Gender Equality or Inequality: Becoming Registered Urban Residents during China's Massive Urbanization

Abstract

What has the rapid economic development and tremendous social changes shaped the gender inequality in China? The past literature has examined the gender gap on earnings or occupational attainment for either urban or rural residents, or rural migrants. However, less attention has been paid on the gender inequality on the attainment of urban household registration (*hukou*), which is crucial for not only rural migrants' occupational attainment, but also their access to social welfare. Using a 2008 nationally representative dataset with unique information on *hukou* conversion process, this paper attempts to examine the gender inequality in *hukou* conversion for rural migrants. The results surprisingly show equal chances for rural men and women in *hukou* conversion and exhibit a gender-specific pathway, with men mainly relying on educational or occupational channels, whereas women predominantly employing marriage, which almost offsets the advantages of men in educational and occupational channels. While this research specifically distinguishes the predictor and *de jure* channels of *hukou* conversion, empirical evidence shows that education, employment in state sector, and marriage to an urban spouse predict the access to multiple types of channels. Further, aside from the individual converters who achieve urban *hukou* as a result of their personal and family attributes, this study finds that rapid urbanization contributes considerably to the gender equality in achieving *hukou* conversion.

Introduction

The past three decades have witnessed the dramatic economic development in the People's Republic of China. One of the most prominent contributing factors is its huge population movement from rural to urban areas. What has happened to the gender inequality in the rapid development and urbanization process? Does it become more equal or unequal? This issue has attracted a large number of researchers to participate in this area. However, the majority of the past studies focus on the gender inequality in earnings and/or occupation attainment in urban China (e.g., Bauer et al., 1992; Bishop, Luo, and Wang, 2005; Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Li and Li, 2008; Cao and Hu, 2007; Chi and Li, 2008; Demurger et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008; Shu and Bian, 2002, 2003; Ng, 2004, 2007; He and Wu, 2014), or in rural China (e.g., Dong et al., 2004; Hare, 1999; Matthews and Nee, 2002; Meng and Miller, 1995; Meng, 1998; Rozelle et al., 2002), but less attention has been paid merely to the gender inequality within the rural-to-urban migrants.

It is well known that the rise of the feminist movement since the 1970s has attracted great attention among scholars on the link between gender and migration (Tienda and Booth 1988; Chant 1992; Lall, Selod, and Shalizi 2006; Mahler and Pessar 2006; Boyle and Halfacree 2005), or between gender and immigration (Sassen-Koob 1984; Kelson and DeLaet 1999; Fitzpatrick 1997; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Tastsoglou and Preston 2005), resulting in fruitful theories and empirical findings. Although there are also studies on the relationship between gender and migration in China, their analyses have predominantly concentrated on the gendered pattern of migration and occupational attainment (Yang and Guo 1999; Zhang and Pan 2012; Fan and Huang 1998; Fan 2003). But few studies have examined the gender inequality in crossing the institutional barrier, that is, obtaining local urban household

registration (*hukou*) status in urban areas, among the rural migrants. In fact, this is crucial to the rural migrants, because it not only affects their occupational attainment, but also indicates whether they are accepted by the local government and provided with the access to the social welfare benefits exclusively enjoyed by local urban residents.

Meanwhile, in contrast to most western societies, communist China enforces severe migration control through the *hukou* system for a long period of time in order to implement industrialization and maintain unequal resource allocation between rural and urban areas (Cheng and Selden 1994, 1997; Wang 2005; Chan 2009; Chan 1994; Solinger 1999). In both pre- and post-reform era, obtaining urban *hukou* status is persistently at stake for rural migrants, which determines the access to good jobs, education for one's children, housing, health care, and pensions (e.g., Cheng and Selden 1994; Chan 1994; Solinger 1999; Wu and Treiman 2004; Wang 2005). Thus it is meaningful to examine the gender inequality in *hukou* conversion during the massive urbanization in China.

Intriguingly, one often-cited research on *hukou* conversion observes that rural-origin women are about as likely as rural-origin men to obtain an urban *hukou* at zero-order level (i.e., without controlling for any covariates) —10.8% of women, compared to 11.8% of men, did so (Wu and Treiman 2004:376). Furthermore, when accounting for such covariates as education, occupational status, and other demographic characteristics, it surprisingly shows that rural women are more likely than rural men in achieving *hukou* conversion (Wu and Treiman 2004:376; Goldstein, Liang, and Goldstein 2000:225; Zhang and Treiman 2013:77).

Does is suggest that China has already entered an advanced phase of urbanization characterized by high level of gender equality? Or does it alternatively indicate that

the gender equality highly advocated by the communist China in the Maoist era has been successfully maintained after the economic reform? This claim does not seem to reconcile with the empirical findings that rural women are disadvantaged in China compared to rural men in various aspects of well-being such as parental investment in higher education (e.g., Park, 1992; Song, Appleton and Knight, 2006), and exposure to labor market discrimination (Honig and Hershatter, 1988; Fan and Huang, 1998; Huang, 2001; Solinger, 1999; Meng and Miller, 1995; Loscocco and Wang, 1992; Fan and Li, 2002; Fan, 2003; Knight and Song, 1995, 2005). Considering that higher education and state sector jobs are two important predictors of *hukou* conversion (e.g., Wu and Treiman, 2004; Chan and Zhang 1999), we are lead to believe that *hukou* conversion for rural women is likely to be lower than that of rural men rather than equal chances.

Using a national representative dataset with sufficient information on life history, this paper attempts to address the following questions: Is it true for the gender equality or even migrant women's net advantage over men in *hukou* conversion? If it is, how do we reconcile with the contradictory findings? Further, what channels do men and women employ in *hukou* mobility? Do they get equal access to these channels? Do the channels vary by gender? What are the major predictors for the access to these channels, and are there predictors with general predictive power for different types of channels?

This article is organized as follows. First, it briefly delineates the history of *hukou* system to show its importance for people's life chances and why people desire for it. Second, it demonstrates the main channels of *hukou* conversion and designs the analytical framework for solving the gender puzzle in *hukou* conversion and predicting the access to these channels. Third, it describes the data, variables, and

models. Fourth, it presents the results and interpretations. Next, based on descriptive analysis, it attempts to elaborate on the marriage process in *hukou* conversion to demonstrate the specific forms of upward mobility in the urbanization process. The conclusion and discussions will be found in the final section.

I. The Chinese Household Registration System

The *hukou* system was first set up in cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955 (State Council, 1955; Chan, 1994; Chan and Zhang, 1999). *Hukou* registration[1] is not only the principal basis for establishing identity and proof of citizenship, it is essential for nearly every aspect of daily life, such as the access to good jobs, education for one's children, housing, health care, and even the right to move to a city (Cheng and Selden, 1994; Chan, 1994; Solinger, 1999; Wu and Treiman, 2004; Wang, 2005). In the long history of *hukou* system, it has been conferred with two main functions, migration control and resource allocation. Before the economic reform in 1978, the establishment and tightening of the *hukou* system reflected an effort by the government to cope with population pressures in the course of China's rapid social industrialization (Cheng and Selden, 1994; Chan and Zhang, 1999; Wu and Treiman, 2004; Wang, 2004, 2005). During the majority of this period, rural-to-urban migration was severely restricted[2] and *hukou* conversion was also suppressed (Chan, 1994; Wu

[1] Chan and Zhang (1999, 821-22) states *hukou* registration is classified by two related parts: residential location and social-economic eligibility. The first classification is the *hukou suozaidi* (the place of *hukou* registration), based on a person's presumed regular residence, which is commonly categorized as urban centers (cities or towns, or industrial and mining areas) or rural settlements (villages or state farms). The second classification is the *hukou leibei* (the "status" or type of *hukou* registration), essentially referred to as "agricultural" and "non-agricultural" *hukou* (synonymously, "rural and urban" *hukou*). The latter classification is used to determine a person's entitlements to state-subsidized food grain (called "commodity grain"), occupation, social security and other prerogatives. People with urban *hukou* status can enjoy these entitlements and prerogatives, whereas those with rural *hukou* status cannot. "*Hukou* status conversion (*Nongzhuanfei)*" refers in particular to the change of the type of *hukou* registration from rural (agricultural) to urban (non-agricultural) status, without necessary relation to the place of *hukou* registration. In this paper, *hukou* mobility is equivalent to *hukou* status conversion.

[2] In fact, *hukou* system initially served as a monitoring instead of a control mechanism at the early stage of the People's Republic of China. However, as influxes of peasants into cities escalated, the state began to stop the rural migrants, resulting in the first full-fledged *hukou* legislation in 1958, which granted state agencies great power in migration control through migration permits or recruitment and enrollment certificates (State Council,

and Treiman, 2004, 2007; Zhang and Treiman, 2013). The real power of the *hukou* system in suppressing migration did not come from the system itself but from its integration with other social and economic control systems, such as the commune system in rural areas with the authority to ration food (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Cheng and Selden, 1994), and the *danwei* system in urban areas which provided most social services for their workers (Walder, 1986; Bian, 1994; Wu, 2002).

Since the economic reform, a series of major reforms have taken place in China. The commune system and food rationing were abolished (Wang, 1997; Dong and Fuller, 2006), and the "household responsibility system" was introduced, which greatly improved the efficiency of agricultural production. As a result, increasing numbers of rural residents were freed from the land to seek jobs in the industrial and service sectors in urban areas (Liang, 1999, 2001; Liang and Ma, 2004). To enhance the development of the urban service sector, the government allowed peasants to enter cities and establish small businesses (*getihu)*, (Goldstein, 1990; Yang and Guo, 1996; Wu and Xie, 2003), resulting in a large "floating population" of urban migrants. Thus the function of the *hukou* system in migration control has been considerably weakened.

In the meantime, *hukou* policies have witnessed significant changes by introducing a series of new measures such as the temporary residence certificate, citizen identity card, "self-supplied food grain" *hukou*, "blue-stamp" urban *hukou*, and other reforms in small cities and towns (e.g., Chan and Zhang, 1999). By and large, the purpose of the new policies is to relax the conditions for rural-urban migration and satisfy the rising demand for cheap labor in urban areas by inducing rural migrants to fill the job

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[1958]1986). However, the role of *hukou* system in migration control is hindered by the Great Leap Forward in 1958 but was restored in 1960 in the face of Great Famine (see Cheng and Selden, 1994; Liang and White, 1996 for detail).

vacancies that are unattractive to urban residents (Yang and Guo, 1996; Wang, Zuo and Ruan, 2002).

Although the *hukou* system has been subject to revisions and reforms after 1990s that facilitates rural migrants' entry into urban areas, they are still considered "peasant workers"—second-class citizens without urban *hukou* (Chan, 1994; Solinger, 1999)—and are subject to labor market discrimination and occupational segregation from urban *hukou* residents (e.g., Fan, 2001, 2002; Wang et al., 2002; Yang and Guo, 1996; Yang, 2003; Meng and Zhang, 2001). Moreover, it remains very difficult today for the rural population to convert their *hukou* status to from rural to urban (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Sun and Fan, 2011; Zhang and Treiman, 2013) and rural migrants suffer from discrimination in seeking jobs and securing education for their children.

II. *Hukou* Conversion from Rural to Urban Status

Among the mass of rural migrants, some succeed in obtaining local urban *hukou* status and thus are entitled to a set of social welfare benefits such as health insurance, pension program, and access to local public schools for their children. This process is called *hukou* conversion (*nongzhuanfei*). *Hukou* mobility from rural to urban status is an important path to upward social mobility in China. Ample empirical evidence shows that *hukou* converters become the real elites in the society, even superior to the urban local residents in education, occupation, and earnings (Fan, 2002; Li and Gu, 2011; Wu and Treiman, 2004, 2007; Zhang and Treiman, 2013), suggesting that this is a highly positive selection process.[3] From the inception of the *hukou* system, *hukou* conversion has been very selective, with the conversion rate between 1.5 and 2.0 per

[3] Recent studies have nevertheless differentiated the varying effects of *hukou* conversion on their socioeconomic attainment (Zheng and Wu, 2013; Wei, 2012). Their analyses based on propensity score matching show that the positive income effect of *hukou* conversion is only limited to those highly selective *hukou* converters who are well-educated and/or with high status occupations in the state sector, whereas in the market sector, where efficiency and productivity is emphasized, *hukou* status does not have a significant effect on income improvement.

thousand persons each year, even in the reform era (Lu, 2003:144-46).[4] However, Zhang and Treiman (2013) differentiate between individual *hukou* conversion and collective *hukou* conversion. The individual converters are affected by family or individual characteristics such as education, party membership, and whether the father is employed in a state work unit (Wu and Treiman 2004); the collective hukou converters are determined by administrative fiat and depend on whet her a village is incorporated into an adjacent town or city or is upgraded to a town (Chan 2010), or whether urban residents with local registration but with rural hukou are allowed to convert as the results of a policy decision.

How do rural migrants obtain their urban *hukou* status? What are the pathways they may take to *hukou* conversion? Does the route vary by gender? While plenty of documentary studies have contributed to these questions (Cheng and Selden, 1994; Chan and Zhang, 1999; Wang, 2004, 2005; Chan and Buckingham, 2008), there are nevertheless few empirical studies. Using the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008, Table 1 shows the main *de jure* channels rural migrants may use for *hukou* conversion, the percentage for each of the channels, and the percentages by gender.

[Table 1 About Here]

Before I enter into the interpretation of the results, there are some points that need to be noted. First, the percentages for three types of channels are not shown, because the survey does not collect such information and therefore their percentages are counted in the "others" category. Second, perhaps due to lack of data, the familial-tie (i.e., marriage, parental tie, and adult children tie) channels are not examined by previous studies. In fact, the questionnaire originally only specifies one broad

[4] *Hukou* conversion is regulated by dual control mechanisms—policy (*zhengce*) and quota (*zhibiao*). The former defines the qualifications of people entitled to urban *hukou*, whereas the latter regulates the number of qualified people who will get urban *hukou*. In order to be eligible for *hukou* conversion, a person has to satisfy the conditions set out in the policy control criteria while also obtaining a space under the quota control (Chan and Zhang, 1999, p. 823).

familial-tie channel rather than three distinctive channels. I divide the broad familial-tie category into three types of channels by distinguishing the timing of *hukou* conversion.[5] These familial ties bear many sociological meanings. The parent-child tie is indicative of an ascriptive process by lineage or descent, whereas the marriage tie can be considered as an achieved tie, conceived as partly a form of social exchange between a man and a woman, or even between their respective families. An ascribed tie is largely random, but an achieved tie is socially selective and thus susceptible to strategic motives.

Table 1 shows several key points. First of all, the familial-tie channels are important suggested by their large percentages. Furthermore, marriage and parental tie are the most frequently used among familial-tie users, whereas few people convert their *hukou* status through their familial ties to their adult children. Moreover, the second panel of Table 1 shows the gender difference in the use of the *hukou* conversion channels. Interestingly, it demonstrates a stark contrast between rural men and women in employing the *hukou* conversion channels. Men are more likely to use education, military, SOE job, and cadre channels, whereas women are extremely more likely to use marriage channel. Further, not much gender difference is observed in the use of the parental tie and land expropriation channels. Lastly, it is indeed revealed that rural men and women have nearly the same overall probability of *hukou* conversion.

In summary, Table 1 shows that rural men and women have equal chances of achieving urban *hukou* status, but they use distinct channels. While Table 1 reveals

[5] Three time points are relevant to distinguishing the channels for all those using familial ties: time of *hukou* conversion, first marriage, and retirement. If *hukou* conversion occurs before the first marriage by familial ties, they are classified as by parental tie; if it occurs between the time of first marriage and retirement, they are regarded as by marriage; if it happens after retirement, I will regard them as by adult children tie, because it is explicitly stipulated in the *hukou* policy document that, for rural men over 60 years old and women over 55, if they have no children around to take care of them and need to take refuge in their children's household in urban areas, they can be granted urban *hukou* status of the places where their children reside (see State Council, 1998). The retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women in China in most of the places in China.

substantial information, there are still many questions that are yet to be answered. First, *de jure* channels are conceptually different from predictors. For example, people with higher education may use SOE job or cadre channels other than education. Wu and Treiman (2004) examine the *predictors* rather than the *de jure* channels of *hukou* conversion, and the gender puzzle they find is also based on the analyses of predictors. Therefore, the first question is whether the above gendered pattern observed through channels still holds for predictors.

Second, if it holds, it leads me to infer that the puzzling net female advantage in *hukou* conversion may result from an omitted variable bias, because previous studies merely include the male-dominated predictors (e.g., education, party membership, and military service), but omit marriage, an important channel for rural women. Hence, I will try to solve the gender puzzle by testing this inference, which implies several predictions for empirical testing.

Third, if it is found that the predictors, like *de jure* channels, do vary by gender, do the gender-specific predictors exclusively predict the access to the corresponding gender-specific channels? Are there any predictors that have general predictive power for all types of channels, controlling for other covariates? I attempt to address the above questions by the following data and methods.

III. Data and Methods

I use the CGSS 2008 dataset, a national stratified probability sample of 6,000 adults under the age of 18-98, with a male-female ratio of 48:52. The sample for analysis is restricted to those who have already or can potentially undergo *hukou* conversion, excluding urbanities by birth or those who converted their *hukou* statuses before 1955, when the *hukou* system didn't exist nationally.

Several outstanding features of CGSS 2008 render it capable of addressing the above questions. First, CGSS 2008 collects the information of the *de jure* channels. Second, it asks respondents directly[6] whether he or she had undergone *hukou* conversion and records the exact time of *hukou* conversion as well as other socioeconomic life events, including first marriage. This information is vital, because it allows us to check whether the attainments of these characteristics are prior to *hukou* mobility to avoid the problem of reverse causation. Third, CGSS 2008 is superior for containing spouses' *hukou* status and the time of spouses in achieving *hukou* conversion. The time of spouses' *hukou* mobility enables us to distinguish whether the respondents convert their *hukou* status before or after their spouses do. We will apply the discrete-time hazard-rate model to carry out the analyses. The dataset will be accordingly constructed as person-year structure.

Variables

Dependent variables

There are two sets of analyses and the dependent variables for them are different. While *hukou* conversion is for the first set of analysis, channels of *hukou* conversion are for the second.

***Hukou* conversion:** is whether the respondent experiences rural-to-urban *hukou* conversion (yes=1, no=0). For the event history analysis (EHA), it refers to whether the respondent had experienced *hukou* conversion by the year of risk, which is a time-varying variable.

[6] The dataset adopted in previous studies usually documents the *hukou* status of several time points, such as year of birth, age 12 and current *hukou* status (e.g., Wu and Treiman 2004). Then they use the comparison of *hukou* status between several time points to measure whether the respondents experienced *hukou* conversion. As a result, they do not know the exact time of conversion. They can only impute the timing data by the time information of other life events, such as residential mobility or educational attainment, which is likely to cause inaccuracy and subject findings to the problem of reverse causation.

Channels of *hukou* conversion: the dependent variable for the second set of analysis is *de jure* channels of *hukou* conversion, with no conversion as the reference group. For the purpose of examining the gender divergence and based on the information from Table 1, I classify the channels into male-dominated, female-dominated, gender-neutral, and other channels.[7] The male-dominated channels are mainly educational or occupational channels (education, military, SOE job, and cadre); female-dominated channel is marriage; gender-neutral channels include parental-tie, adult-children tie, and land expropriation channels; and other channels.

Independent variables

The independent variable of primary interest is gender (male=1, female=0), a time-constant variable. Three key predictors examined by previous literature are: military experience (yes=1, no=0), respondent's party membership (party member=1, non-member=0), and respondent's education (junior high school or lower=0, senior high school=1, vocational secondary school=2, vocational college=3, academic college or higher=4). They are all time-varying variables, referring to whether the respondent had military service, party membership, or educational level by the year of risk respectively in EHA. However, as indicated by the *hukou* conversion channels in Table 1, these three predictors are apparently not sufficient. Therefore, I also add two more predictors—state sector job (yes=1, no=0) and cadre (cadre=1, non-cadre=0), two time-varying dummy variables, and they are likely to favor rural men compared to their women counterparts.

In order to assess the role of marriage, I create a variable named "married to urban spouse before *hukou* mobility" (MTUSBHM=1, others =0).[8] The urban spouses are

[7] The channels belong to the "others" category is hard to be incorporated into the first three categories, because it is difficult to judge by observation whether they are male- or female-favorable channels in Table 1. Moreover, the exact channels they represent are also not clear. Therefore, I keep the other channels as one category.
[8] Other categories including both unmarried (8.73%) and married (88.4%) are considered as the reference group.

either born urbanities or convert their *hukou* status before or after their marriage, through education, occupation, parent-child tie, or land expropriation channels. However, two restrictions are set to avoid the problem of reverse causation. One is that the respondents should obtain their *hukou* conversion later than their spouses do; the other is that their marriage should occur before the respondents' *hukou* conversion. This is a time-varying variable in EHA, referring to whether the respondent gets married to an urban spouse by the year of risk, under the above restrictions.

Control variables

I adopt father's socioeconomic characteristics as control variables for two reasons. One is that they are considered as family background, which affects respondents' attainment of other socioeconomic characteristics. The other is that Table 1 shows that parental tie is also an important channel of *hukou* conversion, and *hukou* policies suggest that these fathers are usually of higher socioeconomic status.

Father's education is coded according to four levels of education: junior high school or lower, academic senior high school, vocational secondary school or college, university or higher.

Father's party membership is a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the respondent's father is a party membership.

Father's work unit type, a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the father works in the state sector (i.e., in a governmental agency, state institution, or state enterprise).

Of those married respondents, 82% of them are married to a rural spouse, and 18% are married to an urban spouse. But for these cases, either the respondents have already obtained *hukou* conversion before they got married to an urban spouse or their spouses achieved *hukou* conversion later than the respondents. To avoid the problem of reverse causation, neither of them can be considered as respondents who achieved *hukou* conversion by marriage.

Birth cohort is included as a set of dummy variables (1937-1946, 1947-1956, 1957-1966, 1967-1976 and 1977-1990) to control for birth cohort effect in *hukou* mobility.[9]

These control variables are all time-constant variables. They only vary across individuals but not over time, because we assume that father's socioeconomic characteristics have been achieved before we start the timer—at age 14[10] of the respondents—in EHA.[11] In addition, the three sets of analyses share the above independent variables as predictors.

Statistical models

Discrete-time binary logit model

Discrete-time logit model is applied to analyze the respondents' *hukou* conversion (Allison, 1982, 1984; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002). The discrete-time hazard function P_{it} is the conditional probability that the respondents' *hukou* conversion occurs prior to time t. The dependence of P_{it} on the explanatory variables is assumed to follow a logit model,

[9] The classification of birth cohorts in CGSS 2008 basically follows the pattern of Wu and Treiman (2004), in which the birth cohort was divided into five categories by a decade: 1927-1936, 1937-1946, 1947-1956, 1957-1966 and 1967-1976, with its data collected in 1996. The birth year in CGSS 2008 actually begins in 1923, but individuals born between 1923 and 1936 (56 cases) are dropped from the analysis for two reasons. First, these subjects are elderly (72-85) and the group suffers a lot of mortality, so it is not appropriate to represent a birth cohort. Second, these individuals became adults before 1955 (ages 19 to 32), the year when the *hukou* system was established.

[10] Since about 1.1 percent of respondents (4.9% of all converters) convert their *hukou* status before age 14 usually with their parents, I restrict their timing of *hukou* conversion to the time of entry into the observation (i.e., age 14). Sensitivity analyses show that the model results are essentially the same given I omit these cases or include them with the above restrictions. To maximize the sample size, I keep these cases.

[11] In fact, Wu and Treiman (2004) also control for the effects of period and age. I do not control for these effects here for several reasons. One is multicollinearity. I have found a substantial multicollinearity among birth cohorts, period and age effects (VIF>8). Further, the effect of birth cohort may not be clearly distinguished from the period effect, given the concentration of time of marriage and obtaining other socioeconomic characteristics among Chinese people. In addition, due to the problem of oversampling, the substantive meaning of birth cohort, period or age effect should be treated with caution. Therefore, they are only considered as control variables here; we will not pay much attention to their substantive meaning.

$$\log\left[\frac{P_{it}}{1-P_{it}}\right] = \alpha + \beta_1 Male\text{-}_i + \beta_2 Military_{it} + \beta_3 Party_{it} + \beta_4 Education_{it}$$

$$+ \beta_5 StateSec_{it} + \beta_6 Cadre_{it} + \beta_7 MTUSBHM_{it} + \beta \mathrm{X}_i \text{---}$$

where α is a constant intercept. Education is not one variable, but a vector of five educational levels, which will be translated into four dummy variables with the first category as the reference group. The predictors with subscripts *it* indicate that these variables vary both by individuals and over time. Moreover, $\mathrm{X_i}$ refers to a vector of control variables that vary over individuals but not over time; they are father's socioeconomic characteristics and birth cohorts, with β as a vector of parameters for $\mathrm{X_i}$ to be estimated.

One of the advantages of applying event history models is to avoid the problem of reverse causation. For example, some rural women may get urban *hukou* status by higher education before marriage and then get married to urban husbands; such cases will be automatically right-censored in this model. Further, this model does not include the interaction effect, but the last extended model will include it between the predictors and gender. In addition, standard errors are adjusted for clustering of observations within respondents.

Competing-risk discrete-time hazard-rate model

For the second set of analysis that attempts to examine the main predictors of the access to the *de jure* channels, I adopt the competing-risk discrete-time hazard-rate model (see Allison 1997:42; Zhang and Treiman 2013: 77). This model examines not the *hukou* conversion per se, but conversion through which types of channels. The form of this model resembles the multinomial logistic regression, but is situated in the person-year data structure. This model assumes that each of the channels is available for choice, that is, all of them are at risk for selection during the period.

$$\log\left[\frac{P_{it}}{P_b}\right] = \alpha + \beta_1 Male\text{-}_i + \beta_2 Military_{it} + \beta_3 Party_{it} + \beta_4 Education_{it}$$

$$+ \beta_5 StateSec_{it} + \beta_6 Cadre_{it} + \beta_7 MTUSBHM_{it}\text{---}, i = 1,2,3\ and\ 4$$

The definitions of the predictors are essentially the same as those in the previous binary logit model. I therefore will not repeat them again. The only key difference is that the dependent variable changes, with P_b the probability of baseline for no conversion and P_{it} the probability for the four types of channels respectively.[12]

IV. Results

Descriptive analysis of the variables

[Table 2 About Here]

Table 2 shows the weighted percent distribution of the variables. The percentages are drawn from cross-sectional rather than person-year data. For the independent variables that are time varying in EHA, the percentages are all restricted prior to their *hukou* conversion to avoid the problem of reverse causation.

Moreover, Table 2 also shows the distributions of the variables by gender. First, consistent with the finding of Wu and Treiman (2004:376), the probability of *hukou* conversion for rural men is as likely as that for rural women at the zero-order level. Second, the gender difference in percentage for the independent variables reveals a gendered pattern. Rural men have an obvious advantage in education, party membership, military service, and state sector jobs, whereas female migrants are more

[12] An alternative modeling for the competing-risk discrete-time hazard-rate model is to model each of channels separately by defining a type-specific hazard-rate model, such as logit model (Allison 1997: 31). The key difference is that multinomial logit model puts all of the channels together cross-board, assuming all of them at risk at the same time period. But type-specific hazard-rate model is able to account for the variant duration effect for different channels, relaxing the above assumption, for different predictors may enter into risk set at different time periods for idiosyncratic individuals, even for the same individual. For example, some channel usually happen at the early stage of lifetime, like familial ties, whereas others occur at the middle or later stage of lifetime, like marriage, cadre. However, sensitivity analyses show that the results from multinomial logit model are qualitatively the same as from the type-specific hazard-rate model. For ease of application and interpretation, I decide to apply the multinomial logit model here.

likely to get married to urban spouses. Nevertheless, we do not know whether such results still hold under statistical control in EHA. They will be tested in Table 3.

Solve the puzzle of net female advantage in hukou conversion

[Table 3 About Here]

Consistent with previous findings and the preceding descriptive analysis, Model 1 shows that there is no significant overall gender difference in the probability of *hukou* conversion. While control variables are included in Model 2, the gender effect changes slightly and remains insignificant, suggesting that father's socioeconomic characteristics and birth cohorts do not have a crucial impact on gender difference in *hukou* conversion.

However, while we control for male-dominated predictors in Model 3, it is shown that rural men are significantly less likely to obtain urban *hukou* status than rural women, in accordance with previous findings (Wu and Treiman 2004:376; Goldstein, Liang, and Goldstein 2000:225; Zhang and Treiman 2013:77). Moreover, consistent with previous findings, both education and military service have significant positive effects on *hukou* conversion. Not surprisingly, the state sector job significantly enhances the likelihood of obtaining urban *hukou* status. However, the negative effect of party membership and cadre position, though not significant, might seem surprising. My previous study found that the negative rather than positive effect is mainly because we have tackled the problem of reverse causation with accurate data and appropriate methods (Xiang and Tam, 2013).[13] After dealing with the problem of

[13] Although Wu and Treiman (2004) also applied the discrete-time hazard rate model to deal with the potential problem of reverse causation, they nevertheless imputed the time of *hukou* conversion by other life events, such as residential mobility or educational attainment. However, such imputation is likely to cause inaccuracy. For example, they use the year when successful converters moved to their current place of residence as the year of *hukou* conversion; nevertheless, if people changed their locale more than once, they may have converted their *hukou* status before they moved to the current place. Thus, the dates of *hukou* conversion may be recorded as later than they actually were. Combined with the fact that respondents obtained their party membership after their real time of *hukou* conversion but before their current imputed time of *hukou* conversion, results will observe the positive effect of party membership on *hukou* conversion but overestimate the effect due to reverse causation. Therefore, the seemingly positive effect of party membership is likely to be positively biased by reverse causation.

reverse causation appropriately, we instead find that party membership and cadre positions in rural areas, which often associate with key resources, undermine the occupants' incentives for *hukou* mobility. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, I will not go into detail about it.

Based on the findings that the predictors also vary by gender in Table 2, I argue that the net female advantage in *hukou* conversion may result from an omitted variable bias, omitting a female-dominated predictor—marriage. I predict that if we merely include marriage, the gender effect will be conversely subject to an omitted positive bias; that is, men is expected to have a net advantage than women in *hukou* conversion. Furthermore, when both male- and female-dominated predictors are included, the gender effect tends to decline and perhaps is equal to zero. The Model 4 and 5 are intended to test these two predictions.

In support of our expectation, Model 4 indeed shows that rural men are significantly more likely to achieve *hukou* conversion than rural women, while only including the variable of marriage to an urban spouse, the female-dominated predictor. Specifically, the odds of achieving *hukou* conversion are more than 11 times (11.22=exp(2.418)) as high for those married to an urban spouse as for those in other types of martial situations. Further, when male- and female-dominated predictors are both included in Model 5, it shows that the gender difference decline sharply till insignificance, which supports my prediction. I think it is because these predictors simultaneously explain rural men and women's pathways of *hukou* conversion and their effects offset each other.

In summary, Table 3 suggests that the gendered pattern in *hukou* conversion channels holds for the predictors of *hukou* conversion. Moreover, it has been proved that the puzzling net female advantage in previous studies is due to an omitted

variable bias, that is, omitting a female favorable predictor—marriage. The subsequent analyses will examine the relationship between the predictors and *de jure* channels? Do they correspond to each other by gender? Are there any predictors that have general predictive power for both genders?

Predictors of de jure channels from competing-risk hazard-rate model

[Table 4 About Here]

This set of analyses applies the competing-risk discrete-time hazard-rate model with channels of *hukou* conversion as the dependent variable. Apart from gender and the control variables, Model 1 only includes education, because it is likely to be obtained before the other socioeconomic characteristics. Consistent with the results in above analyses, Model 1 shows that rural men are significantly more likely to use the educational and occupational channels, whereas women tend to use marriage channel. The higher the respondents' education is, the more likely they can get access to educational and occupational channels. The odds of getting access to educational or occupational channels are more than 10 times (10.58=exp(2.359)) as high for those attaining university or higher education as for those with junior high or lower education. And no significant gender difference is found in employing the land expropriation or other channels.[14] Moreover, education has general predictive power for almost all kinds of the channels, except for marriage and land expropriation channels. However, senior high school and vocational secondary school have significant positive effect on these two types of channels. I conjecture that, for one thing, those highly educated (i.e., with tertiary education) have better alternative channels—educational or occupational channels, and hence they do not have to resort

[14] As noted in the "variables" section, the third category of channels is originally designed as gender-neutral channels, including parental tie, adult-children tie (only 0.1 percent of the sample), and land expropriation channels. However, as land expropriation has revealed interesting story, I keep it alone as the third category and combine the parental tie and adult children tie channels with the fourth category, the "others" category. Moreover, sensitivity analysis shows that the results are not sensitive to this regrouping.

to marriage or land expropriation. For another, those resorting to marriage or land expropriation channels are probably the ones who have no better choices available and regard marriage as a pathway to upward social mobility (Fan and Huang 1998; Fan and Li 2002). In addition, it also indicates that not all of those rural migrants can get access to marriage and land expropriation by getting married to urban spouse, but only those with relatively higher education among rural migrants.

Model 2 includes the male-dominated predictors. It shows that the gender (men=1) effect has declined and becomes insignificant, because military service and state sector job account for men's advantage of the access to educational or occupational channels. However, cadre position and party membership undermines the likelihood of employing educational or occupational channels, which is consistent with the preceding analysis. Further, it is found that state sector job has general predictive power for all types of channels, except for the channel of land expropriation. With respect to marriage channel, Model 2 shows that none of the predictors have significant effects except state sector and senior high school education. Compared to Model 1, it suggests that state sector job is likely to mediate a certain amount of the effects of education.

Model 3 further incorporates the variable of marriage to an urban spouse (MTUSBHM). It is shown that this is also a key variable with general predictive power for nearly all types of channels except educational or occupational channels. Nevertheless, it cannot fully explain the male's net negative effect on marriage channel, only raising it a little bit. I suppose it is because the omission of the marriage predictor induces a negative bias on the gender effect on the access to marriage channel. However, the effects of both education and state sector have a substantial decline, probably due to the mediation effects of marriage. In other words, the

migrants with relatively higher education or employed in state sector are more likely to get married to urban spouses, thus getting access to the marriage channel.

Interestingly, those married to urban spouses are extremely (48.42=exp(3.880)) more likely to take the land expropriation channel than those with other types of marital situations. Why do rural migrants get access to land expropriation channel by marrying urban spouses? Alternatively, why do a large number of migrants married to urban spouses employ land expropriation channel instead of marriage?

This is an interesting and, in fact, common phenomenon during China's massive urbanization process. With the rapid pace of urbanization, a large amount of agricultural land has been appropriated by local governments to expand the city (Chan 2010). As compensation, the local governments usually offer new apartments and urban *hukou* status to the peasants who lose the land. Moreover, these farmers are usually near the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy in their local community, because those who are competent have usually migrated to cities for better lives. These rural lower class men are usually difficult to marry local urban women due to the consumerism culture after the economic reform and the tradition of status hypergamy in China (e.g., Yu and Xie 2013; Mu and Xie 2014). However, while lower status urban men are not valued in urban marriage market, their urban status and location give them an advantage in marrying rural female migrants (Fan and Huang 1998; Fan and Li 2002). [15] In fact, this cross-border marriage market differs from the urban marriage market, but essentially resembles the international marriage market, in which such marriages occur in structurally and institutionally unequal contexts. International marriage migration is a prevalent pathway in upward social

[15] One policy change on *hukou* conversion conducive to the marriage between urban men and rural migrant women is that parents can choose either their father or mother's *hukou* status for their babies after 1998, whereas new born babies before 1998 were only permitted to inherit the *hukou* status of their mothers, which undermined the incentive for the cross-border marriage to some extent (State Council, 1998; Wang, 2005: 95).

mobility, and this process is highly gendered, usually with women from poor countries marrying men in rich countries, but the socioeconomic status of these men is relatively low in their own local societies (Constable 2011; Gaetano and Jacka 2004; Palriwala and Uberoi 2008; Williams 2010). Similarly, men in urban China who marry rural migrant women are typically older and poorer, and some are even mentally or physically handicapped (Ma et al. 1995; Xu and Ye 1992).

I would like to address that how rural women manage to marry so many urban or rural men in better locations (i.e., east coast villages or towns adjacent to large cities). How do they achieve *hukou* conversion? Do all the people married to urban spouse convert their *hukou* status and also exclusively by marriage channel? Is there status exchange involved in the marriage process? The above regression models show that marriage to urban spouses does not automatically lead to the access to the marriage channel. It has relatively equal chances to the access to both marriage and land expropriation channels. Therefore, there are likely to be several different underlying social processes, on which I attempt to elaborate by the following descriptive analysis.

V. Different Situations in Marriage Process

To investigate the specific marriage process, I select all of the respondents who get married to urban spouse before *hukou* mobility (MTUSBHM). As defined in the above variables section, this variable has two restrictions: one is that the respondents should obtain their *hukou* conversion later than their spouses do; the other is that their marriage should occur before the respondents' *hukou* conversion.

[Table 5 About Here]

First, the panel A of Table 5 shows that 28% ((601-433)/601) of those MTUSBHM, in fact, do not achieve *hukou* conversion. Second, consistent with the regression model results, among those who did achieve *hukou* conversion, not all of them (only 27.7%) use marriage channel and extremely more of them are rural women. Intriguingly, it shows that the largest proportion of the channels is land expropriation, and more rural men adopt this channel. Additionally, other channels take up a modestly large proportion.

I conjecture that status exchange may exist during the marriage process but there are possibly different types of martial exchanges in terms of the items to be exchanged, thus resulting in the use of different types of *de jure* channels. In order to distinguish different mechanisms for status exchange, I divide those MTUSBHM into three groups—spouses are born urban, spouses experience *hukou* conversion before marriage, and spouses experience *hukou* conversion after marriage. I combine the first two together, because both of the two situations indicate that spouses have urban *hukou* before marriage, and accordingly I infer that the two parties have marital exchange on urban *hukou* status. The third situation is classified as the second type of status exchange, because in this situation I assume that they do not exchange on *hukou* status but may exchange on the spouses' better location.[16]

Panel B shows the distribution of channels by gender for the first type of status exchange. First, among those whose spouses have urban *hukou* status before marriage, women are extremely more likely to have *hukou* conversion (86%=198/231*100%) and half of them use marriage channel. Their husbands are either born urban with relatively better education and occupations, or those competent men who can migrate to urban areas and convert their *hukou* by establishing small

[16] The first type of marital exchange, of course, also implies that the spouses with urban *hukou* should live in urban areas, a better location. However, the second type cannot base their exchange on *hukou* status, because the spouses do not have it available. Hence, the classification here just tries to make a distinction, though it is not sharp.

business, investment or purchasing houses. In this case, these women are likely to exchange with these men on their abilities or better socioeconomic status. By contrast, not only with smaller absolute cases, rural men also have lower percentage (22%) in using marital relations to convert *hukou* status.

Furthermore, panel C examines the respondents whose spouses obtain urban *hukou* status after marriage. Contrary to the results of panel B, panel C shows that, firstly, men and women have equal overall probability of conversion. Secondly, half of the respondents use land expropriation channel rather than marriage and there are no large gender difference in using this channel. During the rapid urbanization process of China, when cities grow and expand, the rural residents are often given urban *hukou* status as compensation. More interestingly, I further find that 99% of those who use the "land expropriation" channel convert their *hukou* status with their spouses at the same time. However, it is equally possible that rural migrants or local rural women get married to these rural men living adjacent to a city or town. If the majority of them are rural migrants, we may claim that they have a certain exchange on their husbands' better residential locations. Alternatively, if the majority of them are local rural residents born with local *hukou*, then we may not be able to claim that there is any marital status exchange though. The evidence nevertheless supports the second supposition. It is observed that, among the cases of Panel C, 64% of women and 88% of men who use land expropriation for *hukou* conversion are actually born in the place where they convert their *hukou* status. Therefore, they do not actually have exchange with their spouses on residential location. This results echo the findings of Zhang and Treiman (2013:80) that 94% of the mixed population (those with rural *hukou* and urban residence in childhood) are actually born in urban areas and 86%

had local *hukou*. In other words, the valuable resources of better access to the *hukou* conversion opportunities are only confined to the local residents.

The part of analysis explicates the specific social process in the marriage process during the urbanization in China, which shows signs of status exchange in the marriage process. Those who get married to spouses with urban *hukou* before marriage are more likely to convert their *hukou* status by marriage, and the majority of them are female. By contrast, those whose spouses obtain *hukou* status after marriage are more likely to convert their *hukou* status by land expropriation. However, further analysis shows that the latter cases are predominantly the local rural residents, with less sign of status exchange.

VI. Conclusion and Discussions

What has happened to the gender inequality in China's rapid economic development and urbanization process? Does it become more equal or unequal? Regarding this question, this paper specifically examines the gender difference in *hukou* mobility among the rural-urban migrants. Previous studies observe that rural men and women have equal overall probability of *hukou* conversion; but accounting for education, occupational status and other demographic characteristics, their analysis surprisingly shows that rural men are less likely to achieve *hukou* conversion than rural women. These analyses are based on the examination of the predictors of *hukou* conversion. I conceptually distinguish the *de jure* channels and predictors of *hukou* conversion. Descriptive analysis of the *de jure* channels of *hukou* conversion exhibits gendered pathways of *hukou* conversion. While rural men and women have equal chances of achieving urban *hukou* status, men are more likely to use education, military, SOE job and cadre channels, whereas women are extremely more likely to

use marriage channels. This result inspires me to infer that the puzzling net female advantage in *hukou* conversion may result from an omitted variable bias, only including male-dominated predictors but omitting marriage. In other words, whether the gender divergence pattern in channels holds for the predictors? This hypothesis is confirmed by empirical evidence and thus the puzzle is solved.

Furthermore, I examine the predictors of the access to the *de jure* channels. I find that education, state sector job, and marriage to urban spouses are predictors that have general predictive power for various types of channels, usually cross-boarding the male and female dominated channels. Then I try to examine whether all of those married to urban spouses use the marriage channel? Is there any status exchange? Results nevertheless show that not all of those MTUSBHM succeed in *hukou* conversion. I further distinguish two situations, because they have different implications for the status exchange in the marriage process; one is that spouses are born urban or convert their *hukou* status before marriage; the other is spouses obtain urban *hukou* after marriage. Descriptive results show that only in the former situation women are more likely to get access to the marriage channel, with signs of status exchange, whereas the second is dominated by the use of channel of land expropriation. In the latter situation, in fact, the majority of those who use land expropriation for *hukou* conversion are actually born in the place where they convert their *hukou* status. Therefore, there is likely no obvious sign of status exchange.

The above results surprisingly show that rural men and women have equal chances of *hukou* conversion in China's urbanization process, but they employ distinctive pathways. These results are confirmed by the analyses of both the *de jure* channels and predictors. Men are more likely to use the educational or occupational

channels, whereas marriage to urban spouse help rural migrants get access to marriage channels or rural local women convert their *hukou* status through land expropriation.

The findings echo some of the previous findings on marriage migration in China (Fan and Huang 1998; Fan and Li 2002), which emphasize the rural female migrants' agency in achieving upward social mobility. Confronted with the unequal and discriminative socio-cultural (e.g., patriarchy), and socio-structural environments, rural women may have few upward mobility pathways unless resorting to marriage. This may resemble much literature in the interventional female marriage migration, in which women usually resort to marriage as a way of upward mobility. Through examining the *hukou* mobility process among the rural migrants, this study provides a new perspective and evidence for addressing the gender inequality in the rapid urbanization process in state communist China.

Table 1. Percentage of *De jure* Channels of *Hukou* Conversion, by Gender (Weighted)[a]

Channels	Description	Percentage	Gender	
			Male	Female
Education	Enrollment in institutes of higher education	18.7	17.9	12.1
Military	Military demobilization	4.2	8.4	0.1
SOE Job	Recruitment by state-owned enterprises (SOE)	18.6	23.0	11.9
Cadre	Promotion to administrative posts	3.4	7.3	2.0
Marriage	Use spousal-tie based channel	16.5	2.6	25.0
Parental tie	Conversion with their parents	9.7	8.4	10.3
Adult children tie	Conversion with their adult children	0.4	0	0.9
Land expropriation	Land expropriation by the government	12.5	18.1	18.7
Investment[b]	Making investment in urban areas	/	/	/
Real estate purchase	Purchasing real estate in urban areas	/	/	/
Professional skills	Professions demanded by the government	/	/	/
Others	A number of other channels	15.9	14.5	19.0
Total (unweighted)		1164	548 (31.1%)[c]	616 (31.0%)

Source: Chan and Zhang, 1999; Wang, 2004; Chan and Buckingham, 2008.

Note: a. The percentage is calculated based on the Chinese General Social Survey 2008 dataset. The sample includes 3750 respondents in total.

b. The three channels are not shown with percentages, because the survey does not specify these channels in the questionnaire. Hence, their percentages are included in the "others" category. These channels, in fact, emerge as channels of *hukou* conversion starting from the 1980s and 1990s.

c. The percentages in parentheses specifically represent the percentage of *hukou* converters out of the all respondents rather than all *hukou* converters by gender.

Table 2. Weighted Percent Distributions of Variables, Chinese Adults Ages 18-71 from CGSS 2008

Variables	Percentage	Male	Female
***Hukou* Conversion**	21.6	21.2	21.9
Education			
Junior high school or lower	83.2	79.8	86.3
Senior high school	8.2	9.7	6.9
Vocational secondary school	5.1	6.0	4.2
Vocational college	2.2	2.9	1.6
Academic college or higher	1.3	1.6	0.9
Party member	5.8	9.7	2.1
Military service	2.1	4.3	0
Employment in state sector	10.8	14.4	7.5
Cadre position	3.6	4.7	2.5
Marriage			
MTUSBHM	12.8	8.2	17.2
Others	87.2	91.8	82.8
Father party member	9.9	10.0	9.7
Father in state work unit	9.8	9.4	10.1
Birth cohort			
1937-1946	11.4	14.6	8.5
1947-1956	20.4	21.3	19.6
1957-1966	24.3	24.1	24.5
1967-1976	24.4	22.0	26.6
1977-1990	19.5	18.1	20.7
		100%	100%
N	3750	48.3	51.7

Source: Chinese General Social Survey 2008

Table 3. Coefficients for Discrete-time Hazard-Rate Models for Predicting *Hukou* Conversion

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Gender (Male=1)	-0.077	-0.018	-0.361***	0.262**	-0.111
	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.098)
Education[a]					
Senior high school			1.127***		0.831***
			(0.115)		(0.126)
Vocational secondary school			1.713***		1.399***
			(0.156)		(0.193)
Vocational college			1.499***		1.431***
			(0.199)		(0.219)
University or higher			1.641***		1.827***
			(0.269)		(0.365)
Party membership			-0.533*		-0.753**
			(0.238)		(0.267)
Military service			1.310***		1.193***
			(0.290)		(0.356)
State sector			1.481***		1.265***
			(0.125)		(0.141)
Cadre position			-0.436		-0.423
			(0.276)		(0.272)
Marriage (Ref: Others**)**					
MTUSBHM[b]				2.418***	2.038***
				(0.095)	(0.120)
Father's education[e]					
Senior high school		0.305	0.109	0.362	0.362
		(0.193)	(0.201)	(0.215)	(0.215)
Voc. sec. school or college		0.635*	0.477	0.591	0.591
		(0.315)	(0.332)	(0.330)	(0.330)
University or higher		0.842**	0.509	0.761*	0.761*
		(0.265)	(0.313)	(0.336)	(0.336)
Father as party member		0.275*	0.110	0.305*	0.305*
		(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Father in state work unit		0.971***	0.742***	0.680***	0.680***
		(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Birth cohort (Ref: 1937-1946)					
1947-1956		-0.572***	-0.609***	-0.282	-0.282
		(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.160)
1957-1966		-0.449**	-0.749***	-0.125	-0.125
		(0.157)	(0.165)	(0.155)	(0.155)
1967-1976		0.114	-0.271	0.610***	0.610***
		(0.149)	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.157)
1977-1990		0.557***	-0.013	1.205***	1.205***
		(0.165)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.184)
Constant	-4.787***	-4.853***	-4.906***	-5.821***	-5.821***
	(0.062)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.150)	(0.150)
Number of Observations	84109	84109	84109	84109	84109
Pseudo R^2	0.000	0.035	0.120	0.118	0.177
-2 Log Likelihood	10425	10064	9178	9191	8580

Source: Chinese General Social Survey 2008

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters within individual respondents are reported in parentheses.

a. Junior high school or lower omitted.

b. MTUSBHM is shorthand for "married to urban spouse before *hukou* mobility"; other categories include both unmarried and married other than the aforementioned situation.

c. Junior high school or lower omitted.

Table 4. Coefficients for Competing-risk Discrete-time Hazard-rate Model for Predicting the Access to the *De jure* Channels of *Hukou* Conversion

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	Edu/Occ	**Marri**	**Land**	**Others**	**Edu/Occ**	**Marri**	**Land**	**Others**	**Edu/Occ**	**Marri**	**Land**	**Others**
Gender (Male=1)	0.339*	-2.502***	-0.270	-0.293	0.219	-2.691***	-0.238	-0.342*	0.218	-2.114***	0.389	-0.074
	(0.147)	(0.295)	(0.228)	(0.166)	(0.162)	(0.323)	(0.223)	(0.169)	(0.162)	(0.334)	(0.201)	(0.167)
Education[a]												
Sen. high sch.	1.702***	1.538***	1.182***	0.492*	1.602***	1.391***	1.168***	0.395	1.609***	0.759*	0.623**	0.064
	(0.163)	(0.242)	(0.252)	(0.223)	(0.178)	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.232)	(0.180)	(0.308)	(0.237)	(0.257)
Voc. sec. sch.	2.461***	1.115**	1.165**	1.072**	2.422***	0.868	1.109*	0.974**	2.418***	0.219	0.085	0.637
	(0.210)	(0.426)	(0.438)	(0.350)	(0.211)	(0.458)	(0.444)	(0.353)	(0.214)	(0.451)	(0.268)	(0.385)
Voc. college	1.938***	0.370	-0.780	0.992**	2.123***	0.269	-0.604	1.107***	2.131***	-0.546	-0.828	0.980**
	(0.246)	(0.554)	(0.760)	(0.334)	(0.261)	(0.575)	(0.755)	(0.333)	(0.263)	(0.633)	(0.787)	(0.345)
Univ./higher	2.359***	0.271	-0.750	1.254**	2.151***	0.060	-0.758	1.140*	2.164***	0.304	-0.272	1.212*
	(0.313)	(1.000)	(1.054)	(0.446)	(0.344)	(0.982)	(1.061)	(0.457)	(0.344)	(0.969)	(1.153)	(0.580)
Military service					2.166***	1.389	-14.185***	0.359	2.164***	0.894	-13.470***	0.072
					(0.352)	(0.749)	(0.348)	(0.500)	(0.352)	(0.845)	(0.446)	(0.380)
State sector					1.988***	1.317***	0.566	1.255***	1.990***	0.865**	0.135	0.938***
					(0.182)	(0.310)	(0.407)	(0.225)	(0.184)	(0.307)	(0.372)	(0.252)
Cadre position					-0.710	0.251	-0.056	-0.918	-0.705	0.887*	-0.094	-0.893
					(0.386)	(0.495)	(0.520)	(0.551)	(0.384)	(0.407)	(0.443)	(0.549)
Party membership					-0.706*	0.017	-1.207	-0.263	-0.691*	-0.254	-1.351	-0.415
					(0.304)	(0.497)	(1.026)	(0.573)	(0.303)	(0.541)	(0.944)	(0.588)
MTUSBHM[b]									-0.081	3.812***	3.880***	2.202***
									(0.249)	(0.312)	(0.240)	(0.238)
Father's education[c]												
	0.093	-0.147	-0.196	0.255	0.240	-0.139	-0.198	0.268	0.232	-0.011	-0.149	0.346
	(0.283)	(0.506)	(0.577)	(0.397)	(0.282)	(0.503)	(0.575)	(0.368)	(0.284)	(0.551)	(0.626)	(0.411)
	0.342	0.988	0.202	0.149	0.446	1.255	0.191	0.251	0.437	1.422*	0.340	0.290
	(0.490)	(0.768)	(0.847)	(0.472)	(0.532)	(0.777)	(0.843)	(0.471)	(0.531)	(0.650)	(0.660)	(0.523)
	-0.091	1.006	0.335	0.545	0.217	1.069	0.314	0.623	0.205	0.845	0.233	0.564
	(0.572)	(0.539)	(0.909)	(0.424)	(0.614)	(0.594)	(0.917)	(0.421)	(0.615)	(0.862)	(0.716)	(0.486)
Father party member	0.232	-0.060	0.016	0.030	0.201	-0.023	0.044	0.037	0.187	0.021	0.009	0.188
	(0.208)	(0.312)	(0.408)	(0.214)	(0.225)	(0.324)	(0.406)	(0.206)	(0.226)	(0.369)	(0.347)	(0.213)
Father in state sector	1.020***	0.936**	0.258	1.183***	0.782***	0.763*	0.229	1.089***	0.797***	0.355	-0.189	0.808***
	(0.217)	(0.313)	(0.505)	(0.218)	(0.224)	(0.343)	(0.513)	(0.207)	(0.224)	(0.323)	(0.452)	(0.210)
Birth Cohort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-6.200***	-5.811***	-6.188***	-6.790***	-6.403***	-5.869***	-6.158***	-6.834***	-6.391***	-8.059***	-8.278***	-7.689***
	(0.230)	(0.268)	(0.302)	(0.284)	(0.237)	(0.280)	(0.307)	(0.270)	(0.238)	(0.492)	(0.344)	(0.299)
N	83901				83901				83901			
Pseudo R^2	0.105				0.132				0.210			
-2 Log Likelihood	11432				11085				10091			

Source: Chinese General Social Survey 2008

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters within individual respondents are reported in parentheses.

a. Junior high school or lower omitted.

b. MTUSBHM is shorthand for "marriage to urban spouse before *hukou* mobility"; other categories include both unmarried and married other than the aforementioned situation.

c. Junior high school or lower.

Table 5. Distinction of Channels by Gender among those Married to Urban Spouse Before *Hukou* Mobility (Weighted)

Channels[a]	A. Married to urban spouse before *hukou mobility* (601)			B. Spouse with urban *hukou before* marriage (361)			C. Spouse with urban *hukou after* marriage (240)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Education	0%	1.7%	1.1%	0%	1.9%	1.6%	0%	1.3%	0.6%
Military	2.9	0.2	1.2	12.7	0	1.8	0.5	0.6	0.6
SOE Job	9.5	6.3	7.4	29.3	8.7	11.7	4.6	2.6	3.6
Cadre	9.8	2.3	4.8	11.4	3.8	4.9	9.4	0	4.8
Marriage	**7.2**	**38.3**	**27.7**	**21.9**	**49.9**	**45.8**	**3.7**	**20.4**	**11.7**
Adult children tie	0	1.4	0.9	0	0.3	0.2	0	3.0	1.5
Land Expropriation	**46.6**	**25.2**	**32.5**	**9.1**	**14.1**	**13.4**	**55.8**	**42.6**	**49.4**[b]
Others	**24.0**	**24.6**	**24.4**	**15.7**	**21.4**	**20.6**	**26.1**	**29.6**	**27.8**
Total	100% (148)	100% (285)	100% (433)	100% (33)	100% (198)	100% (231)	100% (104)	100% (98)	100% (202)

Note: a. As there is no one among those married to urban spouses use parental tie channel, I therefore omit this channel in the table.
b. 99 percent of the respondents, who use the channel of "land expropriation" and whose spouses obtain their urban *hukou* after marriage, convert their *hukou* status with their spouse at the same time. However, it is further observed that, among them, 64% of women and 88% of men are actually born in the place where they convert their *hukou* status by land expropriation.

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