Contested citizenship in France: the republican politics of identity and integration

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The 2012 French presidential campaign, which ended with the election of a Socialist president in May, put immigration—once again—at the heart of public debate and societal choices. While the politicization of immigration issues does not begin in the 2000s, the sequence of events opened by the appointment of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002 as Interior Minister in the Raffarin government made immigration a core issue before it was eclipsed—for only a few months—by the impact of the financial and subsequent economic crisis that hit Europe. Even more than his predecessors, Nicolas Sarkozy addressed immigration in its three increasingly intermingled aspects: the management of migration flows; the integration processes; the fight against discrimination and the promotion of diversity. Indeed, he went so far as to make it one of the *core identity themes* of his political discourse. In this field, as in others, Nicolas Sarkozy took a proactive stance that sought to break with earlier policies. However, this did not prevent a string of reversals and failures to meet the stated goals.

The creation of the "Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Supportive Development" in 2007 and the unexpected launch of a "national conversation on national identity" in December 2009 constituted a major revision of—if not a challenge to—the "grand bargain" (Hollifield, 1994) that had shaped immigration and integration policies since the late 1980s, transcending changes in political majorities. That bargain consisted in restricting immigration flows in exchange for opening French society to diversity. The will to reassert the preeminent role of national identity in fostering social cohesion marked a toughening of the "immigrants' duty" clause in the "republican contract" and the instrumentalization of national identity for exclusionary purposes (Noirel, 2007). The debate on national identity thus gave prominence to the question of loyalty, which weighs constantly on immigrants and their descendants. While the debate did not lead to spectacular reforms of nationality law, it was a further step in the nationalist reaction that tends to converge toward the "closed, xenophobic, and even racist nationalism" (Taguieff, 1995: 14). National identity is indeed a Janus-like concept that generates cohesion by incorporating individuals through citizenship, while at the same time excluding individuals by creating and reproducing hierarchies among members of the *polis*. The main divide between citizens and non-citizens is seconded by the hierarchical statuses based on gender, ethnicity and race. The "Sarkozy period" is characterized by a racialization of immigration policies and social issues, which N. Bancel describes as a "nationalist retraction" (Bancel, 2011).

This paper revisits the developments in French immigration and integration policies of the past decade, placing them in the longer history of the construction of the integration model. We assess the legacy of the "Sarkozy period" (2002-2012) in the fields of immigration (Part 1), integration (Part 2), and national belongings (Part 3). In Part 3, we use the findings of the "Trajectories and Origins" (Trajectoires et Origines: hereafter TeO) Survey, conducted by INED and INSEE in 2008-2009 on a sample of 22,000 immigrants, children of immigrants, and persons whose families have been French for two generations (Beauchemin et al., 2010), to revisit the foundations of national identity as a "performance."

1. The immigration policies: discourses and reversals

Immigration was the first area in which where Nicolas Sarkozy implemented his break-with-the-past policy. On his appointment as Interior Minister in 2002, he introduced a series of laws to reform entry and residence conditions for foreigners, while adopting a policy that linked immigration and integration in a clearly coercive spirit. But when we screen out the bills passed and the administrative, legal, and police practices, can we truly characterize the immigration policies since 2002 as a departure from the past? Judging from the controversies and clashes triggered by these policies, there seems little doubt that the republican consensus over immigration management was transgressed. Yet it is hard to separate the real changes introduced by the four laws voted in eight years from the hyper-proactive and aggressive communication tone adopted by Nicolas Sarkozy as well as his successors at the Interior Ministry. In this field, the impact of announcements is as significant as concrete achievements. Beyond the dissuasive effects on would-be immigrants, the rhetoric of the hard stick against immigration is targeting public opinion. So leaving aside the rhetorical effects, we can try to evaluate how successful was the new immigration policy to meet its own goals.

First, the laws. Rather than a break with the past, Danièle Lochak coins the suggestive image of a dreadful path dependency to describe the common inspiration behind the laws enacted since 1974 (Lochak, 2011). The replacement of the *Ordonnance* of 1945 by the Code for Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Asylum-Seekers (Code d'Entrée et de Séjour des Étrangers et des Demandeurs d'Asile: CESEDA) in March 2005 can serve as the marker for the policy switch toward a mainly coercive management of immigration flows (Slama, 2006). This entailed an unprecedented administrative integration of services involved in immigration management under the authority of the Ministry for Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Supportive Development: visa delivery, naturalization, asylum and integration policy. In addition, prerogatives were transferred from the judiciary to administrative authorities (particularly for decisions regarding illegal residence and expulsion procedures) and powers previously held by central government were devolved to Prefects.

The four immigration laws passed in 2002-2012 do not, strictly speaking, represent a decisive break with the previous legal-political framework. They did entail the following changes: longer waiting period for obtaining residence permits; their replacement by "long-stay visas"; broader use of short-term permits to be renewed several times before issuance of a permanent permit; and more complicated conditions for family reunification and entry of French nationals' spouses. However, this tightening should be viewed as a significant narrowing of opportunities for migrating to France, not as a radical change of course. In a sense, the red line was not crossed—but not for lack of trying.

The first significant turning point came with the new framing of the "*immigration choisie*" (Chosen immigration*)*. By stressing the need to open the doors to highly skilled migrants, the 2003 Immigration Act marked a departure from the zero-immigration model theorized by Charles Pasqua, then Interior Minister, in 1993. The concept gained strength with the second "Sarkozy Act" in 2006 which "creates new legal instruments to better regulate immigration, combat misuse of procedures, and promote chosen immigration and successful integration."[1] The *immigration choisie* cannot be understood without its corollary of *immigration subie* ("unwanted immigration"), which designates the forms of immigration, mostly of family members, blamed for the integration difficulties encountered by immigrants to France.

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[1] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/immigration_integration.asp.

Labor immigration was thus officially reopened for the first time since 1974. The government published a list of occupations facing labor shortages, for which the hiring of foreign workers was not only authorized but desirable. In 2007, the new Immigration Minister, Brice Hortefeux, announced the government's goal of raising labor immigration from 10% to 50% of total annual flows. The easing of conditions for residence permits to highly skilled migrants was supposed to boost the economically motivated share of immigration, while the additional constraints on family reunification and spouses of French nationals would reduce the proportion of "undesirable" immigration. Five years later, this policy has clearly failed. Between 2006 and 2010, economic immigration rose from 6% to 9% of entries, whereas family immigration declined modestly from 54% to 44%. Ultimately, the inertia of immigration flows underscores the limits of the political management of immigration, already identified since their inceptions in 1946-1950 (Tapinos, 1975). In this field, nothing has ever turned out the way authorities had expected.

Indeed, the tools for achieving a qualitative transformation of immigration seem ineffective. A estimate done by the Mazeaud Commission (2008) gave that only 5% of annual inflows could be controlled "at the government's discretion." An explanation of the government's relative powerlessness to enforce its policy orientations resides in the legal supervision of the Constitutional Council and the Council of State (Hollifield, 1994; Weil, 1991) and of the European Union (EU) directives that frame the immigration policies of the Member States. The EU has adopted several directives to (1) establish a common legal framework defining conditions for migrants' entry and residence, and (2) promote a coordination of national policies and harmonize the governance of migration flows. The directives include: a directive on long-term residence status,[2] a plan to harmonize statistics,[3] a directive on family reunification (2003), an action plan against illegal migration (2002), a "return" directive (2008), and a "European blue card" directive (2009). A further step in this harmonization process was the signing of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in 2008 (Guiraudon, 2010). This dual framework—domestic and external—forces national immigration policies to respect immigrants' basic rights and avoids crossing the red line into State racism.

The many restrictions on family migration delay immigrants' plans to live together as a family, but cannot permanently stop such plans from being fulfilled. Family migration is no longer an induced migration as in the 1970s and 1980s. Family reunification does persist, but it is declining and has been largely replaced by the arrival of family members of French nationals, mainly their spouses. The number of marriages of French nationals abroad reached 47,000 in 2010 and is expected to stay at that level because of the globalization of marriage markets. A decrease in family migration seems unlikely to happen at a short term.

The government contemplated introducing "restrictive migration quotas" based on migrants' skills and/or nationality. The notion in itself is not new and echoes the point system implemented in Germany or Canada, even though the criteria of nationality has not been explicitly mentioned by any other immigration countries for a long time. The resurgence of ethnic selection challenges the "republican synthesis" (Weil, 2008). This attempt to control immigration failed as well. When asked for its opinion, the Constitutional Council confirmed that annual quotas on immigrants would be unconstitutional. The Mazeaud commission set up

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[2] European Council Directive 2003/109/EC of November 25, 2003.
[3] COM(2005) 375 final: "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics on migration and international protection," September 14, 2005.

to challenge this opinion concluded that quotas are "unachievable and worthless"—a verdict that closed the case.

Having failed to enact quotas, the government set quantitative targets for the number of deportations of undocumented migrants. Expulsions rose to nearly 30,000 in 2008, including almost 10,000 "voluntary returns" of Romanian or Bulgarian citizens. This highly controversial "quantitative" policy relied on a limitation of foreigners' right of appeal, an increase in the capacity of detention centers, and an increase in the number of expedited procedures condemned by human-rights and immigrant-defense NGOs. The gains achieved in carrying out procedures did not, however, reduce the social visibility of undocumented migrants (Martinez, 2011).

If immigration policy has failed to significantly alter the composition of migration flows, has it at least impacted their intensity? Although still very imperfect, migration statistics show that the suspension enacted in 1974 led to a steep drop in entries from 130,000 that year to 80,000 in 1975[4]. Entries of foreigners then settled at around 60,000 until the early 1980s, bottoming out at roughly 40,000 after the 1982 legalizations. The number started to rise again in the early 1990s to over 100,000 before leveling off at slightly over 200,000 in 2002-2005, then easing to around 190,000 since 2006. In the years in which the four successive immigration laws were enacted, the variations were weak and incommensurate with the degree of political publicity over the issue. In fact, these swings seem largely due to economic conditions, international geopolitical dynamics, and the inertia generated by the composition and intensity of earlier flows.

If the voluntarism showed during Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency did not substantially alter the intensity and composition of migration flows, the living conditions of immigrants—whether legal or illegal—were heavily affected by the tightening of controls and the erosion of their legal status. The *immigration choisie* was soon thwarted by the economic crisis, which shut the door that had been timidly opened, and the concurrent stigmatization campaign against immigrants suspected of resisting integration. Despite studies showing the net positive contribution of immigration not only to the economy but also to the welfare accounts (Chojnicki and Ragot, 2011; Monso, 2008), the image of immigrants as a burden on French society has come to prevail.

2. Failures of the French integration model

The linkage between new immigration and the integration of immigrants already settled in France began in the late 1980s but gained momentum in the 2000s. Previously, the connection had been one of the rhetorical arguments to justify closing the borders—i.e., restricting entries to secure the residence of immigrants already in France. The key argument was that the continuous inflow of new immigrants—the "invasion," as former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing put it[5]—triggers xenophobic and racist reactions, and worsens the status of existing immigrants. While one of the most widespread clichés on immigration, it has never been demonstrated. In the 2000s, what was essentially rhetoric has turned into the new immigration Acts.

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[4] Migrations of Algerians are counted separately and should be added to these figures: in 1974, 550,000 entries and nearly 540,000 exits have been recorded.

[5] "This type of problem that we shall have to face is shifting from immigration […] to invasion," statement to *Figaro Magazine*, September 21, 1991.

The 2003 Act required immigrants to demonstrate their "republican integration" in order to be granted their right of residence. This perceptible shift was confirmed by the 2006 and 2007 Acts. Integration was no longer a goal to be reached in one or more generations, but a prerequisite for obtaining a residence permit (with minimal but explicit criteria). A "reception and integration contract," which became compulsory in 2006, is signed when the first residence permit is issued. It includes a commitment to abide by the laws and values of the Republic, a civic-education training day,[6] and a language test. In this context, the integration criteria proved to act as an indirect method for selecting on the basis of ethnic origin, since these criteria tend to favor—on a cultural basis—certain profiles of immigrants deemed easier to assimilate than others. Moreover, the assessment of the civic and linguistic skills of applicants largely relies on the subjectivity of consular staff or (in France) *préfecture* officials.

The integration framing has thus opened a large space of subjective and discretionary practices (Lochak, 2006). It assumes that immigration applicants have already adjusted or can be adjusted to the destination society, and that they possess sufficient financial and cognitive resources to settle without placing an additional burden on the country. The imposition of "civic integration" criteria not only for naturalization applicants, but also for immigrants applying for residence in several European countries (Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, and France) signals a coercive reaction to the deep changes triggered by cultural diversity (Joppke, 2007; Goodman, 2010).

The insistence on the immigrants' acceptance of the norms and values of the destination society is not, strictly speaking, a novelty in France, whose model is essentially assimilationist (Simon and Sala Pala, 2009). Although the term "national model" is strongly criticized in comparative studies (Bertossi and Duyvendack, 2009), we can make the case that France's "republican" approach to integration is far more assimilationist than that of the United Kingdom or, until recently, the Netherlands. Even if integration policies have been increasingly Europeanized with the Tampere summit in 1999, the *Basic Common Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy* in 2004, and the common agenda for integration of 2005, national idiosyncrasies do persist. What does "assimilationist" mean in the French context? The High Council for Integration (HCI) has formalized the official definition of integration: "Integration consists in fostering the active participation, in the society as a whole, of all women and men who will be living permanently on our soil, by accepting without ulterior motives the persistence of specificities, particularly of a cultural nature, but emphasizing the similarities and convergences in the equality of rights and duties, in order to ensure the cohesion of our social fabric. […] It postulates the participation of differences in a common project and not, like assimilation, their elimination, or on the contrary, as with inclusion [French: *insertion*], the guarantee that will ensure their long-term survival" (HCI, 1993). The HCI has remained deliberately vague about the balance between the rights and duties of "women and men who will be living permanently on our soil," and especially about the changes needed in French society to accommodate newcomers and the degree of tolerance for the public expression of differences. The means to achieve integration are described as follows: proficiency in French; the dispersion of the immigrant population across residential areas; the gradual weakening of community ties and their replacement by an individualized relationship with the State; and, above all, the acquisition of French nationality in two generations. According to this vision, once they have become French, immigrants and—even

more so—their children born in France will no longer stand apart as distinct elements in society. In exchange, they will obtain equal access to all spheres of social life.

The discourse underlying integration policy rests on an ambivalent vision of the ever more visible signs of the multicultural character of French society. The concrete signs of belongings to ethno-cultural or religious minorities in the public arena are rapidly stigmatized as expression of "communitarism" and the minorities receive injunctions to return to the collective norm. Concentrations of ethnic minorities in deprived neighborhoods –portrayed as ethnic ghettos- are interpreted not only as the consequence of segregation processes, but also as a threat to national cohesion. The "ghetto" is treated as a source of "identitarian closure." This vision feeds on fantasies of "parallel societies"—as in the United Kingdom and Germany—where dominant social and cultural norms, as well as the language and religious practices, tend to be those of the designated group: immigrants, or sub-Saharan Africans and North Africans, or Muslims, as the case may be.

Yet such visibility is the outcome of a lasting change in the composition of the large urban metropolitan areas, which have become more ethnically diverse than ever. The resumption of immigration flows in the second half of the 1990s and the transition to adulthood of the second generation of immigrants who arrived in the 1960s and 1970s translate into an unprecedented demographic presence of groups of immigrant origin. Over two generations, persons of immigrant origin accounted for an average 25% of the total population in metropolitan France (mainland + Corsica), but for up to 56% in the Paris region and 75% in the Seine-Saint-Denis *département* just north and east of Paris.[7] Their visibility is accentuated by the deep shift in immigrant geographical background. Until 1975, Europeans formed the majority of the immigrant stock: 63% of immigrants were European, *vs* 27% North and sub-Saharan African. In the past ten years, the overwhelming majority of newcomers came from North and sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In 2008, 42% of immigrants residing in France were born in an African country and 10% in an Asian country. In 2010, 54% of foreigners admitted as residents came from Africa and 25% from Asia. These trends observed for immigrants are reproduced, with lags, in the second generation. In 2008, the second generation was still mainly of European origin among adults, but mostly of North and sub-Saharan African origin among the under-18s. The demographic data merely hint at what a basic observer in large urban centers—and especially their suburbs—would feel immediately: cities and neighborhoods are organized and stratified around ethno-racial and religious diversity.

The "immigrants" referred to in the debates over integration are thus largely of North and sub-Saharan African origin, more rarely of Asian or Turkish origin. They stem from a "post-colonial" immigration that is not only more visible but vulnerable to longer-lasting discriminations than those once directed at European immigrants (Simon, 2010). Their visibility challenges the main purpose of the integration model which is to assimilate outsiders into the national body politic by making them similar. The pivotal notion of the model is that institutions of integration —foremost among them, the school system—ensure the convergence of minority groups toward the majority population, into which they will ultimately melt and dissolve. The persistence of minority practices is tolerated, but only as a residue expected to fade away. The framework of the integration model is then clearly adverse to the need for more plasticity required for multicultural societies. The constant revision of norms and values that constitutes the core process of adjustment between minorities and the majority calls for an update of national identity. But the republican consensus that emerged in

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[7] Data from TeO Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008-2009, supplemented by the population census, INSEE, 2008.

the 1990s has in fact reasserted the supremacy of the majority over minorities. While emphasizing the reciprocity of exchanges, it organizes and justifies the immutability of national identity. By promoting uniformity against diversity, the republican model of integration is organizing the clash of norms and thus the subordination of minorities to the majority.

Among the various aspects that crystallize tensions around the definition of norms, Islam and its expressions have come to the forefront: the legislation on the headscarf (1989, 2004) and the burka (2009-2010); the street prayers denounced by Marine Le Pen of the National Front (12/2010) and debated by the then majority party, the UMP (05/2011); halal slaughter and the availability of halal food in school lunchrooms (03/2012); adjustments to working hours to meet religious obligations; the financing of mosques; the reservation of time slots at swimming pools for Muslim (or Jewish) women; etc. The media response to the survey coordinated by G. Kepel in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil (two cities in the Seine-Saint-Denis *département*) for the Institut Montaigne is symptomatic in this respect (Kepel et al., 2011). Conducted in 2010-2011, the local monograph published in 2011 shows how social and institutional life develops in a deprived and immigrant neighborhood. Most media commentary focused on the section of the report devoted to Islam's role in the structuring of the social bond. Coming as a revelation, the role played by religious-based community groups and networks was interpreted not as the mundane and expected reflection of the population composition in the neighborhoods studied, but as the sign of a failure of the integration model. As the title of weekly *Le Point* on November 1, 2012, -"L'islam sans gêne" ("Uninhibited Islam")- simply puts it, the issue of accommodations is perceived as excessive and ultimately *unreasonable*.

3. National identity and dual nationality: tilting at windmills

A final recurrent theme in the poisoned debates on immigration is the questioning of nationality law. Since the late nineteenth century, the nationality code has combined right of birthplace (*jus soli*) and right of blood (*jus sanguinis*) by guaranteeing the automatic acquisition of nationality after reaching the age of majority for children of foreigners born in France. A foreigner can also acquire nationality through marriage or naturalization. These provisions have been regularly challenged, and after an initial failure in 1986, a reform of the nationality code was eventually enacted in 1993 when the Right recaptured a parliamentary majority. The key concept behind the attacks against the nationality code is that citizenship should reflect and foster national sentiment. However, just as minorities are accused of not abiding by the rules of integration, French citizens of first- or second-generation immigrant origin are also suspected of having a flawed national identity and of lacking loyalty to their homeland. They have been described as "French on paper" (*des Français de papier*) by the Front National—an expression taken up by a section of the mainstream conservative parties. Alternatively, they have been called the "involuntary French" (*Français malgré eux*), a status deplored by the advocates of the 1993 reform, which introduced the need to "demonstrate a voluntary choice" for young people born in France to foreign parents as a substitute for their automatic acquisition of French nationality on coming of age.

These doubts on the national sentiment of French people of immigrant origin were fed by various incidents, notably the trauma caused by the jeering of the French national anthem (and not the Algerian anthem) during the friendly France-Algeria soccer game in Marseille on October 6, 2001 (Gastaut, 2008). The event is still referred to today, so much so that it is mentioned in the introduction to the report submitted in June 2011 by the Parliamentary

Information Mission on Nationality Law, chaired by Manuel Valls (the current minister of interior). The suspicions about the authenticity of national sentiment among French citizens of immigrant origin are directed at descendants of North and sub-Saharan Africans and almost never at descendants of European or Asian immigrants. This focus reveals a racialization of national identity that disrupts the traditional construct based on legally defined citizenship.

In fall 2010 and spring 2011, an exacerbated nationalist reaction prompted the National Front and Members of Parliament of the "popular Right" (*droite populaire*)[8] to challenge the right to dual nationality. A bill was introduced to abolish dual nationality on the grounds that it generated (or reflected) a deterioration of national sentiment and threatened national cohesion. Beyond the issue of national sentiment, it was argued that a choice was needed in regard to voting rights. The bill was eventually rejected in Parliament, but the attacks against the nationality code—deemed too loose—were extended by a tightening of naturalization procedures in February 2012.

The crystallization of controversies on the nationality code needs to be understood in the context of the historical formation of the French Nation-State. Countries that have adopted multiculturalism more or less officially (Canada, United States, Australia, United Kingdom) promote multiple national and/or ethnic identities as positive signs of a diverse heritage. By contrast, assimilationist countries tend to promote exclusive choices and to regard the preservation of an ethnic identity as the sign of incomplete assimilation (Bloemraad, 2007). Public assertions of a "hyphenated identity" combining references to a foreign culture or country and France are perceived negatively (Simon, 2005). This hostility against hyphenation reveals a vision of identities as a "finite stock." In other words, the feeling of belonging to a country should automatically result in a correlative weakness of the feeling of being French and thus a lack of stickiness of the national identity. This expectation is contradicted by the reality of multiple identities that individuals express by combining citizenships, belongings and ethnicities according to the contexts.

For evidence of this, we can turn to the findings of the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) Survey. First, the range of citizenships varies across generations of migration and countries of origin. As we know, acquisition of French nationality is almost automatic for children of immigrants born in France, and 95% of them are effectively French. The same is true of 28% of immigrants who arrived as adults and 59% of those who arrived as children ("generation 1.5" in the rest of this text). We observe major variations by country of origin, reflecting the time span of migration flows, the age of arrival in France, and the role of nationality in the relationships with the country of origin. The naturalization procedure itself adds a filter to the process. Despite its "openness," access to nationality is regulated by several selections including an "assimilation report" prepared by a *préfecture* official. The document comprises three parts: (1) details on migration, training, and occupational status (age at migration, educational attainment, and current employment), (2) proficiency in French, and (3) "inclusion in the French community." The third part records details on participation in local life and the applicant's links with the country of origin. The official must assess whether the applicant "seems to have assimilated our practices and customs." The philosophy of this procedure and its practical implementation have been well analyzed by A. Hajjat (2012). They are informed by a culturalist approach that does not match the vision of the political bond that (so it is argued) forms the basis of French citizenship. The decoding of the underlying criteria implemented in the naturalization procedure and citizenship induction ceremonies shows that

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[8] An authoritarian fraction close to the far right wing of the UMP.

the political context and social debates strongly influence the content assigned to citizenship and thus steer decision-making (Fassin and Mazouz, 2007). The pressure exerted by the context of the debate on national identity and the official circulars aimed at making the procedures more selective. The number of naturalizations fell from 91,000 in 2010 to 66,200 in 2011. This steep drop was due to a spectacular rise in rejections and delays based on language or cultural criteria. These criteria signal the emergence of a selection based on a *naturalization of naturalization*, to coin the expression of A. Sayad (1993). In other words, the newly naturalized must embody an ideal citizen who has incorporated the history, values, personality, and physical attributes of the Frenchman or Frenchwoman. The new French must "perform the nation".

The rise of multiple identities and belongings can be seen in the development of binationality among immigrants and second generations. French law allows dual nationality and does not require naturalized foreigners to renounce their former nationality. The same applies to children of foreigners born in France who may keep the nationality of their parents when becoming French. According to the TeO Survey, nearly half of the immigrants who acquire French nationality keep their former nationality. Fewer than 10% of immigrants from South-East Asia are binational, but more than two-thirds of North African immigrants, 55% of Turkish immigrants, and 43% of Portuguese immigrants combine French nationality with that of their country of origin. The proportions of binationals recorded in the 2008 TeO Survey greatly exceed those observed in 1992 in the Geographic Mobility and Social Integration Survey (Mobilité Géographique et Insertion Sociale: MGIS).[9] The percentage of binationals rose from 7% (MGIS) to 67% (TeO) among Algerian immigrants, and from 18% to 43% among Portuguese immigrants. Absent a significant legislative change since 1992, we can only conclude that immigrants' practices in regard to dual nationality have changed considerably. Immigrants' children also preserve a bond with their parents' nationality of origin. Nearly one-third of children of two immigrant parents still declare dual nationality. The proportion drops to 12% for second generations of mixed parentage.

Beyond citizenship, the TeO Survey covers the topic of national sentiment with separate questions on respondents' identification with their countri(es) of origin (or French overseas territory if they from one of those territories or a descendant of their inhabitants). For the second generations, the question is duplicated for each parent and refers to the countri(es) of origin of the immigrant mother and father. National sentiment runs relatively high among the majority population—of whom 98% say they feel French, indicating the absence of a significant crisis of national affiliation. The proportions are comparable for second generations of mixed parentage and are only slightly lower for children of immigrants (89%) and for generation 1.5 (84%). French national sentiment is obviously far less widespread among immigrants (52%), although one does observe a significant affiliation among naturalized citizens (79%). If 21% of immigrants who have become French show no national sentiment, more than half of foreign residents feel French—reaching as many as two-thirds of North African immigrants. If there is a result worth nothing here, it is not the lack of affiliation with national identity among immigrants and their children, but—on the contrary— the powerful attraction of that identity.

The complementary side of French national sentiment is affiliation with the country of origin. Routinely described as antithetical in public speeches, these allegiances and feelings of closeness toward several national entities are not necessarily perceived as contradictory by

[9] M. Tribalat, P. Simon, and B. Riandey, *De l'immigration à l'assimilation. Enquête sur les populations d'origine étrangère en France*, "La nationalité,", Paris: La Découverte, 1996, pp. 145-171.

immigrants and their offspring. But to what extent does the commitment to one country erode the commitment to the other, as if in a zero-sum game? In practice, we do observe the persistence of a tie with the countri(es) of origin (or that/those of the parents) across generations, for 84% of immigrants who arrived as adults and three-quarters of immigrants' children. However, that is not contradictory with the fact of feeling French. The combination of allegiances increases from the immigrants who arrived as adults (45% describe two feelings of affiliation) to the "1.5" generation (56%) and peaks in the second generation (66%). It then declines sharply among descendants with mixed parentage, of whom 58% report an exclusively French national sentiment. In fact, there is only a moderate correlation between the intensity of national sentiment for France and for the country of origin. The fear of dual loyalty as an obstacle to national cohesion therefore seems largely unfounded.

The TeO Survey results offer scant evidence to substantiate the accusations directed against dual nationals, as National Front leader Marine Le Pen wrote in a message to Members of Parliament: "Today, the multiplicity of affiliations with other nations is helping [...] to undermine our compatriots' acceptance of a common destiny."[10] The data, however, show a feeble impact of dual nationality on French national sentiment. Binational immigrants feel just as French as those who have dropped their former nationality (82% in both categories). In contrast, dual nationality is significantly linked with a stronger sentiment of affiliation with the country of origin (one's own country or that of one's parents). In other words, being binational is a sign of attachment to one's origins, but is not incompatible with a strong French national identity. The French dilemma thus resides in the respect for, and recognition of, the pluralism of identities rather than a weakness of national sentiment among the newly naturalized.

The mismatch between ethno-cultural origin and citizenship can be assessed through the acceptance of citizens with a "visible minority background as "one of us" by the majority group. A question in the TeO Survey records this acceptance from the standpoint of French citizen with an immigrant background. Respondent were asked to state whether they felt that they were perceived as French or not. Strikingly, while only 3% of members of the majority population give a negative answer, the proportion reaches 36% among respondents from French overseas *départements* (DOMs), over 50% for immigrants from North Africa and South-East Asia, and 65% for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. European immigrants are shielded from this *a priori* exclusion from the national community. Even more significantly, the exclusion from Frenchness persists for the North African, Asian, and sub-Saharan African second generations, despite a substantial decline with respect to the experience reported by first-generation immigrants from those regions. These finding tally with the results of the survey by S. Brouard and V. Tiberj, who find that citizens of North African, sub-Saharan African, and Turkish origin are indeed "French like the others" in terms of their participation and affiliation, but are not perceived as such (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005).

The legal citizenship of the members of visible minorities does not give them full assimilation to the national community, while European immigrants and their descendants avoid this negative othering. They *are* French, they *feel* French, but they don't *look* French. This gap tells a lot about the current status of the model of integration. The crisis of the model stems from two closely linked trends: first, the social and political visibility of post-colonial immigration, notably the descendants of North African and sub-Saharan immigrants; second, ethno-racial discrimination which target immigrants as French citizens of immigrant origin.

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[10] *Le Monde*, June 1, 2011.

Discrimination deeply challenges the integration model and its promises of equality. It contradicts the fiction of a community of citizens united in a shared national identity. In the late 1990s, the consensus view of integration came under challenge when the fight against discrimination was put on the political agenda (Simon, 2009). The implementation of an effective antidiscrimination policy has quickly reached its limits. Today, instead, the contradictions surrounding the tools and equipments to implement a proactive equality policy have eroded the progress achieved. The opposition to "positive discrimination" (the French equivalent of affirmative action) and the refusal to compile ethnic statistics that could be used to monitor equality have shown the difficulty—if not the impossibility—of linking the philosophy of antidiscrimination with that of integration. The French version of "color-blindness" deepens the ethno-racial divisions that it claims to circumvent. This French dilemma revives the dark side of national identity, the one that theorizes the unassimilable character of certain origins to justify an ethno-racial hierarchy which regulate access to power and privilege. Will the nationalist one-upmanship initiated by the previous government be halted by the socialist government elected in 2012? The first decisions taken by the new Interior Minister, Manuel Valls, do not constitute a decisive break: a bill granting foreigners the right to vote in local elections has been postponed if not shelved; the administrative organization for managing immigration, integration, and naturalization has been preserved; and the demolition of Roma camps and shanty-towns has been vigorously pursued. The main initiative to counteract the previous policy has focused on naturalizations, which are projected to return to their 2009 level of around 100,000 per year. These decisions (or lack of) demonstrate continuity with the Sarkozy's sequence, albeit a slight return to the open version of the nationality code. It testifies that beyond political shift, the Republican model of integration still frames and curtails the expression of ethnic diversity in France.

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