.8	18
FRE of paid paternity leave	1.1	4.9	8	5.4	0.4	0.4	3	-	1	2
FRE of paid parental leave	17.1	32.8	38.6	34.8	4.9	-	-	39.4	79.6	19.4
Formal childcare for children under 3 years										
Enrolment rate in formal day-care (2)	78	28	51	20	50	35	38	2	9	2
% attending childcare for 30 hours or more/week (2)	68	20	33	13	6	4	18	0	8	0
Childcare fees per two-year old in % of average wage (formal childcare and education services) (3)	13.6	12.2	5	23.1	55.8	24.7	24.6	10.6	0	12.6

Country abbreviations: DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, SW=Sweden, DE=Germany, NL= Netherlands, UK=United Kingdom, ES=Spain, CZ=Czech Republic, HU= Hungary, PL=Poland.

Source: 1) OECD 2013a, 2) Eurostat 2014, 3) OECD 2013b [data from 2008].

Figure 1. Gender role attitudes related to woman's role in work and family in ten European countries. Proportion that agrees with the three statements (men and women aged 20-65).



4.1. Country level assumptions

Previous studies have showed that the division of housework is contextually embedded. In countries with strong policy support for work-family reconciliation and less traditional gender norms, women are expected to be equally integrated into the labour market as men, and men to be more involved in the household. This institutional context may therefore weaken gender differences in the division of housework, especially among dual-working couples. In countries with weaker policy support for work-family reconciliation and more traditional gender norms,

women are expected to be the prime carer and men the prime earner. This institutional context may therefore reinforce gender differences in the division of housework. We can therefore expect that (H4) *strong policy support for work-family reconciliation and less traditional gender norms generate smaller gender differences in the division of housework, and that weaker policy support and more traditional gender norms generate larger gender differences.*

5. Data and methods

The present study uses data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2010/11, applied in 20 European countries. The sample is representative of all persons older than 15 years in each country. The present study uses data from ten countries including 7,761 respondents aged 18-65, living with an opposite sex partner. Multivariate linear regressions are the tool of analysis.³

Three dependent variables are used, measuring different aspects of the division of housework: (1) men's share of all housework during a week, (2) women's housework hours and (3) men's housework hours. Housework includes cooking, washing, cleaning, care of clothes, shopping, and maintenance of property. Childcare and leisure activities are not included in the ESS-data. Only one person in the household answered the questions about themselves and their partner.⁴ Given the fact that respondents generally overestimate their own housework contribution and underestimate their spouse's contribution due to social desirability (Coltrane 2000; Kamo 2000), the variables are calculated as follows as to reduce bias in housework reporting: Men's share of the total housework regardless of the gender of the respondent. Women's housework hours are based on the male respondent's estimate regarding their spouse, and the female respondent's own estimate. Men's housework hours is estimated accordingly.

The main independent variable of interest is couple earner types, based on the combination of both parties' occupational position. The variable is divided into six categories: *Dual-career couples*: both the man and woman have managerial or professional positions, based on the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO88), major groups 1-4 (ILO 2014). *Dual-earner couples*: neither the man nor the woman have managerial or professional positions. *Male-career couples*: dual-earner couples in which only the man have a managerial or professional positions. *Female-career couples*: dual-earner couples in which only the woman have a managerial or professional positions. The analysis includes also *male single-earner couples*, regardless of the man's occupational position, and *female single-earner couples* regardless of the woman's occupational position.

Various indicators of time availability and other relative resources (apart from couple's occupational position) are included in the analysis. Indicator of time availability is the man's and woman's working hours, each divided into three categories: (1) less than 35 hours per week, (2) 35-40 hours per week and (3) more than 40 hours per week. Indicators of relative

³ Weights are used to correct for differences in sample design (ESS 2011).

⁴ The questions asked were "About how many hours a week, in total, do you personally spend on housework?", and "About how many hours a week does your partner spend on housework?".

resources are relative level of education and woman's economic dependency. Couple's education is categorised as: (1) both parties have less than tertiary education, (2) both parties have tertiary education, (3) man have higher education than the woman, regardless of level, and (4) woman have higher education than the man, regardless of level. Woman's economic dependency is based on the stated proportion of household income provided by the respondent. The variable range from 0 (very small) to 4 (very large proportion), yet are treated as a continuous variable. If the respondent is a man, the scale is reversed, hence low value indicate that the woman's economic dependency is high.

To control for gender ideology, gender role attitudes related to work and family is included in the analysis. The gender role measure is a summarised index (range 0-8) based on two statements: "women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family" and "men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce". The Cronbach's Alpha for the two items is 0.55, which is somewhat low but applicable. The data is restricted only to respondent's gender attitudes, yet previous studies have suggested that men's and women's gender attitudes, within the same institutional context, are rather similar (Fahlén 2013). This is tested and confirmed in the this study by comparing the mean value of gender role attitudes between men and women across the ten countries included in this study, and by testing for interactions between respondent's gender and the gender role attitude measure. No such interactions were found.

Country dummies are included to account for country differences in the division of housework. Other control variables included are woman's age, respondent's gender and family structure. Earlier studies have found that the presence of younger children and the number of children increase the time spent on housework (Anxo et al 2011; Davies and Greenstein 2004).

Table 2. Standardised index scores of work-family policies and gender norms.

	<i>Work-family policy index</i>	<i>Gender norm index</i>
Denmark	3.55	-4.57
Finland	1.40	-2.94
Sweden	4.68	-3.20
Germany	0.39	0.84
Netherlands	-3.82	-0.85
United Kingdom	-2.86	0.02
Spain	-0.95	1.04
Czech Republic	-1.80	2.53
Hungary	1.45	3.47
Poland	-2.04	3.67
Correlation		-0.55

Two standardised indices have been constructed to capture institutional differences regarding gender norms and work-family reconciliation policies (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Each indicator, in both indices, is transformed into z-scores, denoting standard deviations from the mean, and summarised into an index. In the work-family reconciliation policies, maternity and parental leave are added together prior to the z-score transformation, as these leaves most often are used by the mothers. High scores in the work-family reconciliation policies denote more policy support for work-family reconciliation and high gender norm

index scores indicate more traditional gender norms. The correlation between the two indices is -0.55 (Table 2).

6. Results

The first concern is to examine if the division of housework vary by couple earner types. The descriptive statistics (Table 3) show that men’s average share of the total housework is around 30 percent, and do about 8 hours of housework per week. The average for women is around 19 hours. Dual-career couples tend to share housework more equal than are dual-earner couples, male-career earner couples and male single-earner couples. Most unequal division of housework is found among the male-single earner. Contrary to what was expected, female-career earner couples and female single-earner couples divide the housework most equal. Still, women do most of the housework regardless of couple earner types (Table 3)

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables by average and by couple earner types in the working sample (men and women aged 20-65, living in a couple).

	<i>Men's share of housework</i>	<i>Women's housework hours</i>	<i>Men's housework hours</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Dual-earner couples	29.7	19.0	8.0	3,672	47.3
Dual-career couples	35.3	14.7	7.9	930	12
Male-career couples	30.7	16.5	7.1	1,056	13.6
Female-career couples	36.4	14.6	8.4	741	9.6
Male single-earner couples	21.6	29.6	7.4	986	12.7
Female single-earner couples	40.2	17.2	12.7	376	4.8
<i>Average</i>	30.6	19.0	8.1	7,761	100

To investigate the association between couple earner types and the division of housework, multivariate linear regressions are conducted, with separated analyses by the three indicators of the division of housework (Table 4). The first model (1:1), regarding men’s share of housework, includes only the couple earner types. In the second model (1:2) working hours, relative resources and gender role attitudes are introduced along with respondent’s age, respondent’s gender and family structure. This is to test if these factors moderate the association between couple earner types and the division of housework. In the last model (1:3) countries are included in the analyses to account for potential variations in couple earner types and the other control variables by country, and to detect country differences in the division of housework which cannot be explained by variations in the other independent variables. To further examine the underlying causes of men’s share of housework, women’s and men’s actual housework hours are considered. These analyses are conducted in one step only (Model 2 and Model 3).

In Model 1:1, men’s average share of the housework in dual-earner couples is less than 30 percent. Corroborating the first assumption that dual-career couples share the housework more equally (H1), men’s contribution to the total housework is 5.7 percentage points higher in dual-career couples, compared with dual-earner couples. The second assumption (H2), that the division of housework is more unequal in male-career couples and single male-earner, is

only supported in regard to male single-earner couples where men's share of the household is 8.1 percentage point lower compared with dual-earner couples. The third assumption (H3), that female-career couples and single female-earner couples compensate their less traditional division of paid work by a more traditional division of housework, is not supported. Instead we find that men's share of the housework is higher in female-career couples (6.8 percentage points) and female single-earner couples (10.6 percentage point), compared with dual-earner couples.

Table 4. OLS regressions of the division of housework with separate analyses by men's share of housework, women's housework hour and men's housework hours (HH's). Unstandardized b-coefficients.

	<i>Men's share of housework</i>			<i>Women's HH's</i>	<i>Men's HH's</i>
	Model 1:1	Model 1:2	Model 1:3	Model 2	Model 3
Couple types					
<i>Dual-earner couples (ref.)</i>					
Dual-career couples	5.65 ***	2.00 **	2.02 **	-2.27 ***	-0.37
Male-career couples	1.02	1.56 **	1.36 *	-1.74 ***	-0.24
Female-career couples	6.78 ***	2.78 ***	2.87 ***	-2.17 ***	0.01
Male single-earner	-8.11 ***	-3.82 ***	-3.99 ***	6.46 ***	-0.57
Female single-earner	10.58 ***	3.89 ***	4.31 ***	-0.24	2.61 ***
Woman's work hours					
<i>35-40 h/w (ref.)</i>					
<35 h/w		-5.25 ***	-4.69 ***	2.75 ***	-0.63 **
>40 h/w		1.11	1.05	-0.08	-0.04
Man's work hours					
<i>35-40 h/w (ref.)</i>					
<35 h/w		4.69 ***	4.57 ***	-1.00 *	1.73 ***
>40 h/w		-4.86 ***	-4.80 ***	0.94 **	-1.46 ***
Couple's education					
<i>Both lower educ. (ref.)</i>					
Both tertiary level		3.53 ***	3.58 ***	-1.88 ***	0.42
Man higher education		-0.67	-0.45	-0.29	-0.52 *
Woman higher education		0.98	0.72	-0.27	-0.02
Woman's economic dependency					
Eco. dep.^2		4.63 ***	4.08 ***	-3.55 ***	0.37
Gender role attitudes		-0.67 ***	-0.52 ***	0.71 ***	0.02
		1.30 ***	0.96 ***	-0.50 ***	0.12 *
Respondent's gender					
Woman=1 (Man ref.)		-5.52 ***	-5.34 ***	1.00 ***	-1.34 ***
Age (woman)		-0.14 ***	-0.14 ***	0.16 ***	0.02
Family composition					
<i>Childless (ref.)</i>					
Child age 1-6		-2.42 **	-2.56 ***	3.15 ***	0.71 **
Child age 7+		-3.13 ***	-2.93 ***	0.41	-0.08
Moved out		-0.14	-0.88	1.40 **	0.91 **
Number of children		-0.79 **	-0.92 ***	2.15 ***	0.56 ***
Countries					
<i>Sweden (ref.)</i>					
Denmark			-3.88 ***	-0.65	-1.63 ***
Finland			-2.04 *	-0.66	-1.41 ***
Germany			-7.99 ***	3.07 ***	-1.31 ***
Netherlands			-6.99 ***	1.94 ***	-1.50 ***
United Kingdom			-6.90 ***	-0.88	-2.47 ***
Spain			-8.14 ***	5.37 ***	-0.77
Czech republic			-5.06 ***	5.56 ***	1.56 ***
Hungary			-9.39 ***	9.26 ***	0.71
Poland			-4.81 ***	10.57 ***	3.07 ***
Constant	29.67 ***	34.47 ***	41.97 ***	8.63 ***	7.15 ***
Adj. R	0.06	0.23	0.25	0.29	0.09
N	7761	7761	7761	7761	7761

***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05

The difference in men's share of the housework across couple earner types decreases when accounting for the time availability indicator, relative resources, gender role attitude, woman's age, and family structure (Model 1:2). These factors increase the explained variance in the dependent variable with 17 percentage points, and the major contribution derives from the couples' working hours and relative resources. Nevertheless, the pattern remains the same; men's share of the housework is higher in dual-career couples (2 percentage points), female-career couples (2.8 percentage points) and female single-earner couples (3.9 percentage point), and lower in male single-earner couples (-3.8 percentage points), compared with dual-earner couples. Also men in male-career couples contribute to the housework with about 1.6 percentage points more than are men in dual-career couples. In the last model (1:3), countries are included. The results suggest that the variation in the division of housework across countries does not to any higher extent alter the association between couple earner types, or the other independent variables, in regard to men's share of the housework.

To further unravel the underlying mechanism of the diversity across couple earner types, women's and men's actual housework hours is considered (Model 2 and Model 3). The result suggests that men's more equal share of the housework in dual-career couples and female-career couples mainly related to the fact that women in these couple types spend about 2.17-2.27 hour less on housework, compared with women in dual-earner couples (Model 2). The difference between couple earner types in regard to men's actual housework hours is only minor, except in female-single earner couples where men on average spend 2.6 hours more on housework per week compared with dual-earner couples. (Model 3).

The result in regard to the control variables lends support for the theories discussed in previous section. Working hours, especially women's working hours, display a clear association with the division of housework; men's share of the housework decreases, while women's actual housework hours increases, if the woman works part-time (Model 1:3; Model 2). Long work hours mainly reduce men's time devoted to housework (Model 1:3; Model 3). This support the time availability assumption, i.e. the more hours spend on the labour market the less time is devoted to housework. In addition, high educational level within the couple has a slight equalizing impact on men's share of the housework (Model 1:3), however this is mainly a result of the fact that women in dual-tertiary couples spend fewer hours on housework than women in low educated couples (Model 2). Men's share of the housework increase when women's dependency decreases (Model 1:3). As suggested by the gender approach, this association is slightly curvilinear, implying that the increase of men's share evens out the when women's income contribution is high. This is also observed for women's actual housework hours (Model 2), but not for men's actual housework hours (Model 3), suggesting that women tend compensate their strong economic dependency with more traditional division of housework. Further, the gender ideology approach suggests that less traditional gender norms is associated with a more equal division of housework, which is supported by the results. Men's share of the housework is larger in couples with less traditional gender role attitudes (Model 1:3). Again this is mainly a result of the fact that women in such couples does less housework (Model 2), suggesting that a more egalitarian gender ideology mainly reduce women's housework. Considering the family structure, having

children clearly changes the division of housework. Men’s share of the housework decreases with the age of the youngest child and the number of children in the household, compared with those without children (Model 1:3). This is mainly due to mothers increasing their hours of housework when the child is young, or by the number of children (Model 2). The result also shows vast variation across countries; men’s share of the housework is larger in Sweden than in the other countries (Model 1:3). Women in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK spend the least amount of time on housework (Model 2), while men in Sweden, the Czech Republic and Poland spend the most time on housework (Model 3). No significant interactions between countries and the other independent variables were found.

6.1 Policies, norms and the division of housework

To explore the relationship between institutional context and the division of housework, the unadjusted mean scores of men’s share of the housework is considered, as well as the gender difference between women’s and men’s average housework hours, based on the values in Table 5. We already know that time availability factors, relative resources, gender ideologies and family structure affect the division of housework, and the unadjusted means scores capture the country specific average regardless of these other factors. This section focuses on dual-earner couples and dual-career couples only.

Table 5. Unadjusted mean of men’s share of housework, women’s housework hours, men’s housework hours, and gender difference in housework hours.


	Men’s share of the housework		Women’s housework hours		Men’s housework hours		Gender difference in housework hours	
	Dual-earner couples	Dual-career couples	Dual-earner couples	Dual-career couples	Dual-earner couples	Dual-career couples	Dual-earner couples	Dual-career couples
Denmark	33.9	40.4	14.0	11.7	7.2	8.6	6.8	3.1
Finland	37.3	40.1	14.0	10.6	8.0	7.0	5.9	3.6
Sweden	38.0	41.1	14.7	12.6	9.0	9.0	5.7	3.6
Germany	25.9	29.4	19.5	16.6	6.9	6.4	12.6	10.1
Netherlands	25.2	34.7	19.2	13.0	6.5	6.5	12.8	6.4
United Kingdom	27.5	33.1	15.7	12.5	6.0	5.6	9.7	6.9
Spain	27.6	34.5	21.3	15.0	7.8	9.2	13.6	5.8
Czech Republic	29.5	33.1	21.6	18.2	9.7	9.2	11.9	9.0
Hungary	26.7	27.5	24.3	19.8	9.7	7.6	14.7	12.2
Poland	29.7	35.3	27.5	22.1	11.3	11.6	16.2	10.6

We expected strong policy support for work-family reconciliation and less traditional gender norms to generate smaller gender differences in time spent on housework, and that weaker policy support and more traditional gender norms generate larger gender differences in the division of housework (H4). Figure 2 and Figure 3 confirm this assumption to some extent, yet somewhat different for dual-earner couples and dual-career couples and by policies and norms.

The association between work-family policy index and men’s share of the housework is more curvilinear for dual-career couples, seen in the R2 quadratic value, compared with the R2 linear value. Nevertheless, the association is slightly stronger for dual-earner couples, indicating that men in dual-earner couples in countries with stronger support for work-family


reconciliation do a larger share of the housework (Figure 2.1). Here we find the Nordic countries, though men's average share of the housework among dual-earner couples is less than 40 percent. This association is less straightforward for dual-career couples, yet men's share of the housework is largest in countries with stronger policy support for work-family reconciliation. However, men's share is larger in countries with the weakest support, such as the Netherlands and the UK, compared with countries with more intermediate work-family reconciliation policies, such as Spain, Germany and Hungary (Figure 2.1). The gender difference in housework is smaller in countries with stronger support for work-family reconciliation and larger in countries with weaker policy support, yet this association is less straightforward among the dual-career couples (Figure 2:2).

Figure 2. Work-family policy index and the division of housework by couple type and countries (R2 value for linear and curvilinear estimates).



The association between gender norm index and men's share of the housework is fairly strong for both dual-earner couples and dual-career couples, yet more linear for dual-career couples (Figure 3:1). Even though this association is slightly stronger for dual-career couples, we can observe that regardless of dual-couple type, men in countries with less traditional gender norms tend to do a larger share of the housework. The association between norms and gender difference in housework hours is even stronger, and rather linear (Figure 3:2). The gender difference in housework is largest in countries with more traditional gender norms, such as the CEE countries, and smallest in countries with less traditional gender norms, such as the Nordic countries.

Figure 3. Gender norm index and the division of housework by couple type and countries (R2 value for linear and curvilinear estimates of the trendline).



7. Summary and conclusions

While women have increased their labour force participation during the past decades, men have not increased their housework participation to the same extent. The aim of this article was to examine the division of housework among various earner types, and to test if the relative resources within the couple, time spent on paid work, gender role attitudes and family structure, moderate variations in unpaid work between different couple earner types. The objective was also to examine if the division of housework vary across different welfare regimes in terms of work-family reconciliation policies and gender norms.

The empirical analysis shows that dual-career couples as well as male-career couples, female-career couples and female single-earner couples share the housework more equally compared with dual-earner couples. The difference in man's share of the housework across couple earner types decreases, but are not totally reduced, when controlling for the time availability indicator, relative resources, gender role attitude, family structure and country differences. The difference across earner-type couples remains even after these factors are included in the analysis. The result also shows, consistent with previous research, that time availability, relative resources and gender ideology have an important impact on the division of housework (e.g. Evertsson and Neramo 2007; Fuwa 2004; Killewald and Gough 2010; Kan 2008). Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that occupational position within the couple is a relevant aspect for understating how time is allocated to cope with work and home demands.

To further examine the underlying causes of men's share of housework, women's and men's actual housework hours were considered. These results indicate that the differences in men's share of the total housework, across couple earner types, are mainly due to women's

actual housework hours, meaning that women, especially in dual-career couples and female-career couples perform less housework compared to women in dual-earner couples. These results confirm previous studies that have shown that the diminishing gender gap in housework is an effect of women decreasing their housework hours rather than men increasing their hours (Brittman et al. 2003; Evertsson and Neramo 2004; Hook 2010). The results do not totally corroborate the gender approach, which suggests that couples with less traditional economic relationship tends to compensate with more traditional division of housework (Brittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Neramo 2004; Greenstein 2000). However, this seems to apply when measuring woman's economic dependency. Nevertheless, results regarding men's and women's actual housework hours suggest that occupational position matters more for women than for men, as only minor difference across couple types were found among men. It also suggests that career women have managed to reduce their housework, but not as a result of increased housework by their partner. These couples may have solved the constraints related to work and home demands by substituting the unpaid work by outsourcing certain household tasks to the market, as suggested by Baxter et al. (2009). Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this cannot be verified.

In a gender and comparative perspective, the institutional approach contributes to the understanding of the gendered division of housework. Indeed, the results show vast variations in the division of housework across the ten European countries, which also vary between dual-earner couples and dual-career couples. The association between work-family reconciliation policies and men's share of the housework are slightly stronger for dual-earner couples, indicating that men in dual-earner couples in countries with stronger support for work-family reconciliation do a larger share of the housework, here we find the Nordic countries. We also find that men's share of the housework, among dual-earner couples, is smallest in Germany and the Netherlands. These are countries that support part-time work, mainly used by women, and part-time childcare, which shape an unequal division of paid work and translate into an unequal division of the housework. Also when considering the gender difference in actual housework hours we find similar result, with the smallest gender gap in the Nordic countries. The association is less straightforward for dual-career couples both in terms of man's share of the housework and the gender gap, but still the Nordic countries stand out, as dual-career tend to do more housework than elsewhere. Nevertheless, this suggests that dual-earner couples and dual-career couples face different challenges in regard to work and home demand and have different capabilities to cope with these challenges, especially in countries with weaker support for work-family reconciliation.

The analysis also shows that the gender difference in housework is largest in countries with more traditional gender norms, this hold for both dual-earner couples and dual-career couples. This suggests that gender norms may be harder to challenge in these countries, regardless of couple types, hence women adapt to these norms by spending more times on housework. As a result they are more vulnerable to a double workload.

The gendered division of housework is an important factor contributing to the insistent gender inequality in society at large. This study have shown that institutional context shape gender roles differently. This is most clear in regard to gender norms. However, in the Nordic

countries – with policies encouraging a more equally shared division of caring and earning responsibilities – display a relatively small gender gap in the division of housework. In contrast, the CEE-countries – with policies promoting a more traditional division of paid and unpaid work – display a large gender gap in the division of housework. This suggests that the design of work-family reconciliation policies may also have a relevant role in shaping gender differences across countries.

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